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CHAPTER I. 
Thought Processes in General in relation to the 
Consciousness of a Problem. 
Synopsis,. 
All mental processes motivated by the consciousness of a 
problem. -A problem is implicit in every situation 
failing to satisfy with completeness in relation to a 
given end or purpose. - Consciousness of a problem in 
relation to (a) Cognitive (b) Conative thought processes. -
Reflective thought as motivated by the consciousness of a 
problem. - Clearest case of thought process motivated 
and directed throughout by consciousness of problem 
found in intelligent activity of mind. 
Mental experience is a unity, and mental 
process is a series of continuous inter-related events. 
Most attemptsto analyse and classify mental processes 
have necessarily resulted in either (a) the analysis 
and classification of the contents of mental processes, 
or, (b) the abstraction and classification of aspects 
of mental processes. 
If, however, concern is neither vnth the 
classification of the contents of mental processes, 
nor with the classification of aspects of mental process, 
but with the question of how mental processes are 
motivated and by what factors they are directed, - from 
such a consideration might result a different classific: 
ation of mental processes, and a different emphasis on 
the facts of mental experienceo 
If mental processes are examined without 
regard to the bases on which existing classifications 
are made, it is apparent that all mental processes other 
than some routine activities such as habit, are 
motivated by the consciousness of problemso Under this 
may be included such biological processes as may be 
presumed to be directed by, or accompanied by, conscious 
processes. 
The major part of the normal thought processes 
of normal individuals is occupied with problems of 
business or profession and with the problems of personal 
material existence; and the sphere of the problems which 
are dealt with widens to include, to a greater or less 
degree, preoccupation with the problems economic, social 
or/ 
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or political, of the country and time. It will be 
admitted that preoccupation with problems of this 
nature must imply the conscious direction and motivation 
of thought processes by the consciousness of problems 
but it may be argued that large areas of mental 
experience, perceptual, affective and conative 
experience, the facts of memory, of reverie, and of 
imagination, have yet to be accounted for. Such 
mental processes as come under these heads seem far 
removed in nature from the mental processes occupied 
with the solution of problems of the kind which has been 
indicated. At first sight it seems that such processes 
could not be described as motivated by the consciousness 
of a problem. 
This fact is to be attributed to the absence 
of a clear definition of the concept of a problem. \qbat 
is implied by the consciousness of a problem has not yet 
been adequately analysed from a psychological point of 
view. If the accidental characteristics of specific 
problems are abstracted, there remains a certain 
essential fact which characterises every consciousness 
of a problem situation. It may be expressed by saying 
that a problem is implicit in every (apprehended) 
situation which fails to satisfy with completeness 
in relation to a given purpose. Further, since 
incompleteness can only exist in relation to a given 
purpose, we may leave aside at the moment the factor of 
purpose, and provisionally define a problem situation 
as, a situation characterised by incompleteness. 
With such a concept of what is implied by the 
consciousness of a problem in view, it will be possible 
to show briefly in what sense it may be said that mental 
processes other than those which are generally recognised 
to be motivated and directed by the consciousness of a 
problem yet originate in a consciousness which is 
similar in its essentials to the consciousness of a 
problem. 
(a) Consciousness of Problems in relation to Cognitive 
Processes. 
It may be taken as the necessary pre-condition 
of cognition that an object is related to a subject, 
or, in other words, that the thinking or perceiving of 
anything, means that an object is present to consciousness. 
It is clear, further, that the object present to 
consciousness at any given moment may have different 
degrees of definition, or specificatio~ and that the 
general/ 
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general tendency of objects appearing in the field is 
to grow in the direction of definition and specification. 
On its first appearance in the field of consciousness, 
it may be said that an object tends to lack the 
definition and completeness which, subject to certain 
conditions, it later attains. 
This fact can be substantiated by reference to 
three typical views as to the nature of a primitive 
experience and its growth. 
In the first place, Stout distinguishes 
between the mere presence of an object to consciousness, 
(simple apprehension) and the mature consciousness of 
that object which implies judgment and can be expressed 
in a proposition. ·The cognate presence of an object 
and a judgment upon it constitute cognition. It is 
thus clear that Stout implies the incompleteness of the 
object as a mere sentient experience. 
"When we ask a man what he is thinking of, he 
may reply 'the moon' or 'the college' or 'the soul'. 
But such answers are essentially incomplete. They 
leave room for further questions such as 'What are you 
thinking about the moon?' •••.••••• In general, 
it would seem that a complete object can only be 
described, not by isolated words, but by propositions 
capable of being asserted, denied, doubted or assumed. 
The full object requires to be expressed in the form 
that something is, or is not, so and so" and 
again, "Transient experiences as they come and go are 
never complete objects of thought." 
(Manual. Bkoi, Chapoi) 
It may be presumed hence that Stout would 
agree that an object present to sentience is incomplete 
and points beyond itself. When it is judged about, 
it becomes a whole entity, and has, as Stout says, the 
character of a fact as opposed to an event, "an identity 
independent of time and change"; nothing more is added 
or implied. The incomplete nature of the sentient 
experience is completed by the act of judging, which is 
the essential factor in cognition as opposed to sentience. 
In the second place, reference may be made to 
Ward, who says that, "It is the characteristic of every 
completed concept to be a fixed and independent whole, 
crystallised out, as it were, from a still fluid matrix." 
(Principles. Chap.III) 
The/ 
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The implications of' .this statement are 
ultimately similar to the position adopted by Stout • 
. On its first appearance in the presentational continuum, 
an item is indefinite and non-specific. It grows to a 
completion and specification which contrasts it to the 
non-articulated and non-specified background (fluid 
matrix) of potential experience. 
In the third place, reference may be made to 
the theory of the Gestalt school, that "the simplest 
possible experience cannot be that of a quality (for 
example) in vacuo, but must be that of a quality on 
a background." (Ko.ffka. Growth of Mind. Chapo V.) 
Consciousness is never the experiencing of a 
confused mass of objects present to consciousness, 
but always includes a background upon which qualities 
stand out in an orderly manner. Such outstanding 
groups of qualities (for example) are configurations 
or 1 gestalten', and the essential property of such 
gestalten is their incompleteness on first appearance, 
and the tact that they point beyond themselves o 
Further, gestalten tend to grow, by the inherent laws 
of their own nature, to completeness or "closure" .. 
This growth implies also a growth in the individuality 
of the parts (articulation) and the growing independence 
or distinction of the whole from the background 
(unification). On their first appearance, gestalten 
imply potential or fragmentary judgments. On their 
organised completion, they imply complete judgments 
expressible in propositions. 
The implication of all three theories is, 
in one respect, the same; that the characteristic of' 
experiences as they first enter consciousness, is 
incompleteness, and that in virtue of a specific mental 
activity or process with regard to them, they attain 
completeness; that such completion results in the 
possibility of' a judgment about them which is expressible 
in a proposition or series of propositions. 
In so far as an experience first entering the 
field of consciousness is by nature essentially 
incomplete, in so far as it only grows to completion if 
it is attended to, in so far as it is only attended to 
if the intention to know more of .it is present, it may 
be said that it possesses the characteristics of the 
consciousness of a problem. The cognitive process 
in so far as it completes the incompleteness in 
answering/ 
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answering the potential implicit question "vVhat is it?" 
may be said to be a problem-solving activity of mind. 
It has its origin and impetus in a problem situation 
and hence it may be said that cognition is motivated 
by the presence of a problem to consciousness. 
(b) Consciousness of Problems in relation to Conative 
Processes. 
In so far as behaviour takes place in 
response to the perception of a stimulus, the discussion 
of conative processes in relation to the consciousness 
of a problem depends on the discussion of cognitive 
processes. What stands out on first appearance as an 
incomplete configuration upon a background, is a 
problem, and hence what is not problem is backgroundo 
The question to be decided is what calls forth the 
first reaction or response, i.e., in relation to what 
conative processes are initiated. There is only one 
alternative; conative process must begin either as a 
response to the background, or as a response to the 
configuration. It is clear that a uniform background 
could call for no response, and that hence, it is in 
response to the existence of the configuration that 
conative process begins. 
It is also clear that conative activity is 
directed towards the solution of problems which themselves 
arise, or are constituted by, the fact of obstruction to 
given ends. The behaviour of any organism is its 
response to the problems with which it is confronted in 
the course of direction to ends. ~fuere there are no 
ends in view, there cannot be obstruction to ends, and 
hence problems will not arise and behaviour will not 
result. For example, the facts of adaptation to 
environment can be expressed in terms of the success with 
which the organism solves the problems which arise when 
normal conative directions are obstructed. Thus it 
may be said that not only does conative activity 
originate as the res~onse to the consciousness of a 
problem, but also that problems are constituted when 
conative directions to ends are obstructed. 
(c) Abstract Thinking in relation to the Consciousness 
of a Problem. 
Reflective thought may be broadly classified 
into Directed and Undirected thought-processes. Both 
Directed and Undirected thought can be described by 
reference/ 
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reference to the consciousness of problems. Dr.Stebbing, 
for example, says "Reflective thinking originates in a 
problem to be solved, and is throughout con trolled by the 
conditions of that problem and directed to its solution.'' 
(Logic. Introduction.) 
Directed Thought may be described as thought 
process specifically directed to a s~ecific end, thus 
implying and originating in, specific problems. It is 
thought which is directed and controlled by the immediate 
requirements of a problem situation. 
Nor can Undirected Thought be described as 
wholly aimless. In all its for.ms, in normal reverie, 
wish-fulfilment fantasy, retrospective or prospective, 
and even in dreams, it can always be shown to be 
preoccupied with some ends rather than others, and hence 
with some problems rather than others. It originates 
in, and is directed by, the consciousness of problems 
in the same way as Directed Thought, but it deals with 
problems in a different way. 
The ultimate difference between Directed and 
Undirected thought-processes is to be found in the 
difference in the specificity, intensity and most 
frequently, the immediacy, of the intention to solve 
the problem. Further, it tends to be the case that in 
Undirected Thought, the solutions arrived at are not 
measured against objective facts and conditions- or, 
in short, critical tests of practicability are not 
applied. The distinction may be clarified by reference 
to the fact that a specific intention to solve a given 
problem will necessarily imply the intention to find a 
solution which will be in conformity with the facts of 
objective reality. If, moreover, the intention is to 
solve the problem immediately the conditions of objective 
reality will be held more rigorously before the mind, and 
the scrutiny of the solution in relation to these 
conditions will be more careful, viz., the more rigorous 
will be the critical tests of conformity applied. 
In the case of Undirected Thought, preoccupation 
with a given problem need imply no iw~ediate intention to 
solve the problem, but merely the wish that the problem 
may be solved. The possible methods of solving the 
problem Qr the possible solutions which occur as the 
result of the conscious wish to solve the problem, will 
not tend to be criticised in relation to objective 
conditions. For example, a wish-fulfilment fantasy 
implies/ 
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implies that a certain end is desired and not yet 
attained. The path to this end is obstructed and a 
problem situation is constituted. In reverie, 
possible solutions to the problem are idly followed 
out - facts are supposed which have no counterpart in 
objective reality, hypothetical solutions are presumed 
which might in actuality be impossible. 
It may be said that the intention in Directed 
Thought can be classified under the category of Will, 
the intention in Undirected Thought under the category 
of Wish. The distinction between these two cannot be 
better indicated than by reference to Aristotle's 
dictum that "Vlish is for the end, Will is for the meansn. 
Were the same problem to be considered in 
relation to a specific immediate intention to solve it, 
the means by which it might be solved would be considered 
in reference to practicability, that is, with regard 
to their conformity with objective fact. The 
resulting thought process would be narrowed, controlled 
and directed. It would be altered in quality and 
intensity and come at once under the category of 
Directed Thought. The sruue problem would motivate both 
thought processes. Both would be thought processes 
having their origin and stimulus in the existence of a 
problem for consciousness. 
It can be sho~n that the same facts which 
hold for wish-fulfilment fantasy and reverie, hold also 
for dreams. The fact is fully substantiated by psycho-
analytic analysis. In dreams, the solution of the 
problem tends to be represented symbolically, and this is 
true, also, of one aspect of imagination, more 
particularly artistic imagination, where the solution of 
problems is given by or in sy~abological images. 
From the consideration of these fundamental 
aspects and usual classifications of mental processes 
in relation to the consciousness of a problem, it is 
evident that there is substantial justification for the 
view that mental processes on all levels are motivated 
by the consciousness of a problem. It is clear, 
however, that certain processes above all others are 
specified and directed in relation to consciousness of 
problems. 
Such thought processes are those which were 
dealt with under the heading of Directed Thought processes. 
The specific conscious direction of mental process to the 
solution/ 
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solution of specific problems is the mental activity 
which is commonly designated 'intelligent'. Hence 
it can be said, not only that the clearest case of 
motivation of thought process by the consciousness 
of a problem, but also the clearest case of direction 
of thought process to the solution of the problem 
existing for consciousness, is to be found in the 
intelligent activity of mind. 
In view of this fact, it will be possible 
to describe intelligence provisionally as a 
problem-solving capacity of mind, and to justify 
the description by a more detailed consideration 
of what is implied by such a concept of intelligence, 
and how it can be substantiated by reference to 
existing theories of intelligence. 
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CHAPTER II. 
Intelligence as a Problem-Solving Activity of Iviind. 
Implications of comraon-sense views, and of current theories 
of intelligence (a) Biological (b) Purely Psychological 
(c) Miscellaneous (1) Behaviourism (2) Gestalt. - All 
theories of intelligence explicitly introduce or tacitly 
assume concept of intelligence as problem-solving 
ability. 
During the past thirty years, there have been 
innumerable theories advanced as to the nature of intell: 
igence. This has been due to the development of 
psychology as an experimental science, and. to the belief 
implied by that development that all mental processes 
must be in some way measurable. 
Of all the functions of mind, intelligence is 
that which it is perhaps of the greatest practical value 
to be able to measure. Adequate analysis, however, must 
precede satisfactory measurement, and adequate analysis 
is still lacking. If it were not so, the question 
"What is intelligence? "{fuat is it that is supposedly 
measured by mental tests?" would not continue to be 
asked with unabated persistence. 
In spite of the lack of agreement among 
psychologists as to the definition of intelligence, what: 
ever psychologists may mean by intelligence, and whatever 
it may be that is measured by intelligence tests, the 
existence of a general consensus of opinion as to when 
intelligence can be ascribed to individuals and when it 
cannot be so ascribed, is proof of the fact that 
intelligence can be recognised and that there must exist 
a general pragmatic criterion as to how it can be 
recognised. Vfuat is plainly suggested by ordinary 
discourse is that, in saying "so-and-so is intelligent", 
it is implied that he is capable of solving problems. 
Hence intelligence is ordinarily defined in terms of 
~it~' and it may be that what it is may well 
consist in what it does. 
Thurstone says, for example "When we define 
intelligence, we mean the effects of intelligence, 
wej 
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we cannot perceive the thing itself. Nearly all 
definitions of intelligence show it as the ability to do 
something or other, and it is this something or other 
which is defined." (L.L.Thurstone. B.J".Psych.Vol.XIV.) 
Hence when it is said that "xis intelligent", what is 
meant is that "x can do so-and-so". Thus, intelligence 
is the property of beings who are intelligent, while 
being intelligent means that they are able to do so-and-so. 
We may therefore define intelligence logically in terms 
of the performance, mental or otherwise, of same 
individual. Strictly it is the individual who does 
things and not his intelligence. 
In short, intelligence can be described in 
terms of problem-solving abilityo The activity which 
we describe as "using our intelligence" begins when we 
are conscious of a problem, continues through the various 
processes of finding a solution, and ends when we are 
satisfied with the completeness of that solution, and 
its conformity with objective conditions. Judgment 
as to the presence of intelligence in others will 
depend (a) on the success of solutions to problems, and 
(b) on the number of successful solutions as compared with 
the number of unsuccessful solutions. 
It may be left an open question as to whether 
intelligence is identical with problem-solving activity. 
It has been shown that all thought processes can be said 
to be motivated by the consciousness of problems, and 
thus ultimately a careful distinction would have to be 
drawn between intelligence as problem-solving activity 
of mind and other thought processes which also come 
under the category of problem-solving activities of mind. 
For present purposes it is sufficient that to 
describe intelligence as a problem-solving capacity is to 
describe what it is universally accepted that intelligence 
does. This might perhaps be stated as - "that the 
ability to solve problems to a greater or less degree will 
enable us to characterise an individual as to a concomitant 
degree, intelligent". 
The concept of intelligence as problem-solving 
ability is not only the implication of the common-sense 
view of intelligence but is also implied by current 
theories of intelligence. A brief examination of the main 
trends taken by theories of intelligence will substantiate 
this. 
Current/ 
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Current Theories of Intelligence in relation to the 
Concept of Problem-Solving Activitz. 
Definitions of intelligence fall into two well 
defined categories. 
I. Biological Theories, which involve distinctive 
biological concepts and teleology in some form. 
II. Purely Psychological or 'Mentalistic' Theories, which 
involve reference to states of consciousness, and 
also 
III. Miscellaneous Theories, which do not fall strictly 
under either of the last two categories {a) Strict 
Behaviourism (b) Gestalt Theory. 
The first two categories are crossed by 
theories of intelligence which combine elements from 
both categories. These may be described as Biological -
'Mentalistic' definitions. 
I. Biological Theories of Intelligence. 
Such theories are based on emphasis of the 
con~tive sides of mental life. Their ultimate 
presupposition is an "impulse to live" of varying degrees 
of articulation, from a blind biological force to a 
conscious "will to live" and possibly even to a will to 
live in relation to certain standards. The ultimate 
reference is thus to a conative force which corresponds 
in certain essential ways to Bergson's 'elan vital', or 
possibly to Freud's 'libido', but it will be qualified 
or specified in many different ways by different 
psychologists. It is always teleological in nature. 
This type of theory invariably introduces into 
its analysis biological metaphors, such as "adaptation to 
envirorunent", or "domination of environment". 
As an exfu~nle of the kind of definition of 
intelligence given, reference may be made to Thurstone's 
definition "Mental life is an irreversible :process 
beginning with the life impulse and terminating in 
a successful overt act." (L.L.Thurstone. 'The Nature of 
Intelligence'). There is Stern's definition that 
intelligence"consists in general adaptability to the 
new problems or conditions of life". There is Petersen' s 
definition "Intelligence is a biological mechanism by 
which/ 
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which the effects of a complexity of stimuli are 
brought together and given a somewhat unified effect on 
behaviour. It is a mechanism for adjustment and control 
and is operated by internal as well as external stimuli''. 
There is Thorndike's definition "Intelligence is the 
power of good response to a given situation". 
All such definitions of intelligence are 
biological in tendency in so far as they are based on the 
concept of conative striving for ends, which must be, 
at the same time, adjusted to comply with the demands of 
objective environment, before such ends are attained. 
That the concept of intelligence as problem-
solving ability is implied in all such definitions, is 
clear. Environment is always changing, and in changing, 
it sets problems of adjustment to the organism. Activity 
or behaviour will result as the effort on the part of 
the organism to solve these problems and adjust itself 
to the new conditions. 
Rignano has expressed these facts by saying that 
any organism has an ind.i vidual equilibrium, "an individual 
stationary psychological state", and when this is upset, 
it commences an active process directed towards the re-
attainment of this equilibrium. (The Psychology of 
Reasoning. Chap.I). In doing so, obstructions to its 
ends create problems tp be overcome. The successful 
solution of these problems, when they are concrete, 
constitutes intelligent behaviour. In man, the activity 
of solving these problems is rendered shorter, and the 
trial-and-error method. of concrete problem-solving is , 
eliminated, by the fact of the human capacity for mental 
trial-and-error problem solvingo "Reasoning can be said 
to consist in the substitution of experiments thought of 
for actual experiments". In short,-the capacity for 
abstract reasoning is envisaged by Rignano as having its 
origin in the necessity to solve the problem of re-
attaining the equilibrium upset by the changing 
environmental conditions. The superiority of man in 
dominating his environment so as to preserve this 
necessary equilibrium despite its changes, lies in the 
~act that he is enabled. to solve his problems by mental 
1n place of bodily processes, thus effecting economy of 
time and energy, allowing of infinite experiments in 
place of a few, hence making for a greater plasticity of 
behaviour. Rignano's discussion of reasoning implies, 
then, that when an orgarii~ is successful in solving its 
problems, and in so far as it is so successful, it is 
acting/ 
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acting or thinking intelligently. Thus his definition 
of intelligence falls into line with the general trend 
of biological interpretations of intelligenceo 
In the Journal of Educational Psychology 1921, 
there is a symposium on the nature of intelligence. 
An extract of the biological definitions in this 
symposium, together with biological aspects taken from 
other definitions not so consistently biological, yields 
this result as a composite biological definition of 
intelligence. 
"Intelligence is conscious biological response 
to stimulus, (Thorndike, Watt, Petersen) resulting in 
environmental adjustment {Binet, Stern, Terman, Pintner, 
Thurstone) by conscious solution of problems not 
hitherto solved by the same animal (Meumann, Stern, 
Ballard, Pintner). In life process there are frequent 
conflicts among ideas, instincts and environments 
(Thurstone), individual and social, by which some 
satisfying responses are inhibited and annoying responses 
incited". 
This composite statement brings out not only the 
reasons for calling such theories of intelligence as have 
been discussed, biological theories, but also makes clear 
their relation to, and dependence upon, the description of 
intelligence as problem-solving capacity of mind. 
Purely Psychological or 'Mentalistic' Theories of 
Intelligence. 
Such theories involve reference to states.of 
consciousness, and ultimate emphasis is placed by them 
upon the cognitive as~ects of mental ex~erience in 
relation to intelligence, although they-must be forced 
ultimately to recognise conation as specified or 
expressed in intentions or incentives to think in 
reference to given conditions. 
Such a definition is Terman's "Intelligence is 
the ability for abstract thought", or Binet's statement 
that "intelligence is the -power of auto-cri tic ism". 
The implication of a theory such as Terman's is 
that intelligence depends upon individual ability in 
certain of those activities which can be subsumed under the 
heading of abstract mental processes, such as discrimin: 
ation, power of analysis, integration or judgment. If 
judgment/ 
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judgment is examined, for example, it is apparent that 
external reference is involved. Judgment must be about 
something, that nsomething is so-and-so", that it is the 
case or is not the case. In each judgment, there must 
be at least one alternative implied. If we judge that 
something is the case, there must also be the possibility 
that it is not the case. This fact must hold of 
even the most elementary of judgments. 
A judgment is only called for where a situation 
presents alternatives, and a situation vtill only present 
alternatives when something is called in question, when 
objective existence has to be decided about in some way 
relative to conscious purposes or endso 
Thus the kind of situation about which judgment 
is made, is, as apprehended, the kind of situation which 
is characterised by incompleteness. A situation is given 
which presents alternatives to consciousness. It is an 
incomplete or problem situation. The judgment which is 
passed upon it is at once the completion of the situation 
and resolution of the p?oblem. 
Hence judgment clearly presupposes the existence 
of a problem situation defined by reference to its 
incompleteness in relation to a given end. 7lhen 
intelligence is referred to capacity for judgment, the 
implication of problem-solving activity is present. 
vVhen other 'faculties' of mind, which may be 
subsumed under the heading of abstract mental processes, 
such as integration or discrimination, are examined, it 
is evident that they are taken as criteria of intelligence 
because they bear upon the organisation of experienceo 
The importance of organisation of experience to intelligent 
thinking is evident. The degree of articulation and 
ordering of past experience will determine its revivability, 
and the amount of experience which can be revived in 
answer to the requirements of any task demanding 
intelligence, will tend to aid the successful performance 
of that task. This is true, for example, of creative 
writing or composition of any kind. 
Further, unless the kind of experience which is 
appropriate or relevant to the requirements can be 
produced, the amount of experience is of secondary 
importance. In so far as, in any task involving 
intelligence, the relevant experience can be produced, 
the greater likelihood there is of successful performance 
of/ 
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of the task. But the possibility of the production of 
a relevant part of experience depends in part upon 
the degree to which experience is organised. It is 
clear, in view of these considerations, why it should be 
supposed that mental activities which are responsible 
for the organising of experience will be taken as 
activities upon which intelligent thinking depends. 
Furthermore, the recall of past experience, and in 
particular the recall of some parts of past experience 
in preference to other parts, can only be explained by 
the postulating of a problem holding for consciousness. 
Past experience is only revived in a selective and 
orderly manner, if present experience is occupied with 
a problem. In so far as intelligent thinking involves 
the adaptation of past to present experience, present 
experience will be experience of a problem situation. 
Thus the impli ea ti on of any 'I:Ien tal is tic ' 
theory of intelligence which emphasises either the 
dependence of intelligence upon judgment or its 
dependence upon the activities of mind which account for 
the organisation of experience, is that intelligence 
either is problem-solving activity, or is dependent upon 
factors which will account, in part, at least, for the 
successful solution of problems. 
Finally, to deal with the concept of abstract 
thought along more general lines, it is true to say that 
the essential purpose of abstract thought is to render 
the solution of problems a speedier and more economical 
process. Rignano's account of the origin of reasoning 
describes the initial uses of abstract thought. In its 
final reaches, it becomes far removed from direct dealing 
with the concrete problems of enviro~~ent, but it can 
never be divorced from dealing with problems as suc4. 
Any branch of highly abstract thought such as metaphysics 
or ethics is motivated throughout by consciousness of 
the problems of Truth, Existence or Value. 
It may be concluded that, in so far as any 
'Mentalistic' definition of intelligence will ultimately 
imply some or other of the factors influencing success in 
abstract thinking, the concept of the consciousness of a 
problem is implied and must entail the introduction of the 
problem solving aspect of intelligence. 
Biological - "Mentalistic" Theories of Intelligence. 
'fb.ese/ 
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These theories of intelligence take account 
both of the facts about intelligent thinking emphasised 
by Biological definitions and the facts emphasised by 
purely Psychological definitions. Very few theories 
of the nature of intelligence have attained a consciously 
equal balance between the two types of factor. Dr. 
Hazlitt's theory of ability is an example of a theory 
which equally balances emphasis on, and recognition of, 
these two aspects of the facts of intelligent thinking. 
The intelligent act involves (a} Drive, conative factors, 
and (b) Fecundity of Ideas, which, on analysis, covers 
many of the facts emphasised by purely psychological 
definitions of intelligence. In the light of her 
analysis of both factors, she defines intelligence as 
"a problem solving organisation of mind", thus stating 
explicitly the fundamental importance of the consciousness 
of ~roblems in motivating intelligent thought process. 
Miscellaneous Theories of Intelli ence. 
a Behaviourima. 
Consistently Behaviouristic systems of 
psychology are strictly mechanistic and deterministic, 
and in such systems, there is, by definition, no place 
for what is commonly understood by intelligence. They 
deal with habit responses, conditioned responses, goal 
reactions, all the modifications and complications of the 
reflex arc, to which all phenomena of behaviour are 
reducibleo Any response to any given situation is 
explained by reference to the assumption of pre-existing 
bonds between stimulus and response, and in the course 
of the transit between stimulus and resnonse neither 
consciousness nor any of the factors generally attributed 
to consciousness, can intervene. 
Hence strict Behaviourism cannot, by definition, 
substantiate any theory of intelligence as problem-
solving capacity, since, in the first place, it does not 
allow the existence of intelligence in any form. 
It is significant, however, that where 
Behaviourism most easily tends to break down, and to 
depart from its self set premises of mechanism and 
materialism, is exactly on the point of what is implied 
by the consciousness of a problem. Faced with the 
question of why, in a situation which involves innumerable 
potential stimuli, response only takes place with regard 
to certain of these stimuli, the Behaviourist has no 
adequate answer. Any answer which might be given must 
be/ 
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be based on the fact that response is not to the 
situation, but to the perception of the situation, and, 
further, that response is made exactly to the elements 
in the situation which are apprehended as unsatisfactory 
or incomplete with reference to a given subjective end or 
purposeo In short, response to a situation occurs in 
so far as consciousness of the situation implies 
consciousness of a problem, and when response takes 
place, it takes place only in reference to the given 
parts of the situationo · 
It is to be noted that when Behaviouristic 
systems of psychology fail to maintain consistency, 
they most often fall back upon biological metaphors, 
and hence upon teleological conceptso These are 
latently introduced by reference to "good responses", or 
"successful responses" (Good in reference to what?) 
"adaptation to environmenttt (Can an automaton adapt 
itself?), thus introducing a concept of purpose or 
ends alien to a mechanical system, and ultimately 
implying a consciousness of situations as unsatisfactory 
or incomplete. 
(b) C~stalt Psychologyo 
Gestalt psychology provides the best example 
of a theory which not only implies that thought processes 
in general have their origin in the consciousness of 
problems, but also shows the specific and peculiar 
relevance of such a consciousness in relation to 
learning and intelligence in particular. 
The theory of intelligence advanced by the 
Gestalt school is bound up with the concept of the 
configuration and its tendency towards ''closure". They 
thus emphasise quite rightly that a central and essential 
feature of the situation in which the agent is conscious 
of a problem, is its peculiar incompleteness or "lack 
of closure". 
In so far as every cognized situation is first 
cognized as an incomplete configuration standing out 
upon a neutral background, every situation has the 
essential qualities of a problem situation. The lack of 
completeness of the configuration, which is the distinctive 
feature of the consciousness of the problem, can be 
described by saying the situation is characterised by a 
"gap". •'When a solution is found, the situation is 
altered in such a way that the gap in the situation is 
closed./ 
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closed. Here we have 'closure', ~or when the problem 
is solved, everything in the :perceptual situation 
depends upon the total configuration". {Ko~fka. Growth 
of Mind. Chap.IV}. Hence it is clear that intelligent 
process is the process implied in the completing of the 
gap, or the attainment of 'closure'. The intelligent 
process begins with the consciousness of incompleteness 
and continues until the situation is so altered that 
a consciousness of completeness is achieved. The 
situation, as complete, is static, and no further 
activity takes place with regard to it. 
It is evident that this is a direct statement 
of intelligence as a problem-solving process. 
The salient feature of such a description 
of the nature of intelligent thinking is that no 
conative element is supposed. Emphasis is placed 
wholly upon the 'absence of closure' which characterises 
the consciousness of the problem situation. Such an 
omission is characteristic of the system as a whole. 
Having received its initial impetus from the experimental 
investigation of the phenomena of the perceptual 
field, it has consistently omitted consideration of 
conative elements. The consciousness of a problem is 
not merely characterised by 'absence of closure' or a 
gap, but there is an impulse towards closure, and an 
intention to fill the gap. The assumption most 
difficult to accept of all the assu..rnptions in the theory 
of the Gestalt school, is that the incomplete confi5~ration 
which is the problem-situation, grows to completion and 
closure by the inherent laws of its own nature. The 
acceptance of this theory on the purely perceptual level 
is difficult since it implies that a perceptual experience 
achieves distinctness and articulation without the 
intervention of attention or subjective activity with 
regard to it, but on the level of intelligent processes, 
it presents further and, I believe, insuperable difficulties. 
The solving of a problem, as an intelligent 
process, cannot be conceived as the growing to completion 
of objective data of consciousness in abstraction. It 
must imply a conscious activity, and conscious intention 
and effort. In short, the consciousness of a problem 
situation does imply a gap, or an 'absence of closure', 
but it must also imply the impulse towards closure, and 
the existence of certain specific conative factorso 
Conclusions. 
All/ 
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All theories of intelligence other than 
strictly consistent Behaviouristic theories, either 
explicitly introduce or tacitly presuppose the concept 
of a problemo 
An intelligent thought process begins with 
the consciousness of a problem and the intention to 
solve it, is directed throughout to the solving of 
the problem, and ends when a solution is found. 
Hence ability to solve problems is an 
essential factor in intelligence, and the measure 
of the success with which problems are solved will 
be the measure of the degree of intelligenceo 
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CHAPTER III. 
The Nature of a Problem. 
Problem and Question. -Question and prepositional 
function. -Question, prepositional function and 
Proposition. - The necessary elements in the consciousness 
of a problem. 
Problems as such are universally recognised 
to exist, and each individual recognises so clearly 
that any problem with which he is confronted, is a 
problem, that it must be presumed that in such--
unhesitating recognition of problems when they are 
presented, will be implicit certain criteria as to 
the nature of a problem. Actually, however, it is 
very difficult for an individual to state exactly 
what he means wh,en he talks of a problem. The concept 
has neither be.en sufficiently analysed nor clearly 
defined, and this is more particularly the case when 
the problem is considered from the psychological 
point of view. ~ lA detailed epistemological analysis 
of a problem will be fOund in Nicolai Hartmann's 
"Grundzuge einer Metaphysik der Erkentniss" Part IV. 
Section V., "Das Wissen des Nichtwissens"o ~'Vhat is 
required is an analysis of the necessary elements in 
the consciousness of a problemo 
If any individual is asked what he considers 
a problem to be, he will most probably reply that an 
ordinary problem presents to consciousness a situation 
about which a question can be asked. If this is 
so, it may be said that "S is confronted with a problemn 
means "S asks, or is aware of, a question". Hence, 
as has been seen, a problem is something 'which, in its 
essential nature, is incomplete. It is not a finished 
whole, since something must be added or adjusted to 
satisfy given conditions or conditions thought ofo A 
practical problem calls for something to be done; the 
objective situation must be altered in some way. A 
problem points beyond itself, and no matter what kind of 
problem it is, or of what degree of complexity, it is 
always characterised by incompleteness either in view 
of an end set by the individual who is. going to solve 
the problem, or objectively, by the conditions of the 
problem as sucho Some examples of ordinary problems 
Willj 
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will suffice to make this clear. 
For example (1) Complete the following:-
Annle is to fruit as sheep is to- ? 
-- or ~2) Given a triangle ABC in which AB- 4.5 inches, 
CBA- ?2 , CAB - 45°. IVhat is the length of CA? 
Here the conditions are set objectively. The 
exact place and nature of the gap,is explicitly indicated 
in the statement of the problem. But a type of problem 
exists where it may be said that the conditions are 
indicated subjectively. Suppose a man comes to a river 
which is not spanned by a bridge. To anyone who has no 
wish to cross the river, the situation does not present 
a problem. But if it is the case that this particular 
individual has a goal in view which entails his reaching 
the opposite bank, then the situation immediately 
presents a problem to him. 
A similar example is that of balls on a 
billiard table<t Such a situation only presents a 
problem to the person who wishes to change the 
situation in order to attain a specific end. In 
itself, as apart from such a wish or intention, the 
situation of three balls lying on a green baize table 
is not a problem situation. In the same way, a pile 
of wood has nothing problematical about it, but it will 
take on the character of a problem-situation if it is 
perceived by, for example, a carpenter who intends to 
make a table from the wood. To Kohler's ape, the fact 
that he is enclosed within a cage while a bunch of 
bananas hangs outside the cage, is not a problem 
situation unless he experiences a definite desire for the 
bananas.- -
In all these cases, the incompleteness and gap 
in the situation is apparent. The sentence requires 
something to be added in accordance with given conditions, 
the geometrical problem in effect asks for something to 
be done to comply with given conditions, the man requires 
to alter or add to the situation at the riverside to 
gain his goal, the billiard player wishes to alter the 
situation relative to certain requirements he has in 
mind, and so also do the ape and the carpenter. In so 
far as each of these situations is incomplete, it presents 
a problem to consciousness. The primary characteristic 
of a problem-situation is that it contains a gap and an 
incompleteness which is indicated by the conditions of 
the problem, and it may be concluded that it is to this 
gap that implicit reference is made when it is said that 
to/ 
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to be cpnrronted with a problem is to be co~scious or a 
question. 
A question must hence be concerned with the 
consciousness or a gap. 
Problem and Question. 
The relation of the problem to the question 
must be scrutinised. 
In the case of the man who, arriving at the 
river bank, sees no means of crossing to the other side, 
it· cannot be said that his question "How am I to cross 
this river?" is a problem. It cannot even be said 
to be the expression of a problem; it is the expression 
of the consciousness of a problem, or, more accurately, 
the expression of the consciousness of a gap. The 
peculiar state of consciousness which can be expressed 
in a question, is not the same thing as the expression 
of it. In other words, a question exists apart from 
the expression of a question. 
When a question 1 s expressed verb ally, it takes 
the form of an interrogative sentence, which can clearly 
never be identified with the consciousness it expresses. 
As composed of words which express, an interrogative 
sentence is verbally complete, while what is expressed is, 
as the consciousness of a problem situation, essentially 
incomplete. Interrogative sentences are the clearest 
verbal expressions of the consciousness of a problem. 
Consequently, it is possible to learn much about the 
nature of the consciousness of a problem by an examination 
of the expression of a question in an interrogative 
sentence. 
A primitive form of the expression of a 
question would be', "Vfuat is so-and-so?" Clearly this is 
verbally complete as it stands, and looks like a 
proposition of the Subject-copula-predicate order. As 
we apprehend its meaning, however, its incompleteness is 
evident. The fact of its incompleteness for eonsciousness 
may be made clearer if it is expressed "So-and-so is -?" 
It is apparent that it requires to be added to in some 
way before it satisfies the mind with completeness and 
adequacy, that is, before it becomes a judgment. This 
consideration only emphasises the fact that the verbal 
completeness of an interrogative sentence is nevertheless 
the expression of a consciousness of incompleteness. 
'What' is the symbol of this incompleteness. Its 
symbolic/ 
23 
symbolic function is therefore fundamentally different 
from that of a word which "stands for" something. As a 
symbol it stands for the gap and incompleteness~ It may 
be said of it that it symbolize.s something in consciousness, 
but symbolizes something which is not there rather than 
something which is there. It symbolizes an absence of 
something. Words like "how" and ''why" are also symbols 
of gaps. They are consti t 1uents of the expression of a problem in a sentence, but they partake also in one 
respect of the nature of what Russell calls "undetermined 
consti tuentstt. · 
The gap may hence be provisionally defined as 
an undetermined constituent in the consciousness of.a 
problem expressed verbally in an interrogative sentence. 
Further logical examination of the concept of the 
undetermined constituent may enable us to say more about 
the gap. A logical form which has much in common with 
an interrogative sentence in that it also contains 
an undetermined constituent is the prepositional function. 
Question and Prepositional Function. 
If we examine the prepositional function "xis 
wise", it is apparent that it differs little from the 
interrogative sentence "Who is wise?", in so far as both 
~and who represent, or are symbols of, incompleteness. 
They are both, in some sense, undetermined constituents. 
Here again, it is to be noted that the prepositional 
function "x is wise" is verbally complete as it stands, 
and that it is only the consciousness of its meaning 
that is a consciousness of incompleteness. Thus, the 
expression of that consciousness, the prepositional 
function as a verbal expression, is to be distinguished 
from a proposition, i.e., a determinate statement. It 
is impossible to judge a prepositional function to be 
either true or false. Only when the undetermined 
constituent is determined, (- as, for example, when 
'Socrates'is substituted for x in "x is wise") do we have 
a determinate statement, which is the expression of a 
completed judgmento Both interrogative sentences and 
proposi tional functions may be said to be verbal 
expressions of a consciousness of incompleteness, the 
incompleteness in both cases being symbolised by an 
undetermined constituento 
The undetermined constituent in a prepositional 
function is to be considered with reference to the 
implications of a variable. In, for example, "x is wise", 
x is a symbol which allows for the substitution of any 
member/ 
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member or a class or set of items. As Russell says, 
"A satisfactory definition of a variable presupposes the 
notion any" (Princip. Math. Chap. VIII). The notion of 
"any" always implies any one of a set of items which will 
fulfil a certain condition or conditions, a member of a 
set or class selected in view of their possession of 
certain properties. To understand the-concept of the 
variable, which is the undetermined constituent, reference 
must be made to the concept of a class. The concept of 
classes is closely connected with the prepositional functio~ 
Classes may be expressed by what Russell calls 
"proposi tional functions involving one variable". 
From this point o:r view, it may be said that 
since what is meant, in ~eaking of men, is "everyone who 
is human", the class men may be expressed by "x is human". 
If then the name of any individual who is human is sub: 
stituted for x, a true proposition results as, for example, 
"Plato fs human". The class men is equivalent to the set 
of individuals whose names can be substituted for x in 
"x is human", and any member o:r this class satisfies the 
prepositional function. 
A variable then, is a class or set symbol.p 
It represents any one or a class or set, but it is clear 
that it refers to the class in a way fundamentally difrerent 
from that in which a name refers to an individual. 
This description of the function of a variable 
within a prepositional function is still insufficient. It 
is clear that for any variable occurring in any 
proposi tional function, a member of anl 'class or set 
cannot be substitutedo This is often not sufficiently 
provided against in definitions of a variable. Frege, 
for example, says "The variable keeps an empty place 
which must be filled in by a member of a class in order 
that the e~P.ression in which the variable occurs may be 
completed (Uber Begriff und Gegenstand). It is clearly 
necessary to specify the class or set of which the 
variable is a symbol. What is required is the notion of 
any one or a class or set defined by the function.p~ 
A/ 
P {A class is determined by a property or set of properties, -
a set by enumeration, but the ract of enumeration pre: 
supposes some property in common. As Johnson says, the 
connection is intimate. Both are covered by the concept or 
the variable in this sense.) 
6~ (Such a definition does not guarantee that wherever the same 
letter occurs, the same value shall be substituted. It 
wo.uld be imnossible, on this definition; of a variable, to 
dlstinguish between 3x2+x a:m.d 3x2+ y). 
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A variable may thus be defined as a symbol 
"representing anyone, but not a determined one of a 
class or set of items, the class or set being defined 
by the specific functional relation which is expressed". 
{Dr.Stebbing. Logic). 
From this definition it may be concluded that 
the variable does not keep "an open place" in the 
expression, in the strict meaning of the words, but a 
space which is defined to a certain extent, and thus can 
only be filled by a member of a certain class or set 
of i terns, not by any item. For example in "If A is any 
man, A is mortal'', A is a variable, and an undetermined 
constituent, but it can only be replaced by anyone of 
the definite set of items composing the class men. 
In so far, then, as the undetermined constituent 
can only be replaced by a certain kind of determinate 
constituent, the kind being defined by the specific 
functional relation expressed, the degree of initial 
indetermination of the constituent must be qualifiedo 
It is not a wholly indeterminate constituent. This 
implies, further, that the nature of the incompleteness 
or the shape of the gap of which the undetermined 
constituent is the symbol, is restricted and to some 
extent definedo It is not an "ambiguous" gap nor is 
the expression containing such a gap an ambiguous 
expression. Russell says, for example, that the 
prepositional function, as containing a variable with an 
unassigned value, is to be distinguished from a determinate 
statement in respect of its relative ambiguity. Dr. 
Stebbing, criticizing Russell on this score, remarks that 
if he means by ambiguity "indeterminateness", the whole 
concept of function is invalidated. "The notion of 
functional relation, in its most general form, is the 
notion of determinate correspondence in abstraction from 
the specific mode. of such correspondence". (Logic) • 
The mathematical function tx - y cannot be said 
to be either ambiguous or indeterminate. Both x and y 
are undetermined constituents, but the places they 
hold in the expression are not places into which any values 
may be fitted. In so far as a determinate correspondence 
is specified by the functional relation holding between 
the variables, a given relation must always exist, and 
a specific set of values is indicated. A symbol 
representing/ 
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representing a set or class of items is neither 
ambiguous nor indeterminate, and the gap which is 
indicated by the symbol is thus a specific kind of gap. 
The undetermined constituent in an 
interrogative sentence is similarly a sy~bol of a gap, 
and it is clear that the same reservations can be made 
about the gap in an interrogative sentence as about the 
gap in a prepositional function. For symbols of 
gaps such as who, what, why, which, how, any item cannot 
be substituted, but only any one of a class or set of 
items defined by the inter-relations of the conditions 
of the problem which is given expression in the 
interrogative sentence. That this is the case is 
evident from the fact that, in asking a question, there 
is always present an implicit awareness of the kind 
of reply which must be given. 
There is, however, an important difference 
between what is symbolized by the undetermined 
constituents in an interrogative sentence and a 
prepositional function. While it is true that both 
the "x" of the prepositional function and the who 
of the interrogative sentence symbolize gaps which are 
limited, in the prepositional function the x is limited 
purely by the limits of significance, while-in the 
interrogative sentence, the range of items symbolized 
by "who", although also limited by the limits of 
significance within its objective relational context, 
is further limited by a number of other factors, such 
as the subjective context of past and present experience. 
For example, for ~ in "x is wise" may be substituted 
any member of the class of wise individuals from 
Anaxagoras to Einstein, but in "who is wise?", for "who" 
must be substituted a member of the same class, but the 
choice is not co-extensive with the class. It will 
be limited also by the additional factors of present 
context and significance, and the background of 
individual experience. Hence the undetermined constituent 
in an interrogative sentence resembles only partially 
the undetermined constituent in a prepositional function, 
since the gap, of which each undetermined constituent 
is the symbol, is specified or limited in each case 
somewhat differentlyo 
There is another and ultimate difference 
between a prepositional function and an interrogative 
sentence. The existence of the question which is 
expressed in the interrogative sentence implies a gap in 
the same way as a gap is implied by a prepositional 
function/ 
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function, but the existence of the question, the 
consciousness of a problem, implies the further and 
distinctive factor of the wish and intention to 
complete the gap. 
It may be said that every question involves a 
prepositional function, but that the whole nature of the 
prepositional function involved is altered by the 
addition of the conative element distinctive of the 
question. For example, -the gap becomes specified in a 
different way. "X is wise" does not present a problem-
situation to consciousness, but when the intention 
to substitute a definite value for x is supposed, the 
proposi tional function becomes the question "who is wise", 
which is the expression of the fact that a specific gap 
exists for consciousness along with the intention to 
complete the gap, and resolve the incompleteness. 
guestion, Prepositional Function and Proposition. 
It has been shown that a prepositional function 
and an interrogative sentence are alike in that both 
contain a gap and are incomplete. Analysis of what is 
implied in each case by the s~~bol of the gap or 
incompleteness has led to the point where the completion 
of both proposi tional functions and interrogative 
sentences may be discussed. 
A prepositional function is defined by Russell 
as "an expression containing an undetermined constituent 
"or several undetermined constituents and becoming a 
"proposition,as soon as the undetermined constituents are 
"determined". An interrogative sentence is the 
expression of a question or the consciousness of a gapo 
Here also, the filling of the gap and resolving of the 
incompleteness will result in a consciousness of something 
complete which can be expressed verbally in a proposition 
or determinate statement. In this case also, a 
distinction is to be observed between the consciousness 
of completeness; a state of consciousness which can be 
expressed in a judgment, and the expression of that 
judgment in a determinate proposition. 
In both cases, then, the filling of the gap 
results in a completed judgment. 
(1) Who is wise? (Interrog.Sentence. Verbal expression of 
a question. "Gap" situation). 
(2) X is wise (Prepositional FUnction. Undetermined 
constituent). 
(3) I 
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{3) Socrates is wise (Determinate sentence. Verbal express: 
ion of judgment. Resolution of "Gap" 
situation. Completeness). 
The prepositional function as such does not 
occur within normal thought processes. It is·a logical 
concept. p Normal thought begins with (1) and ends with (3). It may be said that (1) and (2) differ from (3) 
in that neither are complete, but that (1) and (2} 
differ from each other in respect of the nature of their 
incompleteness. It has been shown that in (2) x stands 
for a gap alone {although not an indeterminate gap), whi~e 
'who' in (1) stands objectively for a gap (still further 
specified) and subjectively, for an intention to complete 
the gap, the nature of which is further altered by the 
existence of the intention. 
Conclusions as to the Nature of a Problem. 
A problem must always involve 
A. Ob,jecti vely. {1) ~he consciousness of a gap or 
incompleteness which may be symbolised by an undetermined 
constituent in the verbal expression of the consciousness 
of the problem. 
- {2) The gap itself is not mere gap. It 
represents something in consciousness, and is a 
consciousness of something requiredo It is so specified 
by its context that it implies a consciousness of the 
kind of thing required. In this sense, it potentially 
involves an incomplete judgment or judgmentso 
B. Subjectively. The wish or intention to complete the 
incompleteness, to fill the gap, or to determine, in 
assigning a specific value to, the undetermined 
constituent, so that the result is something complete in 
itself, expressible in a proposition or series of 
propositions which can be judged to be either true 
or/ 
P For example, the prepositional function is introduced by 
Russell to facilitate his analysis of general propositionso 
For present purposes, the analysis of the undetermined con: 
stituents or variables in any of mathematical, descriptive 
or prepositional functions would have served. A descriptive 
function is an expression containing a variable such that 
when the variable is replaced by a constant, a description 
results. Priority or differences in types of functions 
is of no present importance, since all, when determined, 
will result in expressions of judgment. 
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or false. 
It cannot be said that either of these 
essential elements in the consciousness of a specific 
problem is prior to the other. On the one hand, it is 
clear that a problem only arises, that is, that a gap 
can only exist for consciousness, when there is present 
a general intention to achieve a specific end. On the 
other hand, in a given problem the intention clearly 
exists in relation to the existence of the specific gap. 
The seeming paradox can be resolved by reference to 
primary and secondary intentions. Amore general 
intention to attain a certain end will determine 
which situations encountered in the attaining of that 
end will be problem-situations. Any situation which is 
incomplete or unsatisfactory in view of that end, will be 
a problem-situation, but given that such a specific 
problem-situation has arisen within the context of the 
general problem-situation implied by the existence 
of an end not yet attained, a specific intention will be 
correlated with, and consequent upon, the existence of 
the specific gap holding for consciousness. 
30 
CHAPTER IV. 
The Nature of the Processes Involved in the Solving of a 
Problem, and Factors making for Success. 
Processes presumably present in the solving of a problem. -
Productive aspect of the problem-solving process. -
Regulative principles controlling productive-reproductive 
processes. - Factors determining adequate specification 
of the gap. -Meaning in relation to adequacy. - Conditions 
of the problem as specified in meaning are agents 
productive of the relevant. - Success of problem-solving 
process depends upon the adequate functioning of the 
conditions of the problem. 
Since it has been seen from the analysis of 
the nature of a problem that the consciousness of a 
problemmust involve both the consciousness of a gap 
specified in some way, and the intention to fill the gap, 
it can be deduced that the actual solving of a problem 
will require, in the first place, material with which the 
gap may be filled and in the second place, since the gap 
is specified and not formless, that the material which 
fills the gap shall be "shaped" to fit the gap. 
Hence it may be presupposed that the thought 
processes concerned with the solution of a problem present 
to consciousness must include (a} a thought process 
productive of material to fill the gap (b) a process 
"shaping" the material to fit the gapo 
This hypothesis may be ex&uined and expanded 
in relation to the theory of Dr.Hazlitt, who deals 
explicitly with the same problem of the nature of the 
processes involved in filling the gap in the consciousness 
of a problem. 
The definition of intelligence given by Dr. 
Hazlitt (to which reference was made in dealing with 
types of definitions) involved, as was shown, explicit 
reference to the nature of the consciousness of a 
problem in relation to intelligent thought processo 
Intelligence is "a problem-solving organisation of mind" 
and "there is always a problem holding for consciousness 
a gap which can be filled in by the working together of 
experience/ 
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experience". (Ability. Chap. I). Thus the gap in a 
problem is rilled by means of a thought process which 
organises experience in some way to rit the gapo The 
process initially depends upon two factors 
(1} Drive, coming rrom affective and conative settings 
of the situation 
(2} Fecundity of Ideas, the coming to mind of' items 
of experience. 
It is this second factor, fecundity of ideas, 
which must be examined in detail. The factor of drive 
cannot, as Dr.Hazlitt herself says, be regarded as an 
element in the organising process as such. "It is the 
precondition of intelligent as of any other act not 
purely reflex. Its degree differs in the same person 
from one organising act to another, and hence it is not 
the determinant of general ability". It may be taken 
that under drive, Dr.Hazlitt would include what we have 
described as "the intention" to solve the problem. It 
may be admitted that the intensity of the intention will 
differ in the same individual from one problem to another, 
and thus cannot be the only determinant of the general 
measure of success in problem-solving. Moreover, since 
the intention has been treated as partly constitutive· 
of the consciousness of a problem, it is to be regarded 
for that reason as a pre•condition of the problem-
solving process, which may hence be analysed in 
abstraction from its motivating factors.~ 
Fecundity of ideas, the coming to mind of 
experience as material to fill the gap, clearly implies, 
as already suggested, that there must be a process which 
produces material. 
The nature of the material which comes to 
mind in answer to the consciousness of a problem requires 
careful analysis. The outstanding feature of such 
material·is its relevance to the requirements of the 
problem, or, in other words, its relevance to the 
specific gap. Introspective reports from subjects on 
the solution of problems giver evidence of this fact. 
In/ 
~The experimental investigation of 'Incentives', which 
are factors influencing the quality, intensity and 
duration of intentions to solve problems, show that 
ultimately the nature of the intention, and particularly 
its intensity, is a factor influencing the success of 
performance. 
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In the mental search for the right answer to a problem, 
the items which come to mind in answer to the 
consciousness of a :problem are not any items but items 
which tend to be, to a greater or less degre~, relevant 
(See Appendix. Introspective reports). It will 
frequently happen that the items which come to mind 
on the presentation of a problem are characterised 
by complete relevance. Most often, however the items 
coming to mind have only a partial relevance: so that 
a process of conscious selection between alternatives 
ensues. In difficult problems, this is almost 
invariably the caseo The fact that there is most often 
the necessity for this :process of judgment and even of 
trial-and-error activity, mental or actual, with regard 
to the items which first present themselves, does not 
invalidate the fact that the items initially coming to 
mind are characterised by a degree of relevance in 
every case. However remote the connection of such 
items with the requirements of the problem may be, a 
connection is presento 
This primary fact of the relevance of what 
comes to mind leads Dr.Hazlitt to the conclusion that 
there must be "an unconscious factor at work in 
producing the relevant11 • Since the first items which 
come to mind are not primarily selected as relevant from 
any larger mass of irrelevant items by any conscious 
process of selection, hence, if any factors are 
present which guarantee the relevance of the items 
coming to mind, they are not factors discoverable by intro: 
spection, and must work without conscious direction. 
DroHazlitt concludes from these facts that the factor 
accounting for the relevant must be unconscious. She 
recognises the point which has just been discussed, that 
there most frequently supervenes a process by which the 
more relevant is selected from the less relevant. 
"The organising act of mind is not complete without 
either imPlicit acceptance of what comes, or explicit 
judgment between alternatives". Clearly any process of 
conscious selection or explicit judging must take place 
with regard to the items which first come to mind, and 
which are straightway characterised by some degree of 
relevance. 
Vlliat has to be considered, therefore, as of 
primary importance in the fil:ling of the gap, is a 
process which is not only productive of material but 
productive of relevant material. The fact that 
the items first coming to mind are characterised by 
some; 
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some degree of relevance is proof that the material is 
"shaped" in some way to fit the gap, i.e., to fulfil 
the conditions of the problem, and it may be concluded 
that some principle must be at work by which the 
:productive process is directed along lines productive 
of the relevant to the gap. Whether there is any 
necessity to consider this principle 'unconscious' in 
an absolute sense, will be discu~sed later. 
There is no need, therefore, to suppose two 
processes which fill the gap in the consciousness of a 
problem. A single process takes place which produces 
relevant material, i.e., it produces material already 
"shaped" to some degree to fit the gap. There is no 
ground for supposing a secondary regulative process 
which selects the relevant to be superimposed upon a 
process which produces material in response to the 
stimulus of the consciousness of a gap, without 
reference to its relevance to the specific shape of the 
gap or the requirements of the problem. 
It may be supposed then that the thought 
process accounting for the initial coming to mind of 
relevant items is a single productive process, 
regulated in some way by one or more selective, directive 
or controlling factors. The process must imply 
principles of two kinds (a) Productive Principles 
(b) Regulative Principles. For purposes of analysis 
it will be well to consider first the process as 
productive in abstraction from its regulative aspect. 
Productive Aspect of the Problem Solving Process. 
The process in its productive aspect must 
account for the coming to mind of material. It cannot, 
in its purely productive aspect, account for the kind of 
material which comes to mind. There are two questions 
which may be asked about the productive process; in the 
first place, from where does the material come? In the 
second place, by what processes can it be presumed to 
come? 
In answer to the first question, it is clear 
that whatever material presents itself on the presentation 
of a ~roblem to consciousness must come from the past 
experience of the individual. In answer to the second 
question it is evident that its presence will be accounted 
for by r~ference to the processes normally involved in 
the recall or revival of past experience. 
Regarded/ 
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Regarded rrom this purely productive aspect 
it can be said that the consciousness or the problem 
situation is equivalent to the presentation or a 
stimulus, and that the presence of the given stimulus 
to'consciousness will revive other items with which the 
items within the stimulus situation have in the past 
been associated or eo-presented. The c~nsciousness ' 
of a problem situation, considered as an objective datum 
of consciousness, would clearly be productive or 
associated masses or past experience in the same way that 
a single associative item presented to consciousness 
will revive parts of its own contexts in past experience. 
It can be assumed then, that the principle of association 
itself would be surficient to account for the revival - or, 
as we have called it, the production, of material in 
answer to the stimulus of the consciousness of a problem. 
In explaining the presence of items from past 
experience in response to the requirements of a problem, 
Dr.Hazlitt refers to Spearman's Noetic and Noegenetic 
principles as accounting for the production of material. 
It is clear that a principle such as the eduction of 
relations, i.e., that the presentation of two ideas to 
consciousness will bring to mind any relations essentially 
holding between them, and a principle such as the 
eduction of correlates, i.e., that the presentation of 
an idea and a relation to consciousness will bring to 
mind the idea correlated, will be principles which will be 
implied in the production of material from past experienceo 
These however are not the only principles accounting for 
the revival of past experience in answer to the conscious: 
ness of a ·problem. Spearman's principles are necessarily 
involved in a normal associative process, but they do not 
fully explain it. The principle of association cannot 
be subsumed under Spearman's principles. Spearman 
himself says "Association does not give an adequate 
account of the cognition of relations, but cognition of 
relations goes far in explaining association. ~uasi­
mechanical reproductive adherence has its source in 
noetic coherence". {Spearman. Intelligence. Part III.ChapoX). 
It may be that the principle of association does 
not give an adequate account of the cognition of 
relations, but the principle of association is presupposed 
by the cognition of relations. Two items can only be 
cognised as related if it is presupposed that they are 
eo-presented to the same state of consciousness. For 
example, it is impossible that A can be revived as being 
to the left of B unless at some time A has been judged/ 
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judged to be to the le~t of B, and such a judgment is 
only :p~ssible if A_ an,d B are· eo-presented, or if A 
is rev~ ved along w~ th B and thus enters the same state 
of consciousness. Vfhen A and B are eo-presented, they 
are eo-presented as related, but the fact o~ their eo-
presentation is both logically and actually prior to the 
fact of their relation. 
·Hence the cognition of relations cannot be 
substituted for the associative principle in explaining 
the recall of past ex:perience. Spearman's principles 
may accompany and expand the principle of association 
and it is true that they become increasingly important 
as experience becomes organised, but they are not basic 
and cannot operate in isolation from the principle of 
association in explaining the recall of past experience. 
Both must be taken into account as being principles 
which explain the production of items in answer to the 
consciousness of a problem-situation. 
Further, since it is clear that the productive 
aspect of the process in which these principles are 
embodied must be very largely a reproductive process, 
it may be referred· to as the productive-reproductive 
process stimulated by the consciousness of a problem. 
Regulative Principles Controlling the Productive-
Reproductive Process. 
Since it is clear that the principles making 
for the recall of past experience cannot be the only 
principles influencing the problem-solving thought-
process, in virtue of the fact that the coming to mind 
of relevant items is the most important result of that 
process, there must be other principles involved. These 
other principles must be principles which direct the 
problem-solving process to the production of the relevant, 
or, in other words, principles which account for the 
elimination of the irrelevant. Productive principles 
account for the presence of material in response to the 
stimulus, but they cannot account for its relevance. 
Amount of material is, provisionally at least, to be 
distinguished from relevance of material. 
The factor which Dr.Hazlitt postulates as 
accounting for relevance is the unconscious factor of 
confluence. It is to be defined as "the telling of one 
part of experience upon another, so that not only does the 
presented character tend to come into relation with 
innumerable/ 
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innumerable characters with which it has been associated 
in the past, but the present task interpenetrates the 
whole situation". 
The statement that relevance is to be accounted 
for by "the telling of one part of experience upon. 
another" is of central importance, and its implications 
must be examined. It may be taken to mean, as it 
stands, that the associative context related to one 
presented character or condition, is interpenetrated by 
the associative context related to another condition, 
while the consciousness of the gap interpenetrates the 
whole situation and the compound associative relational 
context. 
The principle of confluence is thus of great 
value in showing how the production of the relevant 
may be accounted for. It seems, however, to admit of 
further consideration. It may be asked, for example, 
in what sense it can be said that confluence is an 
unconscious factor, and again, in virtue of what 
principles the associative context of one presented 
character comes into relation with the associative 
context of another presented character, and by what 
means the present task interpenetrates the whole 
situation. 
Taking these ~uestions in the stated order, 
the ~uestion of the degree and kind of consciousness 
characterising the working of the principle of confluence 
may be dealt with first. 
If the question "vTho killed Cock Robin?" is 
examined, for example, it is clear that the gap 
symbolised by 'who' will be filled by some section of the 
associated relational context of the items (a) killed, 
and (b) Cock Robin. But the number of possible items 
which may fill the gap indicated by 'who' will be seen 
by the individual answering the question to be restricted 
(a) to a class of things which might kill, and within 
that class restricted again to a sub-class of {b) things 
which might kill Cock Robin. The fact that a conscious 
process of step-by-step reasoning along these lines is 
not gone through on the reading or hearing of the 
question by an individual who intends to reply, does not 
necessarily mean that the thought process producing a 
relevant answer to the question must be dependent 
upon unconscious factors. Although the steps in the 
~easoning are not actually present in consciousness, they 
would/ 
37 
would seem to be implicit. In such a case as this 
the process of elimination of non-relevant classes 
is accomplished as soon as the meaning of the question 
is apprehended, and this means that the :process is too 
quick to be normally introspectiule. If a subject 
trained in introspection were asked to detail the 
steps by which the elimination of the irrelevant was 
accomplished, it might be possible for him to reproduce 
the steps in the reasoning. When the process is left 
as it would occur in the course of· a normal answering 
of the question, however, the steps are not normally 
consciously present. 
Hence it is necessary to say that the initial 
production of the relevant is habitually an unconscious 
process, but it is not a process which need be accounted 
for by the postulation of unconscious factors, if by 
unconscious factors is meant factors which cannot be 
detected in operationo In the first place, the fact 
that the steps in the elimination of the irrelevant 
are not in simple problems normally followed out 
consciously, does not mean that they cannot be followed 
out consciously. The more difficult the problem, the 
more conscious do the steps become. In the second 
place, the actual conditions of the problem in accordance 
with which the irrelevant items are eliminated are· 
always present to consciousness and can never be 
described as unconscious factors. Thus the sense in 
which we talk of unconscious factors at work in the 
initial production of the relevant must be qualified. 
What is meant is rather that the factors which dictate 
the elimination of the irrelevant and production of the 
relevant," since they are the given conditions of the 
problem, must be present to consciousness, but the process 
in which these factors operate, since it is very often 
accomplished as soon as the conditions of the problem 
are apprehended, most frequently takes place too quickly 
to be detectable. It is clear that the steps in the 
process of elimination of the irrelevant become more 
conscious in proportion with the increasing difficulty 
of the problem. In most cases it may be said that the 
apprehension of the conditions of the problem will at 
once eliminate the greatest mass of irrelevant material, 
and narrow down consciousness to lines relevant to the 
problem. It may be stated that, for all practical 
purposes, the process of the initial coming to mind of 
relevant items is a process which is attended by a very, 
low degree of consciousness and conscious direction, but 
that the factors influencing that process are not 
unconscious factors. 
Proceeding/ 
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Proceeding to the consideration o~ how the 
assoeiative context of one presented character inter: 
penetrates that or another, it is necessary to consider 
first what is implied by "the present task interpenetrating 
the whole situation". This would seem to be the central 
fact by which the principle of' conf'luence explains the 
directing of the productive-reproductive process to 
lines relevant to the problem. It may best be elucidated 
by reference to the analysis of' the consciousness of a 
problem. 
In terms of this analysis, it is clear that 
the "present task" can only mean the consciousness of 
the gap, and the intentional direction of a thought 
process towards the filling of the gap. "Interpenetration 
of the whole situation by the present task" may thus be 
restated as "interpenetration or the whole situation by 
the consciousness of the gap". It may then be 
considered how the consciousness of the gap acts as a 
regulative factor in eliminating the irrelevant. 
To answer this question, reference must be made 
to what has been said of the nature of the gap, and to 
what is implied by the fact that the gap is a specified 
gap. 
In an expression such as "x is wise", or in the 
question nWho is wise?" it was se-en that x and who 
symbolize gaps existing for consciousness7 and that x and 
who might be regarded as partaking of the nature of -
"undetermined constituents". In view of this fact, x and 
who could not stand for anx substitutable item, but must 
be replaced by an item of a certain kind, by a member 
of a set or class of' items defined by reference to the 
relation existing between x and who and the other constit: 
uents of the expression. -Thus in answering the question 
"Who is wise?" there is already present implicit knowledge 
of the kind of item which must be substituted for who in 
the answer, and it may be concluded that the consciousness 
of a gap must imply knowledge of the kind of item which 
must fill the gap. 
In short, consciousness of a gap implies 
knowledge of the kind of item which will be relevant to the 
gap, i.e., knowledge of the kind of thing required. 
This may be substantiated by reference to 
introspection. A question, expressing the consciousness 
of a problem, is never asked without a knowledge of the 
kind/ 
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kind of answer required being implicit in the query. 
On be~ng asked a question, the comprehension of the 
meaning of the question in all cases gives knowledge 
of the kind of answer which is required. It is for 
this reason that a :problem is e:pistemologically a 
unique entity. It implies knowledge of something not 
known, and every theory of knowledge has to give some 
account of how this is possible.p 
The fact that we know the kind of answer 
required is the widest regulative factor influencing the 
productive-reproductive process in the direction of the 
relevant. It specifies the initial intention to fill 
the gap to an intention to fill it with a certain kind 
of item, and explains how "the :present task interpenetrates 
the whole situation" so that what is relevant to the gap 
comes to mind in :preference to what is irrelevant. 
We may diverge for a moment to explain this 
point. It may be argued that to explain the directing 
and controlling of the :productive-reproductive process 
by reference to the ~act that there is implicit ,knowledge 
of the kind of thing required is to explain a recondite 
process by reference to a more recondite fact. But the 
fact that there is a tendency for the kind of things 
which are required to be the kind of things which are 
revived is paralleled by the fact that on the 
perceptual level there is a tendency to perceive the 
kind of things which are being looked foro 
If, for example, one is confronted with the 
problem of being miles from civilization and possessing 
no tin-opener, then anything which is sharp or pointed 
appearing on the perceptual field, assumes, since it is 
the kind of thing which is being looked for, a certain 
intensity value. Such facts relating to the objective 
side of perceptual experience cannot, of course, be 
abstracted from correlative facts of purpose, but in the 
same way, this is also true of the revival of the kind of 
thing which is required. This does not invalidate them 
as/ 
p See, e.g., Hartmann. "Das Wissen des Nichtwissens" 
Metaphysik der Erkentniss. 
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as facts of experience in its objective aspect. Again, 
in looking for proof of a theoretical hypothesis, one 
looks about for facts which will substantiate the 
hypothesis. The specific nature of the facts which may 
be found is not known, but what is present is an implicit 
awareness of the kind of fact which will prove useful. 
Such facts come under the category "kind-of-thing-for-
which-r-am-looking", and any fact which has a remote 
resemblance or connection with this category at once 
assumes an intensity value which sets it off from the 
background of irrelevant material. The same facts 
may be presumed to hold of items within the context 
of past experience. 
To return however to the main line of 
argument and the consideration of the consciousness of 
the gap as the central factor accounting for relevance, -
it had been agreed that it was not the amount of 
experience revived in answer to the consciou·sness of a 
gap but the relevance of that material which was 
important to the successful filling of the gap. It may 
therefore be concluded that the principles which make 
for relevance are those which determine the success of the 
problem-solving process. If the implicit knowledge 
of the kind of thing required is the main principle 
directing the productive-reproductive process towards 
the production of the relevant, it will at the same time 
be the factor which accounts for success in the solving 
of a problem. 
It may be the case, however, that "knowledge 
of the kind of thing required" is itself a composite 
principle depending upon other factors. 
ffKnowledge of the kind of thing required" 
itself means knowledge of the gap existing for conscious: 
ness, and the knowledge of what is required to fill the 
gap will vary in degree with the adequacy of the 
apprehension of the gap as a specified gap. The 
factors which determine the consciousness of the gap 
as specified, and the adequacy of its specification must 
therefore be considered. 
Factors determining Adequate Specification of the GaE• 
Just as the nature of the gap symbolised by 
who in "Who is wise?" is defined by reference to its 
relation to the consciousness of the whole problem 
expressed in "Who is wise?", so, in any other problem, 
however/ 
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however complex, the nature or the gap is derined by 
reference to the consciousness or the whole problem. 
Hence, in so far as the problem is constituted 
objectively by its conditions, the gap in the problem 
is to be regarded as constituted by the conditions of 
the problem. 
Each or the conditions or the problem will 
help to "shape" or specify the gap, and it is the 
apprehension of the gap as speciried which gives 
"knowledge or the kind of thing required" and 
consequently controls the productive-reproductive 
process. Thus it may be said that the-specirication 
of the gap depends upon what may be called the 
constitutive functioning of the conditions or the 
problem. In so far as each condition of a given 
problem co~operates with each other condition in 
constituting a gap of a specific shape, it may be said 
to have a constitutive function. 
Ultimately then, it is the actual conditions 
of the problem which, working as one complex condition 
through the medium or the gap which they constitute 
and specify, decide the "knowledge or the kind of thing 
required" which is the regulative principle directing 
the productive-reproductive process towards the 
production of the relevant. In short, the efricacy 
of this regulative principle upon which the success of 
the problem-solving process depends will itself depend 
upon the adequacy of the specification of the gap by the 
conditions or the given problem. 
It is the functioning or these conditions which 
is of ultimate importance. 
The conditions will not runction adequately 
in specifying the gap unless they are themselves 
apprehended in their full significance, i.e., not only 
as individually significant but as significant in 
relation to a given whole of conditions. This means 
that the meaning or each condition must be apprehended 
within its place in the whole and in relation to the 
whole. The exact meaning of any one condition must be 
fixed by the meaning of the whole problem. Failure to 
apprehend the,significance of each condition in relation 
to the whqle results in failure to solve the problem. 
Partial apprehension of the interrelational significance 
of conditions produces unsatisfactory solutions in that 
they are only partially relevant, or possibly contain 
much/ 
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much that is irrelevant. 
Technically, total or partial failure to 
solve problems (when it is not due to lack of appropriate 
past experience relevant to the conditions of the 
problem) ~s to be traced to the fact that inadequate 
apprehensJ.on of the conditions has meant that the gap 
has not been adequately specified in relation to those 
conditions, so that the regulative principle can only 
function imperfectly, failing to eliminate all 
irrelevant material. 
Adeauacy of Specification of the Gap in relation to 
Meaningo 
When the question of the adequate specification 
of the gap is approached from the point of view or 
meaning, it is clear that a two-fold process must be 
involved in the apprehension of the meaning of a problem. 
In the first place, each condition will be 
understood as having, in its own right, a certain meaning. 
Characterised by such meaning, it will co-operate with 
the other conditions in constituting the gap. But, in 
the second place, the nature of the gap, and the 
consciousness of the problem as a whole reflect back 
upon the individual conditions, fixing their significance 
and meaning in relation to the whole. Introspection 
on the process of apprehending the meaning of complex 
problems will substantiate these facts. The way in 
which this specification of meaning comes about may be 
ill~strated by reference to the same process taking 
place on a different level. 
If it is supposed for a moment that the words 
in a sentence, in relation to the whole which they 
constitute, are equivalent to the conditions of a 
problem in relation to the whole which they constitute, 
the way in which the meaning of the whole is constituted 
by the meaning of the parts and yet fixes the mefrning of 
the parts, is evident. 
It is clear, in view of this, that the 
conditions of a problem, although constitutive parts of a 
larger whole, do not cease to exist as individually 
significant entities in virtue of the fact; rather do 
they gain in specific individual definition in proportion 
as the whole.itself becomes defined as a whole. 
Regarded/ 
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Regarded as a process taking place among 
the objective constituents of experience {i.e. in 
isolation from subjective factors of attention) the 
growth in the specification and articulation of the 
constitutive conditions of a problem in relation to 
the whole can be described as a process similar to 
that described by Gestalt theory as the growth in 
the organisation of the gestalt upon which the act of 
intelligence depends. The following extracts from 
C.K.Ogden's "The Nature of Intelligence" illustrate 
the fact clearly. 
"The first appearance of any data of 
observation can be likened to the emergence of an 
articulate figure from an inarticulate ground •••• 
The apprehended unit is from the start an organised 
whole, although it is at the same time one which may be 
capable of further organisation through a definition 
of its contour and inner articulation •o•• The next 
step in cognitive or intelligent response is the 
definition of the contour and articulation of the 
figure •••• An act of intelligence is an act which 
reflects these higher degrees of definiteness whereby the 
figure becomes highly articulate and sharply drawn •• · •• 
I regard cognition and intelligence as processes 
involving the constructive membership implied by a 
figural whole. The organised whole is there from the 
beginning, and its furiher definition is accomplished 
neither by the associative process of accretion nor by 
an alien mysterious act of eduction (criticism of 
Spearman) but solely by an intelligent principle of 
organic membership which is inherent in the data 
themselves •••• The nature Qf intelligence is revealed 
by the contour and articulateness of experience. A 
mode of experience is an intelligent one according to the 
degree it is articulate within itself or sharply definedn. 
While refusing agreement to Ogden's contention 
as to the ultimate principle on which the organisation 
of the Gestalt depends, his description of the way in 
which the parts of the gestalt (i.e., in this case, the 
specific conditions of a given problem) become articulated 
and defined in relation to the whole of the problem, is 
relevant to this analysis and may be taken as substantiat: 
ing the fact that the separate conditions of a problem 
gain in specific significance as a result of their co-
operative constitution and specification of the gap. 
The Conditions of the Problem as Ultimate Productive-
Reproductive !gentso 
In/ 
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In discussing the principles implied by the 
:producti ve-re:producti ve :process in abstracts the 
consciousness of the existing gap was said t~ be the 
stimulus initiating· the process, and accounting for the 
revival of material from :past experience. If, however, 
the consciousness of the gap is to be referred back to 
the individual conditions which specify the gap, it is 
clear that the productive-reproductive process stimulated 
by the consciousness of the gap must also be referred 
back to the individual conditions. 
This will mean that each condition has a 
value as a productive-reproductive agent, but this only 
in a qualified sense. If each condition were to operate 
as a productive-reproductive agent in abstraction from 
its place within the whole, a chaotic mass of past 
experience would be brought to mind, out of which it 
would be necessary to select the relevant from the 
irrelevant by conscious judgment. It has been shown 
that, in virtue of the fact of the initial production 
of the relevant, no process of conscious judgment 
between alternatives is initiall~ involved. It may be 
concluded hence that the conditions of the problem 
do not function as isolated productive-reproductive 
agents in abstraction from their significance within the 
whole. The meaning of each condition as specified 
in relation to the whole, controls the productive-
reproductive function of each condition. 
The way in which this happens may be illustrated 
by further reference to the example of a sentence. A 
word in a sentence has a meaning in its own right in 
every case. Even if the word has never before been 
perceived, it has the meaning of its :present relational 
context. In the normal case of the perception of known 
words, the meaning is given by a mental act of relating 
in which the terms will be the word itself as an 
immediate datum of consciousness and some context other 
than itself which is aroused by it. Hence, in itself 
any word of a sentence is a potential productive-
reproductive agent. It can bring to mind some portion 
of past experience. 
Within the sentence, however, its meaning will 
be fixed in relation to the whole. Its specific meaning 
content as fixed in such a way, will determine the 
nature ~f the portions of past experience with which it 
will be related. Hence, in so far as it functions as 
an agent productive of past experience, it will reproduce 
experience/ 
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experience relevant to the whole or the seatence. The 
same facts hold true of the conditions of a problem. 
Their productive-reproductive activity will be restricted 
to lines of revival relevant to the gap holding for 
consciousness in proportion as their meaning is 
specified in relation to the whole. 
It may be concluded then that the productive-
reproductive process stimulated by the consciousness of 
a gap, can be referred back to the individual conditions 
of the problem as specified in meaning in relation to 
the exact nature or the specified gap. 
Conclusions. 
The conditions of the problem are the factors 
to which reference must ultimately be made in discussing 
the success of the problem-solving process. 
Through the medium of the gap which they 
specify, the individual conditions are themselves 
specified in relation to the gap. As specified they act 
not only as agents stimulating a productive-reproductive 
process, but as agents directing that process to the 
production of items relevant to the gap. 
Since the relevance of the material produced 
is the prime factor accounting for the success of the 
problem solving process, the success is ultimately to 
be attributed to the adequacy with which the conditions 
of a problem perform their function 
(a) as specifying the gap. 
(b) as, themselves specified in relation to the gap, 
stimulating a controlled productive-reproductive 
process. 
Hence there are three aspects of the functioning 
of the conditions of a problem 
(1) The Constitutive aspect, whereby they constitute, in 
co-operation with the other conditions of the problem, 
a gap of a specific size. 
(2) The Productive aspect, whereby they act as agents 
stimulating a productive-reproductive process. 
(3} The Regulative aspect, whereby, in virtue of their 
specific significance within the whole which they 
constitute, they control the productive-reproductive 
process so that material relevant to the gap comes to mind. 
The success of the problem-solving process 
will/ 
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will depend upon the degree to which the process is 
controlled by the conditions of the problem in each 
of these three aspects. But, since the efficiency 
of the productive and regulative aspects depends 
ultimately upon the constitutive aspect, it may be 
said that the degree of success of the problem-
solving process will depend upon the degree to which 
the individual conditions of the problem work 
together to constitute a gap which is adequately 
specified by these conditionso 
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CHAPTER Vo 
The "Reservoir" of Exnerience. 
Qualitative aspects of experience. -Quantitative 
aspects of experience. - Amount of experience in 
relation to relevance. - Organisation and revivability. -
Adaptability of organised experience. 
The success of the problem-solving process 
has been traced to the adequate functioning. of the 
conditions of the problem in each of their three aspects. 
So far the functioning of the conditions of the 
problem has been considered in abstraction from the 
material upon which the conditions function, but it is 
evident that in a final consideration of the success or 
the problem-solving process, it will be impossible to 
omit consideration of f'ac tors connected with the material. 
If the success or the problem-solving process depends 
upon the adequate organisation of material to fill the 
gap in the consciousness of the problem, the principles 
accounting for the organisation of the material cannot, 
except for purposes of' analysis, be considered in 
abstraction from the material itself. It cannot be 
supposed, for example, that either the quality or the 
quantity of past experience, which is the content of the 
problem-solving process, can be immaterial to the success 
of the process. 
It must be presumed, in view of such facts, 
that the success of a problem-solving process as it occurs 
within the normal experience of a given individual will 
depend upon two different groups of factors 
A. Factors relative to the adequate functioning of the 
conditions of the problem 
B. Factors relative to the experience upon which the 
conditions of the problem function. 
We shall now consider factors of experience in 
abstraction from factors relative to the functioning of 
the conditions. 
The least which is demanded by the functioning 
of the conditions of a problem is the existence of a 
"reservoir" of past experience o .Any analogy such as 
"reservoir"/ 
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"reservoir", when used to describe :past experience is 
of course, ipso racto, a straining of facts. But th~ 
term is convenient if it is taken as representing the 
sum of dispositional traces of :past experience and thus 
as the sum-total of potentially revivable experience. 
Two aspects of the nature of the "reservoir" affecting 
the success of the problem-solving process may 
provisionally be assumed, {1) the qualitative aspect, 
(2) the quantitative aspect. 
Qualitative Aspects of Past Experience in relation to the 
Successful Solution of Problems. 
The importance of the factor of relevance in 
accounting for the success of the problem-solving 
process has already been stressed, but clearly if 
appropriate experience has never been present, the 
principles making for the eduction of the relevant, 
however adequately they function, must function in vain. 
Where experience has ·been inadequate, no problem-solving 
process can be successful. It must be noted that in a 
problem where there has been inadequate experience a 
successful solution may yet be found, since random 
trial-and-error activity may possibly result in the 
filling of the gap by relevant material. But it cannot 
be said that in such a case, the problem has been 
intelligently solved. Chance will be a factor in the 
solution, and the problem-solving process will have none 
of the characteristics of an intelligent process. 
Lack of appropriate experience accounts for most 
cases of failure to solve :problems in the case of subjects 
who are recognised to be intelligent. If there is 
nothing within the "reservoir" of experience, which, by 
the organising work of the conditions of the :problem, can 
be brought into connection with the specific gap, the 
most adequate functioning of the conditions of the 
problem must result in failureo It is with this fact in 
mind that intelligence tests which are designed to test 
the individual's ability to organise experience in 
relation to existing gaps, involve only such material as 
must be common property to all the subjects undergoing 
the test. Only by such means can experience factors be 
discounted and the efficacy of the :principles organising 
experience be measured in abstraction from the experience 
which they organise. 
Again, the material within the "reservoir11 of a 
given individual will tend to be appropriate to certain 
kinds/ 
49 
kinds.of problems rather than others, and hence the 
ex:per1ence factors in the :problem- solving :process 
stimulated by the consciousness of such :problems will 
favour relevance. This is one of the facts which 
explain special abilities. 
It is clear, then, that the experience within 
the "re~ervoir" must be c~aracterised by the quality of 
a:p:pro:pr1ateness to the ex1sting :problem-situation if a 
successful solution is to be found. The detecti~n of 
appropriate experience :presupposes in every case the 
existence of a larger mass of experience bearing in a 
general way upon the situation. The exactly appropriate 
:portions of experience are always surrounded by 
experiential contexts characterised by lesser degrees of 
appropriateness. These larger masses may or may not be 
present to consciousness. The existence of such larger 
masses may be verified by introspective examination of 
a :process of conscious selection of appropriate material 
for any given purpose, for example, for the writing of 
an essay. Sometimes the consciousness of the larger 
mass of experience in which the exactly relevant is 
discovered is :present, sometimes it is absent. 
In the case of the pro cess involved in the 
initial coming to mind of the relevant in answer to the 
consciousness 6f a problem, the consciousness of the 
larger masses of experience is almost invariably absent, 
since the initial process does not involve conscious 
selection of the relevant. If, however, the items which 
first present themselves in answer to the stimulus, are 
allowed to develop their implications by a conscious 
process, the larger masses in which they are "imbedded" 
come with such facility to mind that it is a likely 
hypothesis that such larger masses are already implicitly 
aroused in the course of the initial production of the 
relevant. Whether or not this is the case, the facts at 
least show that the coming to mind of relevant experience 
in every case presupposes the existence of a background 
of exneriences characterised by lesser degrees of 
relev~ncy, and fading off into the completely irrelevant. 
Quantitative Aspects of Experience. 
Amount in relation to Relevance. 
In so far as the exactly relevant is always to 
be found within a mass of experience characterised by 
degrees of relevanc~ varying from the less relevant t~ the 
irrelevant, it might be presumed that amount of exper1ence 
would/ 
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would ultimately be a factor influencing the success of 
the problem-solving :procE;lss. It seems probable that·. a 
l~rge=: "reservoir" of.experience would have a greater 
l1kel1hood of contain1ng appropriate experience. Hence 
in considering the general measure of an individual's 
success in solving problems, one might be inclined to 
believe that an individual who had at his command a 
large "reservoir" of experience, would tend to find within 
it experience appropriate to a greater number of 
problems, and hence tend to be able to solve a greater 
number of problems. Such a consideration would lead to 
the conclusion that the amount of experience, in 
abstraction from its relevance, must be a factor 
determining success in solving :problems. 
But if this hypothesis is examined carefully, 
it is evident that what it implies with regard to "amount 
of experience" is not amount of experience in a purely 
quantitative senseo The implication is rather "amount 
of experience of a certain kind", which is exactly what 
is implied by the phrase "amount of experience" as used in 
ordinary discourse. 
When an individual is said to have "a great deal 
of experience", either of two th~ngs is implied. What 
is meant is either. (a} that he has much experience of one 
certain kind of material, or {b) that he has experience 
of many different kinds of material. It cannot be 
denied that these meanings of "amount of experiencen must 
be taken into account in considering the success of a 
problem-solving process, and they have already been 
touched upon in discussing the qualitative aspects of 
experience. In the first case, amount of experience of a 
certain kind of material will tend to render the 
indiVidual who possesses such experience able to solve 
problems dealing with such material, for he will have 
within the "reservoir" the experience appropriate to 
such problems. In the second case, the existence within 
the "reservoir" of experience of many diverse kinds of 
material will enable an individual to find experience 
appropriate to problems dealing with many different kinds 
of material and he will hence tend to be able to solve 
problems of'many diverse kinds. Thus, what is implied 
by "amount of experience" in ordinary discourse is amount 
of experience either {a) appropriate to problems all 
having the same kind of material as content or (b) 
appropriate to problems having diverse kinds of material 
as content. The meaning attached to amount of experience 
is thet'efore "amount of experience appropriate to certain 
kinds/ 
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kinds of problems", amount of experience in short 
characterised by a certain quality. It is clear that 
quality and quantity are not being separated the 
quali ~ati !e aspect is implied, although only' the 
quant~tat~ve aspect is explicitly talked of • 
. What then_is the purely quantitative aspect 
of exper~ence, cons~dered apart from its qualitative 
nature as appropriate or non-appropriate to gaps in the 
consciousness of problems? · 
If an attempt is to be made to consider the 
pure amount of experience in abstraction from the 
existence of problems, it will mean that the limits of 
revivable experience must be set. The pure amount of 
experience will then be the sum-total of revivable 
experience. 
There is, however, no limit to revivable 
experience; it is infinite and continuous, and there is 
no end to the possibility of revival. A person may 
"free-associate" into eternity. Thus, since there are 
no limits to the amount of revivable experience for any 
individual, the pure amount of experience is equal for 
every individual. Pure amount of experience, -or 
amount of experience considerwd apart from problems, 
requirements, purposes, is a theoretical abstraction, 
and has no significance. "Amount of experience" is only 
a significant ter.m relative to problems and purposes. 
It may be concluded, then, that the use of the 
term "amount of experience" as in ordinary discourse, is 
justifiable. Quantity of experience is only significant 
if what is meant is "quantity of experience of a certain 
quality", i.e., experience of certain kinds of material 
as the content of certain kinds. of problems, or, in other 
words, as relevant to the gaps in the consciousness of 
given ~roblems. It follows hence that the widest 
description that can be given of the quality of 
experience is the description of it as appropriate or non-
appropriate to gaps in the consciousness of problems. 
When amount of experience as characterised by 
the possession of this quality of appropriateness or non-
appropriateness is considered, it is clear that it is not 
an unlimited amount but limited by many different factors. 
The amount of exuerience relevant to a gap will be limited A. by Objective limits, e.g., there are a finite number of 
items in any class or set. 
B./ 
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B. by Subjective limits. (1) Individual experience may 
possibly only include a certain number 
of the members of a class or set. There 
are many classes of which it is con: 
ceivable that an individual might have 
full experience. There are many others 
of which it is inconceivable that he 
should have full experience. The 
possibility of having knowledge or 
experience of all the members of a class 
or set depends upon the objective nature 
of the class or set. What is important 
is that the individual frequently cannot, 
and more frequently does not, experience 
all the items of a class or set which 
exist for him to experience. His 
experience is thus a selection from the 
potentially experiencable number of items. 
Whatever at any time enters the 
individual's experience, is cognised or 
attended to, becomes part of the body 
of his potentially revivable experience. 
Hence the limits of potentially revivable 
experience appropriate to any gap are set 
objectively by the nature of the material 
of which it is the experience, and set 
subjectively by the amount of that 
material which the individual has chanced, 
or been able to exoerience. 
(2) At the moment of presentation of a 
problem to consciousness, the amount of 
the individual's experience is the amount 
he is at that moment actually able to 
recall. It is limited by the limits of 
recall. It is, in short, the amount of 
appropriate experience actually revi v·ed 
out of the potentially revivable. 
These considerations emphasise the point 
already made. The only significant sense of namount of 
experience" is amount of experience, not only appropriate 
to certain uroblems, but rather, the amount of potentially 
revivable eXperience appropriate to a certain gap, the 
amount of experience, in short, which the_individual 
could, if revival were complete, recall in answer to the 
requirements of a problem or problems involving certain 
kinds of material. Only in such a sense of the term can 
it be said that amount of experience will ensure a greater 
likelihood of the relevant to the gap being discovered 
within/ 
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within_it. It.is evi~ent that if a large number of 
potent~ ally_ re~J. vable J. terns appropriate to a specific 
gap ex1st WJ. thJ.n the "reservoirn, a greater number of 
these items will tend to be revived and the chances 
of discovering the item or items ex~ctly relevant 
to the gap will be increased. It is clear that what 
is important to the success of a specific problem-
solving thought process is, that given appropriate 
experience exists within the reservoir, i.e. is 
potentially revivable, as much of this potentially 
revivable experience as possible should be actually 
revived. 
It is to be concluded, therefore, that the 
factor which ultimatel~ determines the amount of 
experience existing for any specific problem is the 
factor which determines how much of the potentially 
revivable shall be actually revived. 
The Organisation of Experience. Organisation and 
Revivability. 
The widest and most inclusive factor determining 
the amount of experience which is revivable is the degree 
to which it is organised. This fact can be substantiated 
by reference to recognised facts about learning and 
remembering. For example, experimental investigations 
of the learning of nonsense syllables has shown that 
these are always organised by the subjects in some way 
and remembered as organised. There does not seem to be 
any material which does not admit of such subjective 
organisation. Series of dots are organised into 
patterns, series of sounds into rhythms, and the more 
easily a material lends itself to organisation the more 
easily is it reproduced. A student preparing for an 
examination will try to organise his material in 
definite ways, arranging it under various headings in 
logical patterns, and the greater the degree of 
organisation to which he subjects it, the greater the 
likelihood of its speedy and adequate recall when it is 
required. 
The or~anising of experience is to be 
attributed to se~eral snecific-mental activities such as, 
for example attention,~discrimination, or judgment, and 
it is for this reason, as we had occasion to point out, 
that intelliO'ence is often defined in terms of one or 
more of thes~ activities. A Gestalt theory of intelligence 
such as Ogden's (see Chapter IV) is similarl~ dependent 
upon references to the organisation of exper1ence, e.g., 
"the/ 
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"the na~ure of intelligence is revealed by the· contour 
and art~culateness of experience", the distinctive 
~eature of the G~stalt theories being that the growth 
~n the organisat1on of experience is considered as an 
objective ~h~nomen, without reference to any subjective 
mental act~v~ty such as is implied by attention 
discrimination or judgment. ' 
The most important generalisation which can 
be made about the organisation of experience is, 
however, that experience becomes organised through the 
solving of problems, and in so far as problems are 
successfully solved, experience grows in a way which fits 
reality. However abstract the problem-solving process 
may be and however abstract the problem itself may be, 
the success of the solution of the problem can only be 
measured in terms of its conformity with objective 
external fact. The criterion of success is thus, in 
a sense, pragmatic. Experience grows in a way conformable 
with objective reality because the solutions of problems 
are measured against objective reality, and this fact 
holds good for all levels of experience of which it may 
be said that problems hold for consciousness. 
An important consequence of the fact that 
experience becomes organised through the solving of 
problems, is that experience will tend to become most 
highly organised along the lines where most problems 
are solved. A problem will arise, as we saw, where a 
conative direction to an end is obstructed. Hence it 
will tend to be the case that the greatest number of 
problems will arise in connection with the kinds of 
material which subserve individual ends, that is, with 
the kinds of material with which conative interests are 
bound up. It can be assumed that where conative 
interests are implicated, the drive factor will be strong. 
There will be a greater incentive to solve such problems 
and the number of problems solved involving material in 
which interest is taken, will tend to be greater than the 
number of problems solved involving material in which 
no interest is taken. A strong interest in a certain 
kind of material will lead to the organisation, and 
accumulation of organised experience, of such material. 
Thus when the individual is presented with fresh problems 
involving this kind of material, there will be a greater 
likelihood that he will find in his past experience that 
which is appropriate to the problem, and will have, so far 
as experience factors go, a correspondingly better chance 
of solving the problem successfully. The effect is 
cumulative:/ 
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cumul~tive: the. greater the number of :problems involving 
the g1ven mater1al as content which he solves the greater 
the amount of organised eXperience appropriat~ to such 
problems will he have at his disposal, and the greater 
his chances of successfully solving more such problems. 
The fact offers a plausible explanation for special 
abilities, and is the ultimate argument for the efficiency 
of a high degree of specialisation. 
Since, then, experience which is easily 
revivable is experience which is highly organised, and 
since the degree to which it is organised may be said, 
in one aspect, to reflect the amount of conative interest 
taken in the material of which it is the experience, then 
the revivability of experience is partially to be 
attributed to conative factors not directly connected with 
problem-solving ability as sucho 
The capacity to organise experience, however, 
clearly does not depend wholly upon conative factors. 
To discuss the lines along which experience tends to 
become organised is not to discuss the capacity to 
organise experience. The capacity to organise 
experience differs from individual to individual even 
relative to the simplest material of experience, and 
there must exist some general factor or factors which 
determine the degree of success with which experience 
is organised. 
When we consider that experience becomes 
successfully organised, i.e., in a way which conforms 
with objective reality, through the successful solution 
of problems, it becomes evident that the same factors 
which account for the successful solution of problems 
must also account for the organisation of experienceo 
Thus, of the two groups of factors involved 
in the successful solving of problems, viz6, (a) factors 
of experience {b} factors determining the adequate 
functioning of the conditions of the problem, ioe., 
organising factors, the basic factors determining a 
general measure of success in problem solving will be the 
factors determining organising ability. In a specific 
given problem, if appropriate experience is pres~ed to 
exist, it will be possible to separate fact~rs wh1ch 
organise from factors relating to the exper1ence which is 
to be organised to fill the specific given gap, and to say 
that the successful solution of the given problem will 
depend both upon the adequate functioning of the conditions 
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of the problem, and the degree. to which the experience 
upon which they are required to function has been 
organised and is revivable. Over the course of an 
individual mental life, however, since the nature of 
the experience available for the solution of problems 
is ultimately determined by the efficiency with which 
the organising factors have operated in all past 
problems, it will be admitted that the organising 
factors have priority, and are the ultimate factors 
to which problem-solving ability is to be attributed. 
. Hence, since the factors accounting for the 
ability to organise experience are not accidental, the 
degree to which any existing experience is organised 
will not be accidental, but a basic factor influencing 
the general measure of an individual's success in 
solving problemso 
It is to be noted that the lines along which 
experience becomes organised, as dependent upon conative 
interests which have no a priori connection with 
ability as such, are accidental to the actual existence 
of problem-solving ability. The lines along which 
experience becomes organised will account for the 
existence of appropriate experience for any given 
problem. It will be a factor influencing the empirical 
measure of problem-solving ability, that is, the judgment 
as to the amount of problem-solving ability a given 
individual possesses based on the measure of the number 
of problems he is observed to have solved successfully. 
It is clear that many accidental factors will influence 
the empirical estimate of problem-solving ability. 
When the experience factors are ruled out by the device of 
presuming only a measure of appropriate experience which 
must be. common to all, persons who have b.een empirically 
judged to be more intelligent through having successfully 
solved a greater number of problems, may often be seen to 
have solved these problems in virtue of the possession of 
appropriate experience rather than in virtue of their 
actual ability to solve pr0blems. 
Thus, the lines along which experience is 
organised which will determine the existence or non-
existence o·f experience appropriate to any given problem, 
is an accidental factor determining success. It is not 
a factor determining the general measure of problem-
solving ability. It will always be present in a 
successful intelligent problem-solving process, but it may 
be present in a non-successful problem-solving process. 
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.Again, it may be present in either a successful or a non-
successful unin telligen t problem- solving process, i.e., 
it may be present and not be used because the ability 
~o employ the conditions of the problem adequately, or, 
1n other words, to organise the existing appropriate 
experience successfully, is ab sent • 
. He~ce it i~ to be concluded that ~he degree 
of ?rgan1sat1on ~f g1ve~ existing, i.e., potentially 
rev1 vable, exper1ence, 1 s the only experience factor 
to be found which is a determinant of the general 
measure of ability to solve problems. It has been 
shown how it depends in a fundamental way upon that 
ability itself. 
It is, in short, the way in which exnerience 
is used which is symptomatic of intelligence, and not 
either the amount of experience of a certain kind of 
material, or the amount of eA~erience of many diverse 
kinds of material. It must be recognised that such 
factors must influence the success of any specific 
problem-solving process, which will necessarily involve 
experience of a given specific material. If such 
appropriate experience is non-existent, the problem 
cannot be solved intelligentlyo But the existence or 
non-existence within the "reservoir" of experience 
appropriate to a given problem or series of problems 
has no connection with the actual problem-solving ability 
of the individual. Given that the appropriate experience 
exists, it is the degree to which it is organised which 
facilitates its revival, and provides the problem-
solving process with the material of experience to be 
shaped to fill the gap. Neither namount of experiencen 
nor "amount of experience having the quality of 
appropriateness or non-appropriateness" can be considered 
factors determining a general measure of problem-solving 
ability. The only sense in which the term "amount of 
experience" has any ultimate significance for a general 
measure of ability is when it is used as meaning the 
amount of notentiallv revivable experience existing as appropriat~ to a given problem, which is actually revived 
in response to the consciousness of that given problem. 
Adaptability of Organised Experience. 
The degree to which given appropriate experience 
is organised is not only important to the reviv~l of that 
experience, but is important also (a) as af~ect1~g~the 
speed with which it is revived and (b) the 1mmed1ave 
relevance of what is revived. 
This/ 
58 
This will be clearer if we consider by way ~f e~ample, what the organisation of experien~e will 
1mply as to the nature of that experience considered 
for the sake of clarity, on a simple level. 
. The productive-reproductive process by which 
the reV1val of the potentially revivable is effected, 
depends, as was seen, ultimately upon the principle of 
association. Associative units are always of a complex 
type. Association is only "association of ideas" if by 
"idea" is meant the kind of thing which can be exuressed 
in a sentence. They are complex units, wholes of 
interrelated parts, or configurations. TI1us, in such 
configurations as have been organised- and it was seen 
that organisation must accompany the act of intelligence 
(see Chapter IV) - the parts will be articulated in 
relation to the whole, and most importantly the relations 
holding between the parts of the configuration will 
become defined. 
Consequently, in an associative process 
directed to the production of the relevant for a given 
gap holding for consciousness, the presentation of one 
item will tend to arouse the more easily other parts of 
the configuration which are relevant to the gap if the 
configuration is already highly organised. 'Nhen 
experience is articulated and defined, revival of the 
relevant will be facilitated. 
Further, when the parts and relations within 
the configuration are clearly defined, the releasing of 
an item from one configuration and its transference to 
another will be more easily effected. This is particularly 
important when it is considered that at the ideational 
level, intelligence does not work by reproduction alone, 
but by the adaptation of past to present. For this to-
take .place, experience must be "pliablel!. Configurations 
must be able to be adapted.in various ways to special 
requirements. One way in which experience is adaptable 
may be considered by reference to Spearrnan's principle of 
the eduction of correlates, or perhaps more simply by 
reference to Stout's Principle of Relative Suggestiono 
If for exanmle a red circle and a green sq_uare are eo-
' ~ ' d b .... nresented so that an associative bond is forme evween 
them (i.e., if they are members of the same c<:mfigura tion, ) 
and then if on some future occasion, a red c1rcle ten 
times small~r than the original is presented, this red 
circle will revive a green square of corresponding size. 
The/ 
59 
The only explanation of such a fact is that 
association holds between abstracts rather than concretes, 
and uni versals rather than particulars. What is 
important is the relation perceived as existing between 
the items of the configuration. The principle of 
Relative suggestion shows how experience is adaptable 
since it shows how the revival of one item in a 
configuration in a different form from its original form, 
will revive the other items in corresponding relation. 
Moreover, if, in answer to the requirements 
of a problem situation several configurations of past 
experience are adapted in this way an entirely novel 
arrangement of experience may result. This is one 
way in which novelty enters, and originality can 
be accounted for. 
These facts are sufficient to illustrate 
the importance of the degree of articulation and 
definition, i.e., of organisation of past experience, 
to the problem-solving process. 
It is to be concluded that the degree to 
which the "reservoir" of past experience is organised 
is the most important factor determining the revival 
of past experience, both from the point of view of the 
speed and the relevance of what is revived. Finally, 
it is the only factor of experience which is a 
determinant of the general measure of ability to solve 
problems, considered apart from the empirical measure 
of the number of problems which have been successfully 
solved. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
The Definition and Operation of Controls. 
The definition of a control - The statement of' the 
cond.i ti ons of' a :problem. The Ouera tion o:f 
Controls (a} in relation to the dir:fi cul tv o:r the 
problem (b) in relation to dif:ferent levels of' o:perationo 
The Definition of' a Controlo 
It has been shown that the adequate functioning 
of the conditions of a :problem in their constitutive, 
productive and regulative aspects, is the factor upon 
which the success of the :problem-solving :process 
ultimately depends. In the light of the experience 
factors which have now been considered, this can be 
restated as, - the ability to solve :problems is the 
ability to organise experience in accordance with the 
conditions of the :problem. The constitutive aspect of 
the functioning of the conditions can thus be restated as 
the ability to organise the conditions of a :problem so 
that they constitute a specific gap. We saw that this 
meant that all the conditions of the :problem, through the 
medium of the gap which they specify, come together to act 
as one complex regulative condition directing the 
productive-reproductive :process, and that hence, in so far 
as each condition acts as an agent specifying the gap, the 
regulative and :productive power is ultimately to be 
referred to the conditions themselves. In the light of 
this, it can be concluded that in so far as each condition 
controls the :productive-reproductive :process, each 
condition can be regarded as a 'control' of the problem-
solving thought-process. The conditions of the :problem 
will in future be referred to as 'controls', and under 
the term •control' we shall understand that the three 
aspects~ constitutive, productive and regulative, of the 
conditions are included, since, as we have seen, all of 
these aspects are implied by the f'act that the problem-
solving thought process is directed by the consciousness 
of the gap. 
A control can be recognised by the fact that it 
is a condition which specifies the gap in the consciousness 
2!_1 
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of a problem. If any condition is stated in a problem 
which does not have any effect upon the 'shape' of the 
gap, that is, does not specify or define it further 
it is not a significant control. A control then is any 
significant condition of a problemo It frequen tiy ·happens 
that conditions are stated which do not specify the gap 
to an appreciable degree. This is one of the methods 
by which '.'trick" problems are constructed, for example. 
Again, when it is said of a problem that it is not 
"well stated" what is frequently meant is that non-
significant controls are included in the statement·, or 
that significant controls are not statedo 
The gap in the consciousness of a problem may 
be conceived as being specified to an additional degree 
with the addition of each significant control and hence, 
the productive-reproductive process will be controlled 
to a corresponding additional degree with the addition 
of each control. It is clear that the degree to which 
a control specifies the gap is measured by the degree to 
which it restricts the range of the productive -
reproductive process. If we suppose there to be two 
controls in a problem, then control A shuts out the 
possibility of the gap being filled solely by the 
productive-reproductive process stimulated by control B, 
and vice versa. Thus the lines of associative 
reproduction become specified as the gap becomes specified. 
The existence of control A narrows the gap in the B 
direction, the existence of control B narrows the gap 
in the A direction, and hence the lines along which the 
gap cannot be filled are eliminated as irrelevant, and the 
lines which are relevant remaino The result of the 
adequate functioning of controls must be the elimination 
of the irrelevant and facilitation of the relevant. 
The Statement of the Conditions of a Problem. 
An interrogative sentence was shown to be the 
expression of the consciousness of a problemo It 
expresses verbally a questioning attitude of mind which 
implies that a gap exists for consciousness. The 
expression of the questioning attitude is the essential 
function of an interrogative sentence, but clearly a 
questioning attitude cannot be expressed without 
expressing at the same time that which it questions, or, 
in other words, with regard to what a questioning 
attitude is held. It must express, in short, where the 
gap is. Hence an interrogative sentence must indicate 
(a) that a gap exists and (b) where a gap exists. 
It/ 
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It is to be noted that an interrogative sentence 
does not necessarily include any statement as to how the 
gap is speci~ied. The conditions of the problem state 
how the gap J.s specified, and the conditions need not be -
and frequently are not - expressed in the statement of the 
question which shows where the gap exists. Thus an 
interrogative sentence is neither necessarily nor usually 
the statement in its· entirety of the problem as it is 
apprehended as a wholeo The statement of the problem as 
it exists for consciousness would require that all the 
controls of the problem should be stated as well as that 
the place where a gap exists for consciousness relative 
to these controls, should be indicated. If then the 
consciousness of a problem is to be expressed verbally at 
all, it must express the fact that a gap exists and with 
regard to what it exists, but it need not state how the gap 
is specified. In the actual expression of stated 
problems, for example, a statement of conditions may be 
made and followed by a question indicating the whereabouts 
of the gap which is to be filled by the functioning of 
the conditions, as in the problem "Given ~c - 45°, A~m -
550 and BC - 4.2c o ·what is the length of AB?" Again, 
the statement of all or some of the conditions can be 
made within the interrogative sentence itself, as, for 
example, in the riddle "Vlhat is 1 t that can go up a pipe 
down, but not dovm a pipe up?" or the question nwho was 
the most famous English poet living before the sixteenth 
century?n But the ways in which problems may be stated 
are innumerable. What :is more important is that most 
often only the whereabouts of the gap _in relation to 
certain material is stated, and the conditions which 
specify the gap have to be supplied by the individual 
solving the problem, as, for example, in "?{hat is the 
relation of ethics to Politics?" "What part does capital 
play in the remuneration o:f labour?" In both these 
cases the controls for the problem have to be supplied. 
Thus, in dealing with problems which are 
expressed verbally, the distinction between subjectively 
and objectively set conditions has to be drawno Clearly, 
if an individual sets a problem to himself, or becomes 
conscious that a specific problem exists, the conditions of 
the problem are set subjectively, while in a geometrical 
problem such as that given above, the conditions are set 
objecti~ely. The distinction is only valid, however, 
in reference to stated or expressed problems. So far as 
the consciousness of a problem is concerned, all the 
conditions are set objectively, for they are set by the 
relations/ 
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relations existing between the facts of objective 
reality.i> 
In a verbally expressed problem, where all the 
conditions are not stated, the problem will most 
frequently b~ found not to be a simple problem, where the 
problem-solv1ng process is directed to the filling of 
one gap, but a complex problem containing many sub-problems 
and ga:pso For example "Wnat is the relation of ethics 
to politics?" presents a problem to consciousness, but 
it is a complex problem, in that the decision as to the 
controls specifying the main gap will involve the solving 
of numerous sub-problemso 
It must be noted that when problems of this 
nature are set for individuals to solve, the aim in view 
is most frequently not the measuring or exercising of 
problem-solving ability as such, so much as the 
measuring of the amount and the degree of organisation 
of the past experience appropriate to a certain kind of 
problem, i.e., experience of a certain kind of material 
existing within the 'reservoir' of the individual's 
experience. Since, however, as we have seen, the degree 
of the organisation of past experience reflects the 
number of problems which have been solved in the past, 
the result is ultimately the same. The immediate object, 
however, is the measuring of the amount of appropriate 
experience which exists. This is the aim of most 
problems set in examination papers, for example, and thus 
simple (i.e., non-complex) problems are most usually to 
be found wher·e the aim is to test problem-solving ability 
in contradistinction from the runount of appropriate 
experience; 
~It can be said of problems where the conditions do not 
express necessary connections between objective facts, that 
they are 'artificial' problems, designed to test ability to 
solve problems. Problems where the conditions are presumed 
to represent necessary connections existing between 
objective facts and do not do so are not valid problems. 
There are thus two main types of problems, (a) problems 
where the conditions express purely formal connections 
between facts, without reference to the conformity of the 
relations expressed with externally existing relations, and 
(b) problems where the conditions express connections 
existing between facts of the external objective world. 
Each, to be valid, must be consistent with its own type. 
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experience existing within the reservoir, as in 
intelligence tests, or ~roblems devised to test ingenuity 
such~~ tricks.o~.puzzles. Such problems are commonly 
descr7oe~ as d7fi:?ult, but what is meant is that they. 
are d~ff~cult ~n vnat either the exact relations of the 
conditions relative to the whole are difficult to 
deteTI?-ine, i~e.! the gap is difficult to specify, or 
that ~t is d~ff1cult to find an item relevant to the gap. 
They are not complex in the sense that they include 
a number of sub-problems. 
Most of the nroblems met with in the course of 
every day living are complex in the latter sense, whether 
they are problems specifically set by other persons 
for us to solve or whether they are problems which are 
apprehended as existing specifically for an individual 
consciousness. \Vhen a problem of administration is 
talked of, for example, what is most frequently implied 
is a series of problems bearing upon a certain point. 
Even in such a problem as "Shall I appoint an executive 
committee or deal with the matter personally?", it is 
clear that many sub-problems are involved. Problems as 
they are conceived in ordinary discourse then, are inter: 
related wholes of ~roblems, subsumed under the conscious: 
ness of and directing the trend of thought ~recesses 
towards the filling of one main gapo Each of the gaps 
in the consciousness of the sub-problems will be specified 
by its own specific controls, and each sub-gap must be 
filled by the operation of a specific controlled problem-
solving process. The judgments which are made as a 
result of the solutions of these sub-problems will most 
probably be the controls specifying the gap in the main 
nroblem. Hence the controls in the sub-problems are not 
the controls of the main problem. They relate to a 
specific gap which is not the same gap as is specified by 
the controls of the main problem. 
It may be concluded that the type of problem 
which is technically to be known as a complex problem is 
reducible to a number of simple problems where the controls 
specify one given specific gap and direct a productive-
reproductive process towards the filling of this gap. 
Simple problems of this type and of a structure such as 
we have analysed, are thus the elements of ~recesses of 
directed thought, however complex t~ese p~ocesses may seem, 
and however abstruse the problems w1th wn1ch they deal. 
If this is so, a control must be defined so 
that the definition makes clear the fact that a control 
is/ 
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is not any condition which may be connected with the 
larger whole of a complex problem. It is a condition 
which is significant to one specific gap in the 
conscio~sness of a problem, and controls one specific 
product~ve-reproductive process. 
With these various considerations in view, 
a co~t~ol ma? be defined as any specific significant 
cond~t~on, e~ther stated or unstated, which exists 
relative_to a specific gap in a given problem present 
to consc~ousness, and which defines that gap to a specific 
degree. 
The Oueration of Controls (a) in Relation to the 
Difficulty of the Problem. 
The difficulty of any given problem may depend 
either upon the factors of experience involved, or upon 
the control or· organising factors. Both factors may 
present difficulty in any one given problem. 
Difficulties which can be attributed purely 
to experience factors arise when the appropriate 
experience is difficult to recall, even presuming it 
exists as potentially revivab~e. For example, although 
the conditions may nave been so org~Dised that the 
gap is adequately specified and there is implicit 
knowledge of the properties which must be possessed by 
the item which is to fill the gap, an item possessing 
exactly these properties may not be revivable. When 
the fulfilling of one or more conditions of a problem 
presents difficulties, it most often means that a 
sufficient number of items fulfilling these conditions 
have either never been known or that they have not entered 
experience in such a way as to be easily revivable. 
Difficulties relative to experience factors, then, relate 
generally either to the kind of material which is present 
in the 'reservoir', or to the degree of its organisation. 
If, however, the question of the difficulty of 
a problem is considered apart from ~th.e 0xperience factors 
involved, ioe., apart from its dependence upon certain 
facts of past experience, it will be seen to depend upon 
difficulties arising from the control factors. Such 
difficulties are largely due to the difficulty of 
organisin~ the controls so that the gap is adequately 
. 0 • 
specified in relation to them. Where the gap ~s not 
adequately specified in relation to the controls, knowledge 
of the properties which an item must possess to fill 
the/ 
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the gap adequately will be lacking, and thus the 
:productive-reproductive process will not be directed 
towards the production of the relevant. 
As a general rule, it may be said that the 
greater the number of controls present, the greater the 
difficulty in organising them to specify the gap. It 
is the constitutive aspect of the controls in such case 
which gives difficultyo The method most frequently 
used in the constructing of diff'icult problems (apart 
frcxn experience factors) is the multiplication of the 
number of controls. This rule must be aualified in 
several directions, however. A problem\vhich contains 
several controls may yet prove easier to solve than one 
which contains :rewer controls, because the gap is often 
narrowed in such a way when many controls are present 
that the properties of the item which must fill the gap 
become fully definedo On the other hand, a problem 
which contains relatively few controls may leave open so 
many lines along Which the relevant may be found, that 
much conscious discrimination between the more and less 
relevant items is entailed. It will depend ultimately 
upon experience factors whether a gap which is specified 
to a high degree is easier to fill than a gap which is 
not so highly specified. Moreover, it is clear that 
a gap to which only one item is relevant is not 
necessarily easier to fill than a gap to which several 
items are relevant, and vice versao The controls 
having been organised to specify the gap and the kind of 
item required being known, all will c1e:pend u:pon whether 
such an item is easy to find in experience or not. 
It may be concluded that the degree of 
difficulty which any problem presents to a given 
individual, as depending upon experience factors, will be 
diff'icult to estLffiate, since the quantity and quality 
(i.e., degree of organisation) of the experience at his 
disposal will not be easily calculated. In problems 
where difficulties arising from experience factors can 
be discounted as, for example, in certain intelligence 
test problems'where only a common measure of experience 
is presupposed, the difficulty of fue problem will be easier 
to estimate, since it will be dependent upon 
(a) the number of controls present 
(b) the complexity of the interrelations of these controls 
(c) the amount of re-organisation of past experience which 
is necessary before it can be adapted to present 
requirements. 
- 6? -
The Operation of Controls (b) in relation to two 
different Levels of the Problem-Solving Process. 
It is clear that any initial process producing 
the relevant is not complete without either impliei t 
acceptan~e of what comes or explicit judgment between 
alternatlves as to their greater or less relevancy. 
Whatever the factors upon which the difficulty 
of a problem depends, if it should present difficulty 
at all, it will tend to involve the conscious process 
of judgment between alternatives and even possibly a 
trial-and-error process, either mental or actual, with 
regard to the items initially produced. 
Most problems will involve two processes (A) 
a process of the initial production of the relevant, 
(B) a process of conscious selection of more from less 
relevant. The line of demarcation which it has been 
found necessary to draw between the two processes gives 
r~se to several important questions. It may be asked, 
for example, whet~er the second process is qualitatively 
different from the first or whether they are both one 
continuous developing processo 
The most obvious difference between the two 
processes and that in virtue of which the line of 
demarcation was initially drawn, lies in the fact that 
the first process, the initial production of the relevant, 
takes place below the level of conscious direction, 
while the second process of selection or judgment is 
fully consciously directed. Both processes must result 
in the elimination of the irrelevant according to the 
same criteria of what is relevant, i .. e., according to the 
apprehension of the gap as specified. This becomes 
evident when we consider that in cases where the first 
process fails to throw up into consciousness the exactly 
relevant item or items, the whole process which we have 
conceived as taking place below the conscious level, ioe., 
the directing of the productive-reproductive process by 
controls, takes place on the conscious levelo It might be 
said that it is reiterated on the conscious level. Where 
the first process fails to produce what is relevant, the 
procedure most likely to be followed is to re-examine the 
conditions carefully in relation to the gap, to make 
certain what exact properties must be possessed by the item 
which can fill the gap, and then to work backwards over the 
associative relational contents of each condition, 
consciously selecting whatever may be relevant to the 
requirements/ 
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requirements or the other conditions, (or, in other 
words, to the gap as specified} and afterwards applying 
critical tests or suitabilityo 
This_ process in its entirety will, however, 
only be gone tnrough where the initial unconscious 
prooess fails to throw up relevant items, and there is no 
question as to the priority in time of the processes 
relative to a specific effort to solve a problemo The 
presentation of a problem will always stimulate some 
ideas. (The case where, on being presented with a 
problem what is described as "a complete blank" ensues, 
is to be explained by reference to the intervention of 
conative or emotive inhibitory factors). Such items 
as are produced by the initial process may prove, on 
critical examination, not to be relevant to the specific 
gap, but they will be characterised in every case-by a 
degree of relevance. When it is said that the initial 
process fails to throw up the relevant, what is meant is 
that it fails to throw up the exactly relevanto An 
initial productive process is thus always present before 
any conscious process, no matter how unsuccessful it is 
in producing the exactly relevant. 
Since, then, it seems justifiable to distinguish 
two processes within the thought process directed to the 
solving of a problem, we must consider how the difference 
in the degree of consciousness by which the one process 
is distinguished from the other, is to be accounted for. 
The most probable explanation is by reference to 
the analogy of physical habit formation, which, from a 
process involving trial-and-error activity, conscious 
selection of the successful and ·conscious jud~aent 
between alternatives, becomes a process in which none of 
these conscious activities and efforts are involved, and, 
as it becomes automatic, sinks below the level of 
conscious direction. The employing of controls may be a 
mental habit of a complex order, and if so, the process of 
acquiring the habit of employing controls will thus pass 
through the same stages as those through which the 
acquiring of a motor habit will pass. It is evident, for 
example, that the solving of problems becomes more like a 
habit as age and education advance. Children tend to solvE 
the problems with which they are confronted by a process 
which involves a high percentage of trial-and-error 
activity and must thus be largely conscious. This is not 
only the case ~~th children, but with unintelligent adultso 
It may be taken that the presence of intelligence hastens 
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the acquiring or habits. The inculcation of habits in 
mental detectives or feeble-minded persons takes 
considerable time. Thus a feeble-minded individual 
may never acquire the habit of employing controls, and 
when such a :person attempts to solve a :problem he may 
do so, but he will tend to do so by non-intellfgent 
methods, by trial-and-error process with regard to 
material which is frequently entirely irrelevant. It 
may be said that the outstanding feature characterising 
an unintelligent problem-solving :process is the failure 
of the initial :process to produce the relevant to the 
gap. Hence the second process of conscious selection 
takes place with regard to items which are irrelevant. 
This failure of the initial productive process 
can best be described (in all cases where lack of 
appropriate experience is not a factor) as a failure to 
employ controls. VJhere this failure constantly occurs, 
it may be presumed that the individual has not yet 
acquired, or cannot acquire, the habit of employing 
controls. Where the failure is only occasional, the 
difficulty presented by specific problems as regard to 
the organising of controls might account for failure. 
Hence it may be that failure to solve :problems 
intelligently occurring in the case of children, is to be 
attributed to the fact that they have not yet acquired 
the habit of employing controls. It is evident that 
the habit will only be acquired through intensive 
practice in problem solving, and this is, of course, 
exactly what is given in the ·course of education. In the 
case of adults who consistently fail to solve problems, 
failure must be accounted for by the fact that the ability 
to employ controls must be lacking, since the habit has 
not been acquired in the course of education and ex:perienceo 
It is a likely hypothesis, then, that there must be some 
innate factor which determines the ability to employ 
controls. Clearly, if the ability to employ controls is 
absent, the employing or controls cannot become a habit. 
In the second place, it is .evident that the ability to 
employ controls must either be improved by practice or 
facilitated by practice. That the ability must be 
present before the facility can be acquired is clear, but 
it is more· difficult to decide whether the increase in 
capacity to solve problems with the advance of age and 
exuerience is due (1} to increase in experience factors, (2) to improvement 
in the abil.i ty to employ controls, or (3) simply to a 
facility in the employment of controls gained by extensive 
practice./ 
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practice. One ~act which is certain is that the greater 
the extent to which the employment of controls has become 
a habit, the less the degree of consciousness with which 
the process will be characterisedo Thus the greater 
the facil~ty with which controls are employed, the· 
further w111 the unconscious initial process or 
production of the relevant encroach upon the second 
process where conscious elimination of the irrelevant 
and selection or the relevant takes place. In other 
words, the greater the extent to which employment of 
controls has become a habit, the greater will be the 
portion of the second conscious process which sinks 
below the threshhold of conscious direction. For 
example, in the case where the exactly relevant to the 
gap instantly presents itself along with the appreheRsion 
of the meaning of the problem, the second process is 
reduced merely to a conscious acceptance of what comes 
as relevant to the gap. The operation of the controls 
on the productive-reproductive process takes place 
wholly below. the threshhold of consciousness, and hence 
no second process, no conscious selection of the 
relevant, is necessary. 
As a general rule, the instantaneous presentation 
of the relevant only occurs in simple problems. Only 
occasionally does it happen to the nornial individual that 
the exactly relevant answer to a difficult problem instantlJ 
presents itself. ~nen it does happen, it will be regarded 
as mystifying, since no series of mental events leading up 
to the production of the relevant idea can be detected by 
introspection. Such instant solutions are regarded as 
"inspirations" and it is implied that they lie outside the 
normal sequence of mental events.p The frequent 
occurrence/ 
/J Investigators of originality and genius have always taken 
account of the phenomenon of the sudden rise of the 
completely relevant. It is generally admitted that such 
phenomena are to be attributed to the operation of processe~ 
taking place below the conscious level. Knowlson says, 
for example, "Sudden illuminations point to a course of 
previous unconscious work" (T.Sharper Knowlson. Originality. 
The same view is expressed by Ribot and Allera (L•Imaginat: 
ion Creatrice. Sulla Questione del Genic}. 
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occurrence of ·"inspirations" is commonly taken as 
evidence of the existence of genius, which is thus 
consequently conceived of as differing qualitatively 
from normal intelligence, or as being dependent upon 
some factor or factors suneradded to the normal mental 
outfit. ~ 
The main fact upon which these assumptions 
are based is the non-introspectibility of the process of 
the production of the relevant. As we have already 
considered (see Chapter IV, page 37) the process 
involved in the production of the exactly relevant 
answer to a very simple question is too quick to be 
introspectible. The same can be said of the coming to 
mind of the exactly relevant in a difficult nroblem. 
In the difficult problem, however, the fact that a 
much more complex operation of controls must be involved, 
is to be considered. It must be the case in the 
production of an "inspiration" that complex control and 
experience factors have operated instantly to produce 
the relevant. Where the production of an inspiration 
is an occasional event, it can only be supposed that on 
such occasions a fortunate concatenation of all the 
factors making for success in the solving of a problem 
has occurred. Naturally a certain capacity to use 
controls and a certain facility in their use must be 
presupposed. 
In the case of an individual who :frequently 
produces solutions of the inspirational type to problems, 
a very great facility in the employment of controls must 
be supposedq It must happen that the operation of the 
controls takes place so quickly and with so little 
conscious effort that the process of production of the 
relevant frequently takes place below the level of 
conscious direction. 
In neither of these cases is it necessary to 
suppose that the process of production of the relevant 
is a qualitatively different process from the process as 
it takes place normally with a certain degree of 
conscious direction. In the case of the person who 
does not habitually produce so called inspirations, it is 
most probable that the operation of controls has by chance 
taken place as a habitual motor action would take 
place. In the case of the person who frequently 
produces inspirational solutions to problems, it must 
be supposed that a habit of employing controls has been 
acquired. Thus the analogy of physical habit will 
explain the process in both cases, and there is 
no/ 
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no n~ed either to suppose the intervention of 
qualitatively different factors or that the process of 
t~e production of the relevant is a qualitatively 
d~fferent process. Further, there is no necessity to 
suppose that the intelligence which tends to produce 
answers of the inspirational variety to problems is 
qualitatively different from the normal intelligence. 
What may be reasonably supposed is that the first type 
of intelligence can be explained as a quantitative 
heightening of the normal intelligence. Before the 
operation of controls could become a habit perfect 
enough to explain the frequent operation of controls 
below the level or conscious direction, it must be 
supposed that the ability to employ controls is already 
present. This alone would not be sufficient, however. 
If facility in the use of controls depends upon other 
or additional factors than these upon which the ability 
to. employ controls depends, these other factors must also 
be presupposed as existing before the perfection which 
the habit of employing controls has reached, can be 
adequately explained. Given both these factors, which 
are merely quantitative heightenings of factors present 
in normal intelligence, the adequate and speedy operation 
of controls which will result will explain the speed with 
which the process of production of the relevant takes 
place, and the degree of unconsciousness which characterise: 
it. 
Thus, given the fact that the operation of 
employing controls can become so facilitated as to present 
the characteristics of a habit formation and to sink below 
the level of conscious direction, the initial process of 
production of the relevant which characterises every 
normally intelligent problem-solving process can be 
accounted foro It is that part of the problem-solving 
process as a whole, in which the controls operate without 
conscious direction. The greater the extent to which 
controls can operate automatically, the wider the extent 
of the initial process of production of the relevant, 
since a greater part of the work of the direction of the 
productive-reproductive process by controls will be done 
within tWs initial process instead of within the second 
process where the operation of the controls is consciously 
directedo The adequacy of the initial process and its 
extent can be taken as reflecting the degree to which the 
employment of controls has become a habit. In view of 
these considerations, then, it may be concluded that the 
unconscious and conscious processes are parts of one and 
the same continuous problem-solving process. The same 
factors/ 
factors are involved in the success of the process at each 
level, the end of each is the same, and. each performs 
the same operation. The only di ff'erence existing in 
virtue of which it :proves convenient to speak of ~o 
processes in :place of one, lies in the fact that the first 
process is characterised by the lesser degree of 
consciousness required for the direction of the :process 
by controls. 
To consic1er the question from a dif'f'eren t angle, 
it is often said that types of intelligence fall into two 
main categories, the intuitive type of intelligence and 
the logical or rational type.~ There is universal 
recognition of this distinction which is based on the 
empirical observation that there seem to be two different 
ways of arriving at a conclusion which characterise two 
different types of mind. The first method belongs to the 
rational type of mind which apprehends facts in series 
of logical interrelations, and follows out each step in 
the argument. The second method belongs to the intuitive 
type of mind. Here the relations existing between facts 
seem to be grasped without the aid of the conscious 
ratiocinating process characterising the first 
type of mind. T.S.Knowlson describing this type of 
problem-solving process says that it depends upon the 
possession of an "Illati ve Sense" - "by which the mind 
draws remote inferences without conscious syllogistic 
process" (Origina.li ty. Chap. I). 
When we consider that these descriptions of 
different types of mind are differentiating the two in 
virtue of a di ff'erence in the method of solving problems 
which characterises each, the distinction may be seen to 
bear upon the present discussion. 
With the conclusions of' the foregoing discussion 
of the degrees o:f consciousness characterising dif'ferent 
sections of' the problem-solving process in mind, it 
becomes uossible to conceive the intuitive type of mind 
as explained, partially at least, as a type of mind in 
which the problem-solving processes take place largely 
below the level of' conscious direction. As was seen, 
when this is the case, the initial process of production 
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of the relevant encroaches upon the second conscious 
process.in such a way that much of the conscious process 
of draw~ng out the implications of the conditions and of 
judgment between alternatives becomes unnecessary. In 
the case of the rational type of mind however it may be 
supposed that the second and consciou~ process'has a 
larger share of the problem-solving process as a whole, and 
that hence the larger part of the process of direction 
of production by controls lies above the conscious level. 
Here again there is no necessity to suppose 
an absolute qualitative difference between the two types 
of mind. The stage of intuition looks like a stage of 
practice. The machinery of the mind is so well practised 
that the operation of the employment of controls is 
immeasurably speeded up, unnecessary steps are eliminated, 
and economy of time and effort is effected as in the case 
of motor habit. But just as in the case of motor habit, 
the steps must all at one time have been present and made 
by conscious voluntary efforto 
Again, there is no suggestion that the 
intuitional type of intelligence is superior in 
reliability to the rational type. It may be the case 
that the ability to solve problems as judged by the 
number of problems successfully solved is the same in the 
case of two individuals, one of whom we shall suppose 
to have a rational, while the other has an intuitive 
type of mind. It is not in the ability to employ controls 
that the differentiating factor lies. The difference is 
one of the facility with which controls are employed. 
This may depend solely upon practice in the use of 
controls, but if this were the case, it would also be the 
case that where an equal amount of ability to employ 
controls was present, an equal amount of practice in 
solving problems would result in equal degrees of facility 
in the use of controls. It seems that some factor 
besides practice must be postulated to account for the 
varying degrees of facility which individuals acquire in 
the use of controls. It may be suggested that a factor 
such as the capacity to form mental habits could account 
for facility. It would hence be a factor of a . 
constitutional kind, and one not necessarily related to 
the factors which account for the ability to employ 
controls. But again, the facility with which controls 
are employed may be an inborn characteristic in some 
individuals while others may attain facility by practice. 
C.S.Myers notes that "there can be little doubt that there 
are wide individual differences in the extent to which we 
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are endowed with intuition. But there can also be 
little doubt that intuition in any given occupation can 
be cultivated, and that its value can be improved by 
careful exercise.]' (C.S.Myers • .A Psychologist's Point 
of View). Since, as we have seen, intuition is 
accountable for, at least in part, as facility in the use 
of controls, Dr.Myers' point may be taken as substantiating 
the view that facility in the use of controls may be 
acquired, although it is frequently an inborn trait. 
Further, in so far as genius is frequently characterised 
by the intuitional method of solving problems, it may be 
that genius stands in the same relation to normal 
intelligence as instinct stands to habito Genius may 
be the inborn formation which the intelligent man may 
come near attaining through practice. As was shown, 
there is no necessity to suppose qualitative or 
structural differences between the normal intelligence 
and genius any more than to suppose such differences to 
exist between rational and intuitive types of intelligenceo 
Through long practice in problem-solving an individual 
may come to solve problems by the intuitional method. 
This is particularly the case with problems of 
a certain type involving a certain kind of material. We 
saw, in dealing with the 'reservoir' of experience that 
the continual solving of problems dealing with a certain 
kind of material led to the accumulation of a body of 
organised experience appropriate to such problemso 
With the practice given in solving such problems, 
the facility with which controls are used will also 
increase so'that the whole process, in virtue both of 
experience and organisi~~ factors, becomes facilitated 
and sinks below the level of conscious direction. Thus 
the attainment of the stage of intuition (i.e., the stage 
of practice) is very much hastened when problems all deal 
with a specific type of material. A consideration of . 
this nature will account for what is meant in talking of 
"financial genius", "business sense" or "intuition in 
business matters". It seems to be a fact that the 
financial or administrative genius very often does not 
reason out every step of his procedure, and thus may be 
said to proceed by intuition. Dr.Ivlyers says .,The 
successful business man or financier owes his success 
largely to intuition. He often does not know w~t he 
takes certain lines of action; frequently, even 11 he 
were able he has not time enough to think out reasons 
for his decisions"o In other words, the use of controls 
in relation to his own specific kind of material has 
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become so much of a mental habit, that the :problem-
solving :processes are characterised by a low degree of 
cons?iousness. . S? great a degree of practice may be 
atta1ned that d~:f:f~cult :problems involving many controls 
may be solved in this way. Lord Melchett in the 
Universities Review, 1928, wrote "The business man is 
compelled, by reason of his trade, to make decisions 
and to reason often quite subconsciously on :problems 
involving a very great number of factors" (i.e., controls). 
Conclusions. 
It is evident that the facility with which 
controls operate accounts for several phenomena of the 
problem-solving processo Facility in the use of 
controls implies that the use of controls has become 
to a greater or less degree, a mental habit. In 
proportion as the employing of controls becomes a habit, 
the operation tends to sink below the level of conscious 
iirection. In normally intelligent individuals, the 
operation of controls attains sufficient independence 
of conscious direction as to allow of an initial 
Qnconscious process of production of the relevant always 
taking placeo 
Increase in the facility with which controls 
are employed will lead to progressive decrease in the 
amount of voluntary effort required to direct the · 
productive-reproductive process by the controls. As in 
the case of physical habit, the :formation of the habit 
speeds up the operation. Hence when facility in the use 
of controls has been acquired, the operation of the 
controls, which results in the production of the 
relevant, will take place with greater speed. 
The degree of facility characterising the 
performance of any individual with controls may be 
attributed either to the result of practice or to an 
innate factor such as, for example, a factor which 
might determine capacity to acquire mental habits. It 
appears to be the case that facility in the use of 
controls is an innate characteristic in some individuals, 
while in some others it can be attained through practice. 
The speed with which the :production of the 
relevant is effected, does not imply anything as to its 
success. The facility with which controls operate is 
not the same thing as the adequacy with ~vhich they 
operate. The intuitive type of intelligence may solve 
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problems more speedily, but it will not, of' necessity, 
solve them more successrully than the rational type of mind. 
Facility in the use or controls must.ultimately 
depend upon the ability to use controls. An individual 
must be able to organise eXperience by controls before 
the operation can be speeded up through practice. Where 
ability to use controls is not present at all, facility 
in the use of controls cannot exist. Ability to use 
controls is more basic than facility in the use of 
controls. More facility in the use of controls than 
ability to use controls might characterise the problem-
solving activity or a given individual. This would mean 
that he tended to solve problems quickly, but that his 
solutions were f'requently unsatisractoryo On the other 
hand, in another individual the ability to use controls 
might be present to a high degree while facility was 
almost entirely absento Such a person would tend to 
solve problems successfully, but slowly and painstakingly. 
Whether we are dealing with a normal or with a 
high level of intelligence, with an intelligence in which 
controls operate largely on the unconscious level, or an 
intelligence in which controls operate largely on the 
conscious level, what is important is that the controls 
should operate adequately in order that the problem-. 
solving process is successfulo 
It is evident that the ability to employ controls 
differs from individual to individual as does facility. 
Just as the f'acility with which controls are employed 
may be either an inborn formation or acquired through 
practice, so it is possible that ability to employ controls 
may be improved through practice in the solving of' problems. 
The degree of' success which will attend the 
problem-solving activity of any given individual will 
depend upon his ability to employ controls, that is, on 
his ability to keep all the controls of' a given problem 
before his mind and to organise them in such a way that 
they act through the medium of the gap which they specify 
as one complex regulative condition directing the problem-
solving thought process towards the production of what is 
relevant to the gap in the consciousness of' a given 
problem. 
It is nrobable that there are two variables 
involved in the problem-solving process 
{a) Facility in the use of' Controls. This may depend 
on/ 
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on some inborn f'actor, but it seems certain that the 
faci'li ty with which controls are employed can be 
improved by practice. Facility determines the speed 
of the operation but not its success. 
(b) Ability to use Controls. Here again an inborn 
factor may determine the degree of ability present, 
or on the other hand, ability may be improved by 
practice. There is not the same evidence for increase 
in the ability to employ controls with practice as 
there is for the improvement of facility ~nth practice. 
It inay be the case that what appears to be increase in 
the ability to solve problems with the advance of age 
and education can be accounted for as increase in the 
quality and quantity of the experience within the 
'reservoir', and, in the second place, as increase 
in the f.'acility.with which controls are employedo 
Neither experience factors nor the degree of' facility 
in the use of controls which is attained will be 
determinants of the success of problem-solving process. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
A Genetic Treatment of Thought Processes with Reference 
to the Kind and Degree of Control Present. 
Problem-solving process directed to solution of specific 
problem most hi@1ly controlled of problem-solving thought 
process. - Degrees of control in other processes. -
Factors directing reflective thought processes. - Nature of 
Controls on Undirected thoughto 
It has been said that all mental processes 
with the exception of certain routine activities such as 
habit, are motivated by the consciousness of problems. 
Hence all thought processes, with these stated exceptions, 
may be said to be problem-solving thought processes. 
Further, the intelligent thought process, directed 
towards the solution of a given specific problem, was 
provisionally cited as being the clearest case of a 
thouGht process motivated and directed by the consciousness 
of a problem. Analysis of a specific problem-solving 
process has shown it to be directed by certain specific 
regulative principles, ioe., controls. Hence it is to 
be concluded that the clearest case of a thought process 
directed by controls is to be found in the intelligent 
problem-solving process, although in so far as other 
thought processes have also been described as problem 
solving thought processes, we should expect to find 
controls of some description operative upon them alsoo 
There naturally arises out of these considerations a 
QUestion as to whether the thought process directed 
towards the solution of a specific problem can justly 
be described as the most highly controlled thought process. 
In so far as it is inconceivable that there 
should be a thought process more highly controlled than 
that directed to the solution of a specific problem, 
then such a process must mark the upper limit of the 
degree to which thought processes can be controlledo 
~ence specific ~Toblem-solving processes are the most 
highly controlled of thought processes, and other 
thought processes, if they are controlled, must be 
controlled to a less degree. It is conceivable that 
degrees of control may exist among the residue of 
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thought processes, and should this be so, it should be 
possible to set. the lower limit of .control, that is, 
the point at Whlch a thought process begins to be 
controlled, and after which it ceases to be controlled. 
It should thus be possible to treat thought 
processes genetically in respect of the degree to which 
they are controlled. 
There is another aspect to be considered in a 
genetic treatment of thought :processes. It is possible 
that the kind of controls which have been found to 
operate on intelligent thought processes directed 
towards the solution of specific problems may not be the 
kind of controls which are o:perativeupon thought 
processes other than these. There may be qualitative 
as well as ·quantitative differences to be taken account 
of in tracing the development of problem-solving thought 
processes up to the specific intelligent problem-solving 
process. In such a genetic treatment of thought 
processes., then, both (a) the quality and (b) the 
degree, of control present must be considered. 
Anal vsi s of Directed and Undirected Thought Processes. 
Normal thought processes .habitually regarded 
as non-controlled can be subsumed under the heading of 
reflective thought, or undirected thought. Normal 
thoueht processes habitually regarded as controlled can 
be subsumed under the heading of directed thought. 
The question as to the kind and degree of 
control operating on these processes may best be 
discussed in relation to two main Questions 
(a) Is undirected thought ultimately undirected - and 
if not, by vrha t principles or factors is it directed? 
(b) Can the principles or factors directing reflective 
thought processes be said to be controls? How do 
they compare with the controls which are operative in 
a thought process directed to the solving of a 
specific problem? 
The answer to these questions will decide what 
quality and degree of control exist in undirected thought 
processes, and again, at which point the line of 
demarcation between directed and undirected thou&~t may 
be drawn. 
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(1) The Directing of Reflective Thought Process. 
If everyday thought processes are examined som~ will be seen to be occupied with the perceptual' 
env1~o~ent, some are reverie, some are occupied with 
spec1f1c tasks and :problems, while emotions and 
conations permeate the whole complex pattern. 
With the thought processes involved in the 
carrying out of specific tasks or the solving of 
specific problems, we have no immediate concern. These 
have already been analysed in detail. Nor, again, shall 
we consider aspects of thou&~t processes such as 
cognitive affective or conative aspects, in abstraction 
from their participation in concrete thought processeso 
Vfua t we are immediately concerned with is all thought 
processes which are not occupied with the fulfilling of 
the ad hoc conditions of a given task or problem. It 
must be considered in what respect these cru1 be 
described as problem-solving processes, and what 
factors determine their general direction. 
It is an accepted fact that undirected thought 
nrocesses are not either aimless or chaotic. All 
thought processes are ultimately directed by the-iidest 
and most pervasive controlling principles of all, i.e., 
the individual's 'propensities'. These are always to 
be taken for granted. To talk of the trend of an 
individual's thought process as determined or directed 
by his individual propensities is only another way of 
saying that each individual stream of consciousness 
is a thing unique in itselfo 
Within the interinfluential unity of ar 
individual stream of consciousness, and within what'may be 
described as its general conative trend, more specific 
trends of thought processes can be distinguished. If a 
time-section of thought process is exmained, it will be 
found to consist in various trains of thought which begin 
and end at specific points in time. Each train of 
thought is Qistinguished from the train of thought which 
precedes or follows it in virtue of the fact that each 
is occupied with some specific theme and its related 
associational context. It is guided and directed by 
the consciousness of that theme for a greater or less 
period of time. It is only by reference to such a 
theme that is by reference to the content of a train of 
thought that ~ith which it deals, that specific trains 
of thou~ht can be separated and considered in abstraction 
from the continuous unity of which they are part. 
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The themes with which trains of thought are 
occup~ed m~y be provisionally regarded as motivating 
and d1rect1ng,~and, hence, as controlling, these trains 
of thought. £urtner, analysis of a theme will ~enerally 
reveal it as concerned with the consciousness of0 a 
pro~lem ~f some kin~. Both retrospective and prospective 
tra1ns or thought Wlll be found to begin with the 
consciousness of a gap. The wide snread nature of the 
associative content of trains of reflective thought is 
to be ex~lained by the fact that the consciousness of the 
problem by which they are motivated is either an 
indefinite consciousness, that is, the gap is not clearly 
specified, or, on the other hand, it is a consciousness 
of a very complex problem in which the main gap could be 
specified only through the filling of innLtmerable sub-
gaps. For example, when we speak of "an end in view" 
what is implied is that something is not yet attained, 
that a major gap or incompleteness exists which can only 
be filled if numerous sub-gaps are filled, - if the 
problems constituted by the obstacles in the path of the 
end are solved. An unattained end presents a problem, 
but it is a remote problem, and one in which the gap 
is not specified by a given number of conditions, as in 
the case of specific problems such as have been discussed. 
In reflective trains of thought, sometimes 
only the main gap is apprehended. It will tend not to be 
clearly specified, and hence awareness of the existence 
of the sub-gaps may only be implicitly present, as 
involved in the consciousness of the main gap. Thus the 
productive-reproductive process stimulated by such a 
consciousness of a problem does not become crystallised 
into lines relevant to specific gaps, but spreads out in 
many directions. Another factor explaining the wide 
snread nature of the associative content is to be found 
in the fact that the intention to solve the problem, in so 
far as the gap is not specific, cannot be a specific 
intention. Suecific intentions are only to be found 
correlated with specific gapso l;'fuat is more important· 
is that most frequently it is not an intention to solve 
the problem immediatelyo 
Evidence for these facts about the nature of 
the problems holding for reflective thought is supplied 
by the fact that if an individual who has been indulging 
in reverie is asked of what he is thinking, he will tend 
to renly nr was just wondering why •••• or what •••• or how 
•••• so-and-so. n That a problem of some kind is in the 
forefront of consciousness is evident, but it is also 
evident that the problem is not specific, and that the 
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individual has no immediate intention of solving it. 
He may wish to solve the problem at some future date 
or merely wish that the nroblem were solved but sin~e 
his wish is not specified into an imraediate'intention 
to act vvi. th regard. to the problem, he does not specify 
the gap which he wishes to fill in relation to definite 
objective conditions which must define it before it can 
be filled. 
Thus, although the consciousness of a nroblem 
acts as a stimulus to a given train of undirected thought, 
the train of thought is not controlled bv the conditions 
of the problem, so that only association~ relevant to a 
specific gap are admitted to consciousness. The 
productive-reproductive process spreads out in all 
directions, is diverted into new charu1els by the arising 
awareness of the existence of a sub-gap, and is finally 
switched over into an entirely new train of thought as 
a different problem comes to occupy the focal point i'n 
the field of consciousness. 
It may be said that the consciousness of a 
problem gives the impetus to a train of thought, and it 
may even be said that :t t controls the train of thought 
in so far as it decides that the train of thought will take 
a certain direction in preference to any of the other 
innumerable directions it might have taken. A train of 
thought is thus only definable quantitatively (span) and 
QUalitatively (content) in terms of the problem with which 
it ultimately deals, and in so far as this is the case, 
it may be said to be controlled by the consciousness of 
a problen. 
Again, in so far as a problem only arises when 
the path to an end is obstructed, the problems with which 
u.ndirected thought is occupied will lie along the lines 
of conative interests. Ultimately then, since conative 
impulses constitute the problems v.rhich exist for an 
individual consciousness, it is the conative impulses 
which direct the trend of undirected thought. These 
conative imnulses become snecified in the awareness of 
problems, a~d hence the general trend of undirected 
thought process is specified in relation to these problems 
into more specific trains of thought. But it is clear 
that the ultimate controlling factors are the conative 
impulses and interests. Undirected thought is thus not 
undirected in any literal sense. In so far as it is 
occupied with the problems arising in connection with the 
ends of conative activity, it is controlled by the 
consciousness of these ends. 
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The Nature of the Controls Operating on Undirected 
Thought Processes. . 
It is evident then, that undirected thought 
processes are directed, that they are occupied with 
problems existing for consciousness, controlled by the 
awareness of the existence of these problems, and 
ultimately by conative impulses. The nature of the 
controlling factors operative upon undirected thought 
must now be examined and compared vdth the nature of the 
controls existing in thought directed to the solution 
of specific problems. 
Relative to directed thought, •controls~ were 
defined as "any specific significant conditions, either 
stated or unsta ted, which are relative to a. specific 
gap in the consciousness of a problem, a~d which each 
define that gap to a specific degree". 
In normal undirected thought processes, the 
factors which ultimately control these processes, 
conative impulses, drives and interests, certainly 
direct the processes towards given ends. We saw that 
an end, as something not yet attained, represented an 
incompleteness and a gap. Hence an unattained end, as 
was seen, presents a problem to consciousness. The 
problem presented by an unattained end is very different, 
however, from a problem of the kind which stimulates 
directed thoughto In the first place, the gap is merely 
apprehended as existing. It is a complex gap and there is 
also almost invariably present an implicit awareness 
of the sub-gaps implied by the main gap. Further, a 
snecific immediate intention is not correlated with the 
main gap, nor, in consequence with any of the sub-gaps. 
Hence the gap implied by the consciousness of an end is 
not a gap specified by, or in relation to, specific 
objective conditions, or by a definite nQmber of such 
conditions. If neither the number nor the exact nature 
of the conditions specifying the gap are clearly 
apprehended, the gap is only apprehended as a gap and not 
as a specific gap. In consequence, the productive-
reproductive process which is stimulated by the existence 
of such a gap cannot be controlled by the consciousness 
of the gap as specified. It cannot, therefore, be 
controlled so that it produces only what is relevant to 
the gap, because specific controls do not exist to decide 
exactly what is relevant and to eliminate the irrelevant. 
Hence a conative impulse, for example, cannot 
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be regarded as a significant control in the sense 
defined. It neither constitutes a gap, nor does it 
control a process directed to the production of what is 
relevant to a gap. As we saw, it determines the lines 
along which gaps will be found. In deciding where an 
end of activity shall lie, it is the presuuposition 
of the consciousness of gaps, and at the same time 
the presupposition of thought processes directed t~wards 
the filling of such gaps, in that drive is a necessary 
factor in problem-solving thought processes. It is 
not a factor which controls the organising of experience 
to fill any gap. 
We saw, however, that the general trend of 
undirected thought could be analysed into specific 
trains of thought definable in terms of more specific 
ends, or, in other words, in terms of the consciousness 
of more specific problems, such as are implied by the 
controlling themes of trains of ideas. 
It might be supposed that where the problem 
motivating reflective thought process is more specific 
than the problem which is implied by the awareness of an 
unattained end, the thought process which it stimulates 
mieht be controlled more in the sense in which a specific 
directed problem-solving.process is controlled. Hence it 
might be expected that a train of reflective thought 
motivated by the consciousness of a comparatively 
specific problem would embody controls in the sense 
defined, and that in the case of such trains of thought 
a degree of control qualitatively similar-to that present 
in directed thought, but quantitatively less, mi~~t be 
reached. 
Here again, howev~r, it is the case that most 
nroblems vfhich form the controlling themes for unit 
trains of thought, do not contain gaps specified by a 
definite number of significant controls. What is 
-present is the awareness "that a gap exists relative to 
such-and-such an end". It is, moreover, clear that the 
specificity of the gap and the specificity and immediacy 
of the intention to fill the gap are correlative and 
concomitantly varying factors. The intention to fill the 
gap which motivates a train of thought is no more specific 
or immediate than the intention relative to a more 
remote endo 
The existence of an immediate specifi'c intention 
to fill a gap which is recognised to exist, will mean 
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that the gap will be specified in relation to a definite 
number of specific objective conditions i.e. 
significant controls. But in so far a~ it i~ the 
essence of undirected thought that specific immediate 
intentions to fill gaps which are apprehended as 
existing, are absent, the specification of the gaps will 
not take place. Hence the controls which would, if the 
gap were to be specified, direct the productive-reproductive 
process to the production of some specific kind of item, 
are only implicit in the awareness "that the gap existsn, 
and never become explicit unless conative activity becomes 
similarly specified into an intention to fill the gap as 
specified and further, to fill it imrnediately. As soon 
as the intention becomes specified in this way, the 
whole nature of the thought process is changed from 
undirected thought to directed thought. The awareness 
"that a gap exists" is no longer sufficient. The specific 
intention to fill a gap req_uires that the exact nature 
of the gap should be kno-vm, and hence the controls 
implicitly present are made explicit. They become 
controls in the significant sense, and conseq_uently 
change the nature and range of the thought pro cess 
stimulated by the awareness of the problem, controlling 
and directing it along the narrower lines of what is 
relevant to the specific gap. 
Hence it is clear that as thought processes 
are narrowed down by degrees from general trends of 
thought directed to general ends by ultimate conative 
interests, to more and more specific trains of thought 
dealing with correspondingly more specific ends and 
problems, the degree to which significant controls are 
potentiallv present, is increased. 
At the s&~e time as the thought processes 
become narrowed,. the drive factors are also narro·wed, 
but controls which are potentially existent or implicit 
in the awareness that a gap exists never become explicit, 
and hence never become significant controls until the 
conative impulse itself becomes specified in a specific 
immediate intention to fill a defined gap in the 
consciousness of a given problem occupying the focal 
point of the field of consciousness. 
Thus the nature of the process changes with 
the specification of the intention. T~e change from 
undirected thouPht to directed thought lS an abrupt one. 
It is a q_ualitative rather than a q_uantitative change. 
The problem which motivates undirected thought processes 
may become gradually more specific in relation to 
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its subject matter - it may vary from the consciousness 
of an unattained end to a problem such as is expressed 
in "I wonder who left this gate open?" without affecting 
the nature of the thou&~t process. The only difference 
is that the controls which would specify the gap in a 
problem such as "\Tho left the gate open?" are potentially 
present to a higher degree. There is an implicit 
awareness of the kind of conditions which would determine 
the question as to which person did leave the gate open, 
which is largely ab sent in the apprehension of an 
unattained endo Immediately; however, that the wish 
to know who left the gate open becomes a specific intention 
to find out immediately who left the gate open, a new 
factor enters, and the thought process is qualitatively 
changed. 
It is to be noted that when thought processes 
are considered as narrowing down from general directions 
to ends to trains of thought concerned with more specific 
problems, what is meant is not that the gap in the 
consciousness of the problems is more specific but that 
the problem itself relates to more specific ends subsumed 
under the general conative trend. They hence imply a 
more specific content, and thus tend to be much less . 
complex than the kind of problem which is present to 
consciousness in an unattained end. But, as we have 
seen, the content of the problems motivating trains of 
undirected thought can be indefinitely specified without 
the gap becoming specified. It will still be a gap 
existing in relation to a given content of experience. 
The qualitative change in the thought process consequent 
upon the specir"ication of the gap demands the intervention 
of the factor of a specific immediate intentiono 
Hence it may be concluded that no degrees of 
control exist among undirected thought processes, if by 
control it is implied that the thought processes are 
controlled by controls in the technical sense of the term. 
In this sense, a thought process is either controlled, i.e., 
directed to the immediate filling of a specific gap, -
or it is non-controlled. When a thought process is 
undirected, it is motivated by the awareness "that a 
problem exists", but it cannot be controlled, since the 
awareness "that a gap exists" can only mean that the gap 
is not specified and that hence significant controls 
which might direct the thought process are non-existent 
for consciousness. Thus an uncompromising line of 
demarcation must be drawn between directed and undirected 
thought. The one does not shade off into the other. 
On the one side of the line there are thou&ht processes 
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directed to ~h~ ~illing of specified gaps, and 
correlated w1tn liT@ediate specific intentions, -all 
thought processes concerned with the solution of .oiven 
. 0 
problems. On the other side, are all other thought 
processes. ~~ether they are motivated by the 
consciousness of problems dealing with a more or less 
s~ecific content, the specific immediate intention to 
solve the problem is absent, and hence the gaps are 
not specified ~, and the thought processes are not 
controlled. 
In the technical sense, then, thought is 
either controlled, or it is not controlled. There are 
no degrees of control existing between directed and 
undirected thought. 
/; Note. 
There is one special case of an undirected thought 
process which is worthy of note. 
It is possible that an undirected thought 
process may be occupied with the consciousness of a 
specific problem where the gap is defined by a given 
number of significant controls, as for example, when 
one muses over a given geometrical problem. Here 
the controls are explicitly present to consciousness, 
but they do not operate as controls until there is also 
present a specific intention to find the answer 
immediately. It can be seen from this that it is the 
specificity and immediacy of the intention which are 
the· determining factors. 
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CI:-LU?TE:R VIII. 
Directed and Undirected Thought under Laboratory 
Conditions. 
U~directed thought is equivalent to Free Association, 
D1rected thought to Controlled Association. - Free 
Association as compared with undirected thought. -
Controlled Association as compared with directed 
thought. · 
Normal thought processes as they pass from 
undirected to directed thought pass from trains of 
thought motivated by the consciousness that problems 
exist, to problem-solving processes directed by controls 
relative to the gap in the consciousness of given 
specific problems. On the one hand are trains .of 
undirected thought, on the other, thought processes 
concerned with specific problems. -
Passing now to the consideration of how these 
thought processes can be dealt with in experirrental 
investigations, the first consideration is the question 
of ho;;r directed and undirected thought processes are 
represented within the laboratoryo 
Undirected thought spoken of relative to 
laboratory conditions, is free association, and when 
undirected thought is investigated for the purpose of 
measurinG its quality, (the nature of associative 
connections}, its content (nature of material to which 
reference is made} or its facility (speed of association, 
or length of trains of associated ideas,) free association 
tests in some form are employed. 
Thus thought processes not directed to the 
solving of specific problems when they are investigated 
with the basic distinction between directed and undirected 
thought in mind, are represented by free association, and 
undirected thought under laboratory conditions will hence-
forward be referred to as free associationo 
When directed thought processes have been 
investigated in the past, they have invariably, as is 
naturally to have been expected, been investigated 
relative/ 
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relative to speciric problems. The problems used in 
laboratory investigation are necessarily in their 
essential structure 7 similar to the probl~ms with which 
normal directed thought is occupiedo They may be 
adjusted for the investigation and measuring of 
experience factors, as, for example, when it is desired 
to measure the orgru~isation or Quality of certain parts 
of experience, or, on the other hand, they may be 
adjusted so as to suppose only a minimum universal 
measure o~ experience, and to test ability to employ 
controls 1n abstraction from factors of exnerience. 
But in either case, the structure of the pi-oblem remains 
unchanged and is necessarily the same structure as is to 
be found in all problems whether they are constructe.d 
to answer specific investigatory requirements, or are 
found wita normal thought processes. There is, for 
example, no essential difference between the problems 
set in intelligence tests and these to be met with in 
the course of ordinary existence, as e.g., in business. 
Directed thought under laboratory conditions 
is, however, to be found in a much sim~olified form, viz., 
in controlled association tests. It is evident that 
such controlled association tests as Opposites, Analogies 
or SynonJ~s reyresent very simple types of problems. 
For exem:ple:-
Apple is to fruit as sheep is to __ ? 
This is a problem, but it is structurally very simple. 
Few controls are present, and the gap is clearly 
indicated and defined by the exJ)lici tly stated 
significant conditions. Only a necessary ~1ount of 
experience is presumed, and moreover, the response given 
in answer to the presence of the stimulating situation 
must before have been linked with part of the stimuluso 
Controlled association, in short, is another nrune for the 
simplest type of problemo 
Hence controlled association tests offer a 
simple and convenient means for investigating directed 
thought at a primitive and non-complex level, while the 
cualitative difference between directed and undirected 
thought is still maintained. It may be considered that 
directed thought under laboratory conditions is 
renresented by controlled association, while undirected 
thought is re)resented by free association. 
It must be evident that a thought process 
taking place within a laboratory must differ in some ways 
from the same thought :process taking place within normal 
ex:perience./ 
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expe~ience. N~w factors must enter, and it must be 
cons1der~d whetner the thought processes are not thereby 
qua~i tatJ. vely c~anged in such a way that the processes 
takJ.ng place unuer experimental conditions do not 
adequately represent their normal counterparts. 
· . We shal~ consider then, how far it may 
justifJ.ably be saJ.d that free and controlled association 
re~resent ~orm~ undirected and directed thought, and in 
do1ng so, J.t WJ.ll be well to bear in mind the possibility 
of a ~ualitative difference being introduced by the 
trans1tion to the conditions necessary for experimental 
investigation and measurement. 
Free Association and Undirected Thoughto 
The trains of thought which compose the stream 
of unchrected thought, as motivated by the consciousness 
of problems are series of complex associa tional units, 
questions, images, judgments, percepts and concepts, all 
bound together in the interrelated interinfluential 
unity of the individual stream of consciousness. 
In free association, in place of this, there is 
a series of discrete words to take the place of the 
series of thoughts. 
If it should be considered for a moment that 
a series of discrete words could adequately represent a 
train of thought, it would be implied that a train of 
thought was a succession of unit 'ideas' in the classical 
atomistic sense of the term. But it is clear that a 
thought process such as that represented by free 
association under laboratory conditions can very rarely 
happen apart from such conditions. It does happen that 
an individual may have a series of images in place of a 
series of thoughts, and since images come closest of all 
mental phenomena to the classical concept of an 'idea', 
when it does happen, there is an undirected train of 
thought which may be more or less adequately represented 
by a series of discrete words. 
But a train of images occurs very rarely, and 
even should it occur, it is unlikely that such images 
could be neatly parcelled out and adequatel! labe~led or 
expressed by a single word. An image, al tnough 1 t is 
psychologically unitary, is most frequent~y an image 
of a complex nhenomenono I may have an 1mage of the 
college quadrangle, but the word '"quadrangle" expresses 
my image very far from adequately. 
1~ 1 I ~orma i 
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Normal thought processes then dO not take the 
form ?f a ser~es of unit ideas except on very rare 
occas1.ons. ~vhere it can be presumed that series of 
images or something corresponding to unit 'ideas' 
frequently occur in trains of thought natholo~ical 
t t "'"d '.t' 0 sa es or m1.n are suspected. In insanity, for 
example, where we have the opposite of intelligent 
thi~in?, there is a breakdown of the unity and 
cont1.nu1. ty of mind whence all relations associative 
as well as logical, (since the latter d~pends upon the 
former,) come. Hence there is a breakdown of normal 
integrating power, and in such a case, a series of unit 
ideas frequently takes the place of the normal thought 
process. The spasmodic interrupted type of association 
response, where the connection between the stimulus and 
res~onse words is esoteric and remote and does not 
follow the lines of logical association, is, as jung 
has shmvn, indicative of the breakdown of normal inter: 
relations, and hence of a pathological state of mind. 
Utter discontinuity is the extreme case. 
There is general agreement that in intelligent 
thinking the smue controlling idea {theme) will serve a 
certain span of associative process. The length of 
the span has freQuently been taken as correlating 
hiehly with intelligence. Hence, in the opposite state 
of insanity, the thought process governed by a controlling 
idea shrinks in length, and may often be represented by a 
single response item. · Changes of controlling idea are 
frequent, continuity is lost, and the whole character of 
the process is jerky and spasmodic. 
In nor.mal thought, the existence of a controlling 
idea will stimulate associational contexts where relations 
are integral and articulate, and thus the mind will pass 
smoothly from one itemm another within the interrelated 
whole. The association is not, hence, from one discrete 
item to another, but from one part of a configural whole 
which can be ex-oressed in a sertence to fuJ.other part which 
can be similarly expressed. Since the units of thoue~t 
are complex in this way, thought can only adequately be 
expressed in a series of linking propositions or sentences. 
The free association test in its standard 
form was originated when the atomistic associational 
theory of mind held the field, and it is this concept of 
mind which is reflected in the theory that a free 
association test can represent adequately a train of 
thought. What today is recognised as,a thought and a 
complex/ 
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complex unit was described by the Associationists as an 
association between two ideaso nchalk is white" for 
example represented the association of the idea white 
with the idea chalk, and hence a train of ideas could be 
analysed into unit elements expressible in discrete 
words. It might thus very well be adequately represented 
by the response words in a Continuous free association 
test. Since, as has been shown, a train of thought 
as now conceived could only be adequately represented 
verbally by a sequence o:r sentences, it may be concluded 
that the standard forms o:f free association tests as 
demanding discrete words in response, do not give an 
adequate representation o:f a train o:f thought. Undirected 
thought outside the laboratory is very different :from 
the form of it which is investigated and measured inside 
the laboratory. 
I:f the change which is effected on undirected 
thought by bringing it inside the laboratory is reflected 
upon, it will be seen that what has actually happened is 
that the undirected thought process (which was shovm to 
be in its normal form non-controlled in the technical 
sense of the term) becomes controlled. . The addition of 
the necessary condition that the subject must respond 
with words, does, in an ultimate sense, control the 
associative process in directing it to the production 
of words, whereas, as we have seen, nonnal undirected 
thought is non-controlled, far less being restricted to 
items expressible verbally in discrete words. 
Again, whereas a train of undirected thought is 
stimulated by the consciousness "that a problem exists", 
in the case of each unit train of thought, this problem 
will be either different or differently conceived. Free 
association is always artificially stimulated by the 
request to begin free associating, which if it does, in 
asking for something to be done, represent something 
which will be apprehended as very simila: to the 
consciousness "that a problem exists", Wlll also be much 
the same problem in every case. A fact such as this 
cannot be said to control the thought process in a 
siPnificant way however; it means only that the process 
will be stimul~ted in a way in which it is not stimulated 
in normal thought. It accounts for still further 
differences between the trains of normal thought and the 
items in a free association series, but it is not a 
controlling factor in the technical sense. 
Free association however may be controlled by 
further/ 
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further c~ntrols which, although accidental, are neverthe: 
less sign1fican~ controlling principles. These are 
the ~ont~ols wh1ch the subject invents for himself. He 
may 1mag1ne, for example, that words are not to be 
repeated, or that only words of a certain kind are to be 
given •. In either of these cases, the subject would be 
controll1ng the free association process by subjectively 
set controls which are nevertheless significant. 
Again, the whole environmental context, for 
example, the laboratory or the presence of the experimenter, 
induce a certain "mental set" which, although it is not 
to be regarded as a significant control factor does 
decide that certain kinds of response words shall be given 
without requiring that they should be given, as a 
significant control would do. For example, if speed is 
presumed to be required, short words will tend to be 
chosen. Again, series of rhyming words will very 
COD~Only be found, and it is clear that these would only 
occur in a normal undirected thought process under 
exce~tional conditions. Experimental investigation has 
shown also, that the presence of the experimenter will 
retard association time with the majority of subjects 
and will have a definite effect on the quality of the 
responses, as eog., making for perseveration. 
It is evident, however, that all these factors 
only determine the lines which will be taken by the free 
association process, in the same way that a conative 
impulse will determine the trend of undirected thoughto 
Except in the case where the subject invents significant 
controls for himself, such facts as "mental set" do not 
specify by requirement the kind of word which must be 
given. In so far as the gap remains unspecified, no 
significant controls are present. 
The one significant control which is invariably 
nresent in free association as compared -vvi th undirected 
thought is to be found in the condition that the responses 
must be· exuressed either verbally or in writing, and must 
take the form of discrete words. It is clear that it 
must also be a condition which is present in all 
association tests free or otherwise, -~vhich take place 
' . ..... . 
under laboratory conditions, for before assoc1a ulons can 
be investigated or measured, they must be expressedo 
The exact nature of the significance of this 
control must be consideredo As we have seen, the 
requirement that the subject is to respond, constitutes 
a/ 
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a gap whic~, to all intents and purposes, is a gap of 
the same kJ.nd as that found in the consciousness of the 
~roblem ~oti v~ting a train of undirected thought. The 
1nstruct1on gJ.ven by the experimenter in short indicates 
"that a gap exists"" The gap is not'snecif'ied and 
hence the intention correlative to the gap is n~t 
specified; it is purely an intention to respond. The 
fact of the consciousness "that a gap exists" stimulates 
the associational process, but since the gap is non-
specified, there are no significant controls operating 
upon the process if we exceut the condition that the 
resDonse must take the form- of words.p This condition 
clearly s~ecifies the nature of the resnonse to some 
degree, for it indicates that a gap exists which must 
be filled by words. It has been shown, however, that 
this control must exist, and exists COTh~on to all 
association tests, (and indeed, many other tests) as a 
condition necessarily ~resu~posed by experimental 
investigation and measurement. Thus it may be discounted 
since it is the universal precondition of investigations 
of thought processes. 
Apart, therefore, from the existence of this one 
significant control which can be discounted, it is evident 
that free association is controlled to the least possible 
degree which is conformable with experimental conditions. 
The awareness "that a gap existsn stimulates an 
associational urocess which is not controlled in any 
si.c-nificant sense. The words which it nrocluces are not 
u -
required to be relevant to any specific gap, they are not 
reouired to be any specific kind of word, and hence the 
direction taken by the free associational process is 
determined purely by subjective conative directing factors., 
It/ 
p It may be considered that the standard form of free 
association test, as requiring the production of 
di se rete words, adds two significant controls to the 
nrocess. A more adequate representation of undirected 
thought could, of course, be obtained if the free 
association test consisted in sentences. These, 
however, would present difficulties of measurement. 
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It nay be concluded that free association 
cannot be less controlled than it is without ceasing to 
be a process open to measurement. 
Again, it cannot be a process more controlled 
than it is without ceasing to be free association. 
This vdll be clearer if it is considered that 
the least reQuirement necessary to change free association 
to controlled association would be the existence of some 
condition which s~ecified the nature of the gap, changing 
the awareness of the gap from the simple awareness of 
the existence of a gap, to an awareness that a gap of a 
specific kind existedo At the same time, the intention 
would become specified. From an intention merely to 
res:pond, it would become the intention to res-pond with 
a certain kind of word, fulfilling certain conditions 
required by the nature of the gap. The associational 
process directed to the filling of the gap would be 
controlled by the existence of one significant control, 
towards the production of the relevant to a specific 
gap, and all the essentials of directed thought would 
therefore be involved. For example, the free association 
process stimulated by "What does the word black suggest to 
you?" (or "Reply with the first words which enter your 
mind to the following stimulus words:- black _!!), becomes 
controlled association as soon as a condition is present 
which specifies the relation in which the response item 
must stand to black, as e. g., "17ha t is the opposite of 
black?" 
Thus, as soon as a condition is present which 
stipulates what kind of word shall be replied, the whole 
nature of the process is qualitatively changed. The gap 
is specified by one significant control, and the intention 
becomes specified in relation to the specific gap. Tne 
change from free to controlled association is all the more 
noticeable in a case such as that cited above, in virtue 
of the fact that the addition of one control is sufficient 
to reduce the number of items from an infinite possible 
number, as in the free association, to the one item 
relevant to the gap in the controlled association~ 
It is evident that the transition from free 
as&ociation to controlled is as abrupt as the transition 
from undirected to directed thought, and that the line of 
demarcation between the two is eQually definite in both 
cases. Free association, as the laboratory counterpart 
of undirected thought, cannot .then, be less controlled 
without ceasing to be a process which can be measured, 
and/ 
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and cannot be more controlled without ceasing to be free 
association and becoming controlled association. 
Controlled Association and Directed Thought. 
· The decision as to the relation of controlled 
assoc~ation to directed thought must hinge upon the 
quest1on whether the form of the problem set in a 
controlled association test is the same as the form of 
the problems met with in the course of normal directed 
thought. 
The question has already been touched upon. 
We have seen that problems as found in the course of 
ordinary living are complex, that they are interrelated 
whales of problems composed of several sub-problems 
subsumed under the consciousness of one main gap. But 
it was clear that such problems could be reduced to 
elements, in the form of simple problems containing one 
gap specified by a definite nuraber of specific related 
objective conditions. The problem which is set in a 
controlled association test, for example in an Opposites, 
Synonyms or Analogies test, is a simple problem of 
exactly this tY};le. In either "VJhat is the opposite of 
black?" or "Apple is to fruit as sheep is to -?" there 
is a gap specified by a small definite nu~ber of 
significant controls, and correlated with a specific 
intention to fill the gap with material relevant to the 
specific requirements. Controlled association tests, 
therefore, present problems similar in their essential 
structure to the simple problems which are the elements 
of all problems, however complex, with which directed 
thought is occupied. The structure of a problem is 
universally the same. All will require that experience 
shall be organised by the conditions of the problem to 
fit the gap, and hence it is true that the solving of all 
problems must depend upon the kind of process which is 
involved in a controlled association test, in short, on 
the controlling of association. 
The problems met with in the course of normal 
experience, (and problems constructed in the laboratory 
for specific purposes, e.g., intelligence tests) appear 
different from the problems set in controlled association 
tests for two reasons. 
In the first place, in controlled association, 
experience factors can be discounted, for only a measure 
of experience which is common and universal is presumed, 
as/ 
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as may_ also be the case with problems constructed for the 
specif~c purpose ?f measuring ability to employ controls. 
In the same way, 1n the controlled association test 
interest is concentrated by this device on the actu~l 
oper~t~on.of the~control of associative process by the 
cond~t~on1ng facuors, and the success which attends the 
operation. 
Controlled association thus lacks the 
difficulty which may characterise normal problems in virtue 
of the experience factors involved in the latter. This 
is one reason why giving the answer to a difficult 
yroblem a~pears to involve very different processes from 
those involved in giving the response to a stimulus word 
in a controlled association test, where the response 
has previously been linke~ with the same stimuluso As 
the difficulties resulting from experience factors in 
normal problems have been shown to be either (a) 
difficulties relative to the revival of annrouriate 
experience or (b) difficulties relative to-th~ adaptation 
of past experience, it will be evident that such 
difficulties are both eliminated in controlled association 
test problems. The only difficulty which such problems 
could theoretically present would be a difficulty of 
specifying the gap. 
The controlled association test problem is, 
however, quantitatively simpler than most normal problems. 
Very few controls are present, most freq_1.1en tly either one, 
two or three. Thus the last po·ssible difficulty is 
removed in that the gap is necessarily easy to. specifyo 
As a result of both of these facts (a) the 
elimination of experience difficulties (b) the elimination 
of organisin[S difficulties, the problems presented by 
controlled association tests appear very different from 
normal ~roblems where, although only one gap may exist, 
and the problem is hence non-complex, a great many 
controls may be present. ~~en controlled association 
uroblems are comuared with uroblems so constituted as to 
make it possible~to discount experience factors, it is 
this quantitative difference in the nuFlber of controls 
present which accounts for the appearance of disparityo 
~Thether problems of the type found in association tests, 
or non-complex uroblems as met with in normal directed 
thought, are beinG considered, the essential structure 
must be the seFleo There is either a problem, or there is 
not a problem. - There are no kinds and degrees in the 
essential structure of problems, and hence the essential 
principles/ 
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principles involved in a thought process directed 
towards the solution of a problem must be always the 
same. Thus, l_lowever, quantitatively simple (or if we 
choose to_co~~lder.~implication of experience factors 
a~ a qual1tau1ve d11ference) however qualitatively 
s1mple a controlled association problem may be, as long 
as it pre~ents a_problem to consciousness, the. process 
involved 1n solv1ng the problem must present the 
essential characteristics of a problem-solving process. 
Moreover, in virtue of the very fact that the 
controlled association test problem is qualitatively 
and quantitatively simple, the process directed to its 
solution 1'rill shovr very clearly the operation of the 
controls in specifying tne gap and directing the 
productive-reproductive process into lines relevant to 
the gap. In the controlled association test, the 
operation of the controls on the associative process is 
found in abstraction from all the accidental factors 
which complicate the investigation of their operation 
within normal problems. Controlled association tests, 
in short, provide a means for examining the way in which 
experience, the associative stream, is directed and 
controlled by the requirements of the gap in the 
consciousness of a problem. They provide a convenient 
and schematic form of problem, which, since it preserves 
the essential structure of a problem, will demonstrate 
the nature of a problem-solving process, and the 
:principles which determine it, in its simplest possible 
form. 
Moreover, if, in controlled association, the 
simplest structure of a problem stimulating a process 
directed to the filling of a specific gap is to be found, 
then it should be possible, taking the controlled 
association test uroblem as the lower limit of a 
"problem s true ture"~ to cons true t a continuous series of 
graded problems, which will become increasingly complex 
quantitatively as controls are increased in number. Such 
a series would thus preserve a qualitatively simple 
structure, i.eo, complexity of gaps or difficulty of 
experience factors would not enter, while quantitatively 
increasing in difficulty. With every additional control, 
the difficulty of organising the controls to specify the 
gap would be increased to an additional degree. Such a 
series would provide a means for measuring the ability 
of any individual to employ a number of controls. It 
would supply, in short, a possible means for measuring 
ability to employ controls in abstraction from factors of 
experience, which, as we have seen, have not, except in 
a remote sense, any a priori connection with intelligenceo 
lOO 
A Summary of Conclusions arrived at by Theoretical 
Analysis. 
I. Ability to solve problems is an essential aspect of 
intelligence. 
II. The success of any specific problem-solving process 
will depend (a) upon the existence of appropriate 
experience within the "reservoir", (b) upon the 
adequate functioning of the conditions of the problem 
in their constitutive, productive and regulative 
aspects. 
III. Of the three aspects of the function of the conditions 
of a problem, the constitutive aspect is basic. Only 
in so far as the conditions of a problem co-operate 
with each other in specifying the gap in the conscious: 
ness of the problem can they act as controls upon the 
associative process stimulated by the awareness that 
a problem exists, and direct it to the production of 
what is relevant to the gap. 
IV. Such conditions of a problem as are specific objective 
conditions relative to a gap in the consciousness of 
a specific simple (i.e., non-complex) problem, and 
define that gap to a measurable degree, are to be 
knmvn as "Controls". 
V. Thought processes motivated by the consciousness "that 
a problem exists" are not necessarily "Controlledn. 
Since controls in the technical sense of the term are 
only found correlated with a specific gap in the 
consciousness of a specific non-complex problem, the 
only thought processes which are technically controlled 
are thought processes directed towards the solution 
of such problems. Such thought processes will 
constitute "directed thought" in the specific meaning 
of the term. 
VI. The degree of success which will attend the problem-
solving activity of any given individual will depend 
upon his ability to employ controls adequately, ioe., 
on his ability to keep all the conditions of a given 
problem before his mind and to organise them in such a 
way that they act, through the medium of the gap which 
they specify, as one complex controlling condition 
directing the .. associative process to the prod.uc tion of 
what is relevant to the gap in the consciousness of a 
given problem. 
The/ 
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The measure of'_an individual's :problem-
solving o.bili ty is a_etermined by the degree of' his 
capacity to employ controls. 
Part II (ExDerimental) 
seeuon III. cone~t1on or e svtu ot tea'ta te 
tnfteUsat• Ule llfJOtbeala. 
Section I. 
The Statement of the Hypothesis. 
. . If an essential aspect of intelligence is 
the abJ.lJ. ty to solve problems; then success in solving 
problems will be a measure of intelligence. But 
success in solving problems depends upon ability to 
employ controls and this ability is ultimately reducible 
to the ability to hold all the controls of a given problem 
before the mind and organise them in such a way that 
they act as one complex condition directing the 
problem-solving process. 
Hence the capacity to hold the controls of 
a problem before the mind and to organise them into one 
complex control is a capacity which should have a high 
correlation with intelligence. Further, the greater 
the number of controls in any problem, the greater will 
be the difficulty of holding them all before the mind, 
and the greater the difficulty in organising them into 
one complex controlling condition. It is to be 
expected that the number of controls with which a 
subject can work will be a measure of his ability to 
employ controls, and hence a measure of his problem-
solving ability. 
Therefore it is to be expected that the 
coefficient of correlation with intelligence will 
increase in passing from the measure of an individual's 
performance with few controls to the measure of his 
performance with many controls. 
Hence the hypothesis to be tested by 
experimental investigation is:- that if an essential 
factor in intelligence is the ability to solve problems, 
and if success in the solving of problems depends 
ultimately upon the extent to which an individual can 
manage a complex gr0up of controls, then the_higher the 
intelligence of an individual, the greater WJ.ll be the 
number of controls with which he can work successfully. 
Section II. 
Inquiry into Methods of Investigating the Hypothesis. 
Alternative ~ethods of measuring ability to employ 
Controls. - Measurement of complex groups of Controls. -
Adaptation of Controlled association tests to measure 
(a) relevance of what is produced in relation to 
varying numbers of controls, and (b) amount of relevant 
material produced in relation to varying numbers of 
controls. 
The investigation of the hypothesis will require 
A. a measure of individual intelligence 
Bo a measure of individual ability to employ a varying 
nu~ber of controls. 
A method of measuring individual intelligence· 
is not difficult to find. Any standard measure of 
general intelligence will suffice. A method of measuring 
an individual's ability to employ groups of controls of 
varying numbers has yet to be found. The first question 
to be considered is therefore that of what methods may be 
used to neasure ability in the employment of controls. 
Methods of Measuring Ability to :E:mploy Controls. 
Ability to employ controls can only be 
measured by measuring the performance of an individual 
under the direction of controls. In other words, what 
is required is a measure of directed thought, or thought 
directed to the solving of problems. It should be 
possible to measure both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of directed thought, and hence performance with 
controls might be measured either (a) by measuring the 
relevance of the items produced under the direction of 
controls (qualitative aspect), or (b) the amount of 
relevant material (i.e., the number of relevant items} 
produced under the direction of controls (quantitative 
aspect). 
If (a) the relevance of items produced under the 
direction of controls, is to be measured, a series of 
problems must be constructed. Within this series, the 
number of occasions on which the relevant to each specific 
gap is produced, when com:pared with the number of 
occasions/ 
occasions on which the irrelevant to each specific gap 
is produced, will give a measure of the individual's 
ability to produce the relevant under the direction of 
controls. 
If (b) the amount of relevant material 
(i.e., number of relevant items) -produced under the 
direction of controls, is to be measured, it will be 
necessary to find_ some way of measuring the amount of 
relevant material actually revived in response to the 
consciousness of existing controls. A t}Te of problem 
must be found in which there are many items relevant 
to the gap in the consciousness of the problem. 
In the majority of ordinary problems, however, 
there is only one item relevant to the gap, and even in 
the case of such ordinary problems as allow of more than 
one item beinc produced which is relevant, the number 
tends to be strictly limited by objective limits, as for 
ex~mple, by the nature of the material with which the 
problem deals. It will be necessary, in order to 
obtain an adeQuate measure of (b) to find a type of 
problem in which the number of items relevant to the gap 
is such that preferably none of the individuals solving 
the problem can produce all the items relevant to the gap. 
Should it prove possible to find problems of 
this tyye, it will be possible to measure by means of 
them, the amount of experience (i.eo, nlliuber of relevant 
items} actually revived under the direction of a given 
group of controls. 
} .. ·Ieasurement of Complex Groups of Controls. 
The investigation of the h}~othesis demands 
not onlv the measurement of the relevance of, or the 
amount of relevant, material produced under the direction 
of controls, but also the measurement of what is produced 
relative to groups of controls of varying complexity. 
Performance with few controls must be compared with 
performance with many controls. For example, a subject's 
ability to pro~uce items relevant to two.controls must 
be compared vTi th his ability to produce l tems relevant 
to five controls. 
Certain further specifications as to the nature 
of the controls must be made in view of this requirement. 
If the performance with a given complex group 
of controls is to-be measured against the perforrnance with 
a/ 
a quantitatively larger or smaller group of controls 
the degree of complexity of each group of controls m~st 
be measurable. Before a grouu of controls can be 
measured, it must be analysabl~ into snecific units 
so that. the quantitative size of the control groups' 
may be 1ncreased or decreased by measurable amounts. 
Practically this means that it must be uossible to add 
or subtract con~rols, and be able to me~sure objectively 
the degree of dlfference thereby made to the suecification 
of the gapo This would be impossible if one ~ontrol 
could not be isolated from anothero In the problems 
ordinarily met with, controls are freQuently so closely 
interrelated as to render this difficult. If it is to 
be possible to isolate each control from the other controls 
alone; vli th which it specifies the gap, it is necessary 
that each control should be unitary in nature, a specific 
significant unit detachable from the group of unit controls 
defininG the gap. Again, in ordinary problems, it is 
frequently impossible to eliminate one condition without 
destroying the significance of the whole problem. The 
controls must therefore be such that they can be added to, 
or subtracted from, the group of controls specifying the 
gap, and still leave the problem standing as a 
significant whole. 
If each control is of this nature, then the 
complex groups of controls which they compose will be 
analysable into units, and their quantitative complexity 
will be measurable in so far as each unit control is 
measurable. 
Further, in order that a complex group of 
controls shall be easily measurable, each unit control 
must specify the gap to an equal degree. Ultimately 
the effect of a control upon the gap is only measurable 
in terms of the degree by which it limits the associative 
process, and hence what will be meant by each control 
limiting the gap to an eQual degree, will be that each 
control will have an effect in limiting the associative 
process equal to the effect of each other control. If 
controls are eoualiseo_ in this way, each group of controls 
becomes a comniex of equal individual units. It may be 
increased or cl_ecreas~d -by objectively measurable amounts 
in adding or subtracting controls, and in so far as the 
effect of one unl~ control upon the associative process 
is known, that is, in so far as the number of i terns 
produced under the direction of one control can be 
measured, the cuEulative effect of the a~dition o~ like 
equal controls can be investigated relat1ve to thls measureo 
In conclusion, then, the effect of a varying 
number/ 
number of controls may be measured if the nature of 
each c~ntrol i~.~uch that {1) each is an explicit unit 
object1ve. co~d1~1on defining the gap, and hence limiting 
the assoc1at1ve process, to a definite degree; (2) each 
defines the gap to the same degree as each other, i.e., 
limits the associative process to the same degree as 
each other; (3) the sum of such controls forms a complex 
whole of ~onditions referring to, and specifying, the 
same gap 1n the consciousness of a problem. 
The Adantation of Controlled Association Tests to 
llleasurint:-~ Relevance of Produced Items. 
';Je have seen that the problems given in 
controlled association tests such as Onnosites or 
Analogies, are exruuples of easy non-complex problemso 
In such problems the experience factors, which account 
for the difficulty of many ordinary problems, are 
eliminated, the controls are explicitly stated 
significant objective conditions, and are few in number. 
The controlled association test problem is thus 
QUalitatively and QUantitatively simple. In the 
directed thought process involved in the answering of 
a controlled association test problem, only the bare 
essentials of a problem-solving process remain. It 
represents the schematic form of that process, while 
preserving its essential characteristics. It shows the 
directing of the productive-reproductive process by one 
or a few simple controls. 
In so far as the controlling of the associative 
process must be an integral part of every problem-solving 
process, and since the controlled association test 
uroblem shows this operation in its simplest form, it 
was seen that it should be possible to construct a 
continuous series of problems ranging from the simple 
controlled association problem to more intricate problems 
involving numerical com:plexi ty o:f controls. (See Part I 
Chapter VIII). 
If such a series were constructed, it vrould offer 
a means of measuring the perfonnance of an individual 
with groups of controls of varyiJ?-g complexity~ Moreover, 
it should be possible to embody 1n sucn a ser1es the 
nrinci:ple of eoually graded controls which is necessary 
to the scientific measurement of the :performance of an 
individual with groups of controls of varying complexity. 
If, for exara:ple, a group of tests could b~ . 
constructed in which a series of problems, A, contalnlng 
one control, was followed by series of problems, B,C,D •...•. 
N/ 
N, containing respectively two, three, four •••.•• n controls 
it would provide a means for measuring the relevance of 
the items produced by an individual working with one, 
two, three, four •••••• n controls. 
E.g. 
Problem Series A (l control).Problem 
Pl,oblem 1 
2 
3 
• 
n 
Series B (2 
Problem 1 
2 
3 
• 
• 
• 
n 
controls) 
The nuBber of successful solutions in the A series would 
be the mes.sure of ability to work with one control, the 
number of successful solutions in the B series, the 
measure of ability to work y;i th two controls, and the 
number of controls could be increased as desired. Such 
a group of problems might then provide a method for 
measuring the relevance of what a given individual can 
produce when working with groups of controls of varying 
complexity. 
':men such a scheme is exmained in the light of 
its practicability, however, various objections .emerge. 
For exm11ple, if it is necessary to construct a series of 
unit problems each involving three controls, it will, in 
the first place, be difficult to find a number of 
ordinary problems each involving three, and three only, 
unit specific objective conditions, and at the same time, 
to make certain that the relevant response is equally 
difficult to find in the case of each problem in the series. 
Since each problem in each series is a separate unit, the 
content of each problem composing any one series will be 
different. Hence it will be difficult to guarantee that 
the experience factors involved in each problem are of a 
difficulty equal to tha~of every other problem in the 
series. Again, since the controls are different for 
each problem, it will be difficult to guarantee that the 
operation of organising the controls to specify the gap is 
equally difficult in each problem of the given series. 
The difficulties relative to each single series 
of problems, however, are not so great as the difficulties 
which are met with in constructing several series. It 
must be certain that each series presents problems which 
are exactly one degree more or less complex than the 
preceding or follmving series. Thus not only would each 
series/ 
series have to contain problems of exactly eQual 
difficulty both with regard to (a) experience and (b) 
organising factors, but also each problem within a 
given series would have to be one degree more or less 
controlled than each problem in the preceding or 
subsequent series. 
These difficulties will be found to be so 
great as to render the construction of a group of series 
of varyingly complex problems an impossibility. The 
most serious difficulty, that of ensuring that the 
problems in, for exa~ple, a B series, are exactly one 
degree further controlled than the problems in an A 
series, can be avoided if the series of problems are so 
constructed that the problems in series B, are the same 
problems as those in series A, but that the gaps in the B 
series are specified by one further consecutive additional 
control. 
In place of 
Series of problems A embodying e.g. three controls. 
Series of problems B embodying e.g. four controls. 
Series of problems C embodying e.g. five controls. 
we shall have 
Series of problems each embodying one, two, three ••••• n 
controls 
E.g. 
Problem 1 (a) one control, (b) two controls, (c) three controls .. 
2 (a) " TT (b) If !f ( c ) 11 fl 
3 (a) 11 IT (b) tl !l ( c ) 11 !I 
4 (a) " " (b) !I " ( c ) !1 " 
• 
• 
• 
• 
n {a) " n (b) 11 !! (c) !1 11 
Such a group of tests has the advantage that 
the number of puccessful solutions produced with two 
controls can be directly compared with the number of 
successful solutions }?roduced with one or three controls, 
since the same gap is implied by each series and only 
the degree of its specification differs. There only 
remains the difficulty of ensuring that each problem in 
the (a) series is of equal difficulty both as regards 
exyerience and organising factors as each other problem 
in the (a) series. 
By such a serial group of tests it should prove 
possible/ 
possible to measure the relevance of what any given 
individual can "?rod~ce working with groups of control, 
of graded quant1tat1ve complexity. 
Adaptation of Controlled Association Tests to measuring 
Number of Relevant Items Produced. 
It is clear that to measure ~ne relevance of 
what an individual produces working with q_uanti ta ti vely 
varying control groups, is not the same thing as 
measuring the amount of material he can revive relevant 
to the req_uirements of quantitatively varying control 
groups. In order to measure this, it was seen to be 
necessary to construct a type of problem where there 
might be innumerable items relevant to the gap. 
Is it possible to adapt the principle of the 
Controlled association test to this form, and to embody 
in it the principle of equally graded controls'? 
In previous investigations, controlled 
association tests have been used to measure either the 
s~eed or the relevance of the response. A series of 
controlled association problems have been given, and the 
speed or correctness of the responses calculated over 
the whole series, as e.g. in the Opposites test. This 
is the form of controlled association test which 
corresponds to the Discrete free association test where a 
different stimulus is given for each response requiredo 
In both the Discrete free association test and the 
Discrete controlled association test, the object is to 
measure the quality of the response, or the speed of each 
unit reaction. On the other hand, when the object is to 
measure the quantity of free association, as e.g. the 
length of trains of connected items, the Continuous form 
of the free association test is used. In the present 
circumstances then, when concern is neither with the 
specific quality nor the specific reaction time of the 
controlled association response, but with the measurement 
of the amount which can be produced under the stimulus of 
control groups, the construction of a Continuous controlled 
association test parallel to the Continuous form of. the 
free association test, will meet the requirements. 
Where in the free association test, the 
process is stira~lated by the awareness "that a gap exists", 
in the controlled association test, there must be the 
awareness "that a gap of a specific kind" exists, and the 
associative nrocess stimulated by the awareness of the gap 
must be limited by the presence of at least one control. 
For example in nlace of instructing the subject to 
' ~ 
"write/ 
"write a list of the first words which enter his mind" 
he will be instructed to "write a list of any words he' 
can think of characterised_ by such-and-such a property". 
In both cases a task is set, and a gau holds for -
consciousness, but whereas, in the fi~st case the gap is 
unspecified, in the second case it is so specified that 
only~ ce:tain class of items, those possessing a 
certa1n g1ven property, are relevant to the gapo 
Into the Continuous form of the Controlled 
association test, the principle of eQually graded 
controls can be fitted. All that is required is that 
the gap should be specified to additional degrees by the 
addition of eQually graded controls, each of which will 
limit the range of the associative Process to an eaual 
degree. At each stage of increase-in the number ~f 
controls, the subject will be working with a group of 
controls of measurable complexity, and his ability to 
manage a group of controls of that quantitative complexity 
will be measurable in terms of the amount of material 
relevant to the control group which he can produce. 
Further, the limiting effect of each control 
on the associative process will be sho~n. It will be 
possible to observe the progressive steps cy- which the 
addition of controls specifies the gap and narrows down 
the range of the associative process. The measurement 
of the effect of a quantitatively complex group of 
controls on performance could, however, best be judged 
if the effect of the progressive steps in the attainment 
of complexity were measured. Ultimately, for purposes 
of adequate comparison, performance ~ith a complex 
group of controls should be measured against perfon1ance 
with one control. What is req_uired then is the 
progressive addition of equally graded controls, beginning 
vlfi th one control. Again, the effect of one control 
upon the associative process, that is, the amount of 
material ';Vhich can be produced relevant to a gap 
specified by one condition, can only be adequately 
considered if it is compared with the amount of material 
which can be nroduced relevant to an unspecified gap. 
Performance under the stimulating consciousness "that a 
specified gap exists", must be compared to performance 
under the stimulating consciousness "that a gap existsn. 
The series of tests embodying :progressively 
increased equally graded controls may thus conveniently 
be preceded by a free association test of the Continuous 
form. Although it is recognised that an absolute 
qualitative difference exists between the thought processes 
implied/ 
implied by free and controlled association, it is 
nevertheless possible, in such a series to regard free 
association as the limiting case of the' controlled 
associ~tion series, as well as providing a means of 
measur1ng the degree of limitation placed on performance 
by the existence of one control. 
The test series must then be or the form: 
A. List of wordso 
B. List of items fulfilling condition a 
List of items fulfilling conditiornab 
List of i terns fulfilling condi tiom abc 
List of items fulfilling conditiomabc •••••• n 
By such a series of tests, it will be possible 
to measure the amount of relevant material (i.e. number 
of relevant items) :produced by a subject working with 
groups of controls of progressively increased graded 
complexity, and, in the second place, to compare 
performance with any one given group of controls with 
performance when no controls are present. 
Conclusions. 
I. The ability to employ controls may be measured either 
{a) by measuring the relevance of items produced working 
with groups of controls of varying complexity, or (b) 
by measuring the amount of material (i.e. number of 
relevant items) produced working vtith groups of controls 
of varying complexity. 
II. The complexity of the groups of controls will be 
rendered measurable if equally graded controls are 
employed. 
rrr. To measure (a), a series of controlled association 
problems may be used. In the case of each problem in 
the series, the gap is progressively specified by the 
addition of unit equal controls. (Discrete Controlled association foym) 
To measure (b) a Continuous controlled association 
test may be used, and the gap is to be progressively 
specified by the addition of unit equal controls. 
(Continuous Controlled association fOTIQ) 
A Continuous free association test may precede 
the Continuous controlled association series. 
Section III. 
Construction of a Series of Tests to investigate 
the Hypothesis. 
Essentials of the test-series. - Measure of intelligence 
chosen.- Preliminary experiments, I, II and IIIwith 
controlled association test series.-
The consideration of methods by which the 
hypothesis may be investigated leads to the conclusion 
that a test series constructed for the nurnose must include 
{a) A test measuring general intelligence.-
(b) A series of tests measuring ability to employ controls. 
Since two alternative methods of measuring ability to 
employ controls present themselves, two types of 
controlled association tests may provisionally be 
included, (1) a test series to measure the relevance of 
items produced (2) a test series to measure amount of 
relevant material (i.e. number of relevant items) nroducedo 
(c) The controlled association series of tests is to be 
preceded by a free association test of the Continuous form. 
The essential points to be observed in the 
construction of a test series to investigate the 
hypothesis are that, in the first place, an adeQuate 
measure of general intelligence should be found, and in 
the second place, that the principle of progressively 
increased controls should be carefully observed. 
Measure of Intelligence. 
The measure of intelligence chosen is Otis 
Group Test, (Advanced form B). This test has the 
advantage that it can be applied to a large range of 
ages, and is of such a nature that a large group can 
be tested in shortly over an hour. Small groups were 
tested with N.I.I.P. Test no.34, and with the Binet-Semon 
scale. The main section of the statistical analysis 
is based on the results of the Otis intelligence scale, 
and the three main groups were tested by this measureo 
Preliminary Expe~iments in the Co~s~~uction a~d . 
Application of a.Controlled Assoclaulon Test Ser1es. 
Two alternative means of measuring controlled 
association presenting themselves, the resolution to 
atte~pt to include both in the series of tests demanded 
thef 
the construction of A. a series of :problems where the 
gap in each :problem is :progressively specified by the 
addition of eQually graded controls. {To measure 
relevance. - Discrete Form) 
B. a Continuous form of con trolled 
association test, where the range of the associative 
process is :progressively limited by the addition of 
equally sraded controls. (To measure amount of relevant. -
Continuous form) 
Number of Controls. 
Tentative efforts to construct tests with 
five, six and seven controls had shovm the difficulty 
of finding so many controls relative to the sa."Tie ga:po 
It was therefore decided to set the upper limit of 
increase of controls at four. 
The following t:,rpes of material suggested 
themselves as sui table. Names (literary). Viords, 
Letters, lJarnes (geographical). Percepts, Concepts, 
Numbers, any material or class of objects which might 
be :progressively specified. 
It was realised that both geographical and 
literary names must ultimately be disq_ualified as 
specialised material. They were employed initially 
to gain as l'vide a view as possible of the general trend 
of scores. The difficulty is to find material which is 
(a) non-sDecialised (b) comraon to subjects of all ages 
(c) lends-itself to the principle of progressive 
specification by controls. 
First Preliminary Exneriment. 
The tests in this first tentative series 
were confined to the Continuous controlled association 
form. They were :preceded by a free association test 
of the Continuous form. 
Each test took the :form:-
1. 
2. 
3. 
Write 
Write 
four 
w·ri te 
four 
a list of words of one syllable (one condition). 
a list of \~Tords of one svllable containing 
letters (two conditions): 
a list of words of one syllable containing 
letters, one of which must be 2 (three conditions). 
4. Write a list of words of one syllable containing 
four letters, one of which must be ~' and another 1 
(four conditions). 
Tests of similar form were constructed for 
Percepts, Concepts, Names (literary}, Names (geographical). 
Sixty seconds was allowed for each se:parate list of words. 
The test vms a-pplied to five first year students, and 
five graduates. 
The uuruose of the test was to discover 
(1) Some indication of the effect of additional controls. 
(2) The suitability of different types of material. 
(3) Sui table methods of scoring; and of tabulating 
individual and group results. 
The tables which follow are 
Table I 
II 
III 
Specimen individual result sheet. 
Group results. 
PJlalysis of different test scores. 
TABLE I. 
Date 
- Name 
- Sub.no.4 Time 
- Age 
-
A Free Assoc. 25 
B ContdoAssoc. r. II. III. rv. [Words 22 12 9 4 
!Percents 10 10 11 4 
Conceuts 9 13 14 12 
Names (Geo_g.) 22 13 ? 4 
Names (Lit.} 23 13 11 8 
Totals. 86 61 52 32 
Average. 17.f 12.2 10.4 6.4 
TABLE II. 
Sum of' .Results of' 10 Subjects in each of 
I. II. III. IV. 
:1ords 286 161 120 86 
~ercepts 1.106 ld.L H4 4(:) 
Concepts 123 129 123 lll 
Names t G-eog. 12o6 19';:1 loo l67 
l1James l Lit.) 11:::46 167 .144 --gg 
A :fERAGES. 
r«ords 28.6 16.1 12 8.6 
[Eerce~Jts 13.6 9.1 8.4 4.8 
Concepts 12o3 12.9 12.3 11.1 
Names (Geog. 23.6 19.9 15.5 16.7 
{ames {Lit.) 24.6 16.7 14.4 9.8 
Words :per 
minute. 
five Tests. 
~0 Red. I-IV. 
69. 935';; 
oi::: • 4~,~ 
9. 7'"/a 
<:::b. ';:15;) 
60.l6)o 
T.lillLE III. 
INo.of Sub. F.Ass. Cont.Ass. Av.words per minutE ~- % Red. 
I. II. III. IV. (I-IV}. 
~ . 
tO {f.l l 24 13.8 9.8 6.8 6 56o52 Q)..P 2 22 12.2 9.8 7.6 6.8 46.26 ?-I!=\ Q) 3 23 13.6 10 10 8.4 38.23 
..Prd 
{f.l ;:::s 4 25 17.2 12.2 I 10.4 6.4 62.8 
r-1-P 5 29 17.2 15.2 i 15.6 8.8 48.54 C!J 
.. 6 36 25.6 16.4 ~ 14.4 13.4 46.87 
..p 
a:! 7 24 23o8 18.6 15.8 13.2 48.62 
;:::s • 8 24 27.4 17.2 19.2 11.8 56o93 rrj{f.l 
a:! Q) 9 36 32 23.8 15.8 10.6 66.88 ~ 
0 10 22 I 19.6 14.4 11.6 9.8 50 
conclusions. 
1. Material. 
. The low scores and the small percentage 
reductlon between one ru1d four controls in the Concepts 
test s~ow~~ tha~ ~espi te efforts to ensure the equal 
spec1flca~1on or ~he gap by each additional control, the 
material was of such a nature that eoual grading of the 
controls ~ould.not be guaranteed. The geographical 
names tes~ exhlbits the same features as the concepts 
test, although not to such a marked degreeo The 
percentage decrease between one and four controls is 25% 
as com~ared to the 6~~ decrease shown by the words and 
names test, and 32~ in the percepts test. Clearly in 
both the concepts and the geographical names test, the 
addition of controls has failed to add a corresponding 
degree of specification to the gap. 
In the percepts test, the score is low, but the 
percentage decrease is higher, although only half of 
what it is in the words test, where the graded nature 
of the controls is evident. The low number of items 
produced is to be attributed to the nature of the materialo 
It is more difficult to think of perceptual objects 
havins certain properties than to think of words having 
certain specifications. · 
Although the names (literary) test gave results 
similar for both score and percentage decrease to the 
words test, it was recognised that it involved specialised 
knowledge. Tne use of the test in the present series 
was to afford further illustration of the degree to which 
controls miGht be expected to limit the associative process. 
2. The experiment as a whole was tentative and 
the results only judged as giving a possible indication 
of the lines more detailed investigations might take. 
The effect of addition of controls is clearly marked in 
all tests save those which are invaliclated by the nature of 
the material. There is a clear distinction between the two 
small groups tested (i.eo first year students and graduates) 
in respect of controlled association scores, the older 
group scoring more highly with almost complete consistencyo 
The high scores in the free association test are sea ttered 
indiscriminatelY between the two groups. Although the 
group was too small for any conclusions to be drawn from the 
data, it was thought that a higher correlation of controlled 
association with intelligence or age was indicated than of 
free association with intelligence or age. 
second Preliminary Experiment. 
In the second experiment, both forms of the 
controlled association test were used preceded,· as before, 
by a free association test. ' 
The Continuous controlled association form 
was used with words and percepts as in the last experiment. 
The concepts test was discarded, but the names 
(geographical) and names (literary) tests were allowed 
to remain, since the group to be tested were all students 
and the specialised kno~1edge might be presumed. As 
~uch data as possible 'wa~ desired for the nurnose of 
examining the general directions taken by the.scores. 
The Discrete controlled association form was 
used in the construction of a series of twelve discrete 
problems embodying diverse contents. The problems were 
printed on four sheets, the first sheet presenting a 
series of twelve class names. The follo'tving sheet 
gave the same twelve class names adding one specifying 
property to each class name. The two subsequent sheets 
each added one further specifying property. The form of 
each sheet was as follows:-
Sheet II. 
Class. 
l.Animal 
2.Mineral 
3.Word 
4.Bird 
5.Fish 
6.Town 
Control. Answer. 
large 
white 
containing P 
water 
edible 
seaboard 
Class. 
7.Flower 
So Person 
9 .. Q.uali ty 
lO.Author 
ll.Thing 
12.Book 
Control. Answer. 
yellow 
fictitious 
literary 
modern 
round 
satirical 
One minute was allowed for the answering of 
each sheet. 
The test series thus comprised 
A. Free association test 
Bo controlled association tests (l)Continuous form 
~Yards 
Percepts 
Names (literary) 
Names (geographical) 
(2}Discrete form 
Mixed Test. 
The series of tests was applied to a group of 
fifty students. 
The/ 
The results of statistical analysis or 
the scores follow. 
Analysis of Scores. 2nd Preliminary Experiment. 
A. Continuous Form Tests. Average over 4 tests for each 
control. 
B. Discrete Form Test. (Mixed Test). 
c. Free .Association. 
Tests A. 
;F .A. I. II. III. 
\1 22.66 1'7.89 12.12 10.2 
F 20.47 16.63 12o07 10o92 
Both 21.81 1'7.40 14.14 10.48 
Test B. 
~I 16.33 8.56 6.1 
F 17.68 9.5'7 5.9'7 
Both 16.8'7 8.96 6.05 
1lean Variations F.,..om ·'";-rou~o .".lveraP"e 
.J.. '- ~· ~ . 
I. II. III. 
Tests A 2.64 2.52 1.51 
Test B 2o62 1.52 1.0 
):; Reduction 
IV. (I-IV). 
'7.58 
7.32 
7.44 5'7.23 
. 
2.88 
2.9'7 
2.92 82.'76 
IV. 
1.42 
.'7'7 
Test A. Grouu Averages in Seuarate Tests. £ 
I I. II. III. 
1Words 21.55 14.69 10.63 
:Percepts 8.81 4.34 4.36 
!Names ( Geog )]9.12. 16.'71 12.4 
!Names (Lit. 18.71 12.83 12.4 
Coefficients of Correlation. 
Free Assoco with A.Av.Control I 
Free Assoc. with A.Av.Control IV -
Free Assoco with B.AvoControl I 
Free Assoc. vvi th B.Av.Control IV 
Test A.Av.Control IV with Test B 
Av.Contro1 IV 
Percentage Red uc ti on A with 
Percentage Reduction B 
Correlation/ 
IV. 
7.97 
1.9 
11.16 
9.22 
H ::. .128, r '= .2 
I{ =-. 02' r =-.03 
R ::. -. 013' r ::. -o 01 
R ::. • 05, r '= .07 
R ::: .238, r ::: o37 
R ::: .205, r ::: .32 
]~,I. V. 
8.58'7 
5.373 
corrd.ation of rank in class with Test A. Control I .31 
" 
!I n I! lt H tt A. Control IV .32 
" " 
!I !T IT ll Test B.Control I .24 
" 
tl lt n 
" " 
If 
" Control IV .11 
conclusions. 
?ne of the objects of this experiment was to 
discover wnether any significant sex differences in score 
were present. Since it is clear from the first table 
that these differe11ce s are: small and variable it was 
resolved to_discount the sex factor in furthe; 
investigation. 
The correlations of free association with 
controlled are negative in three cases out of four. 
There is a small positive correlation between 
the percentage reduction between one and four controls 
in Test A, and that in Test B. 
The correlation be~Neen Control IV Test A 
and Control IV Test B is .37. 
\Then class results are correlated with Test A 
Controls I and IV, the coefficient of correlation remains 
constant, but in Test B it decreases. It is low in 
both cases. 
Possible Explanation of the Correlations. 
It is clear that in Test B, the Mixed Test, 
each :problem differs from each other problem in the 
series, an6 hence it is not certain that the answer is 
equally difficult or easy to e;ive in each :problem of the 
series. ~ach will differ (a) as regards difficulty of 
organising controls to specify the gap (b) as regards 
the experience content. This is important since 
subjects did not work straight through each sheet, but 
selected some problems and omitted others. 
It is however most important that it is 
impossible to guarantee that the addition of Controls 
actually specifies the gap to an additional degree when 
material of this nature is used. In the same way, it is 
difficult to ensure that the control added to each problem 
makes it exactly one degree more difficult, and equally 
as difficult, as the control added to another problemo 
For example, not only is it the case that the addition 
of the control ttsg_ueakinga to Animal, small, does not 
really add one degree of difficulty, but also one cannot 
be certain ,that the addition of squeaking to "An:l,.mal, small"~ 
adds the same degree of difficulty as the addition of 
"white" to "Iuineral, hard n. 
It is evident that with material of this kind 
it/ 
it will be impossible to have an objective standard of 
the eQUal gradation of controls, and further, since 
experience factors of a non-uniform nature are 
involved, it cannot be guaranteed that the experience 
factors will present the same difficulties to every 
subject. 
These factors probably account for the low 
correlations with the class results, and the fact that 
the correlation even decreases when performance with 
four controls is correlated with class resultso 
The Discrete form of controlled association 
test, then, as presenting difficulties of constn1ction, 
the most serious of which is the guaranteeing of the 
eq_uali ty of the added controls, must be discarded. If 
the number of relevant items is to be measured as well 
as the amount of relevant material produced, some other 
method must be found •. 
Review OT the last two ex~eriments. 
Of tests of the Continuous form only two 
remain to so forvrard for more extensive application, the 
words test and the percepts test. The form of the 
tests seems sa tis:factory an<l may be styled "Production 
according to Graded Controls". It measures, as has 
been sho•.'m, the amount of material vrhich is proc1uced. 
vrorldnt:.; with groups of controls of graded quanti ta ti ve 
complexi tyo 
Having discarded the first suggested method of 
measuring the ntrraber of relevant responses by a series of 
controlled association problems, it was resolved to attempt 
th~ adaptation of the principle of the Cancellation test 
to the present purposes, i.e. to adapt the form :for use 
with increased graded controls. The operation involved 
in cancellation with graded controls would. be the 
selection of items relevant to a progressively specified 
gap. The subject, having apprehended the requirements 
in the items to be cancelled, would hold these as controls 
before his mind in selecting from a nmuber of given items 
those relevant to the specified gap. 
In the past, cancellation tests have been most 
frequently employed as requiring the cancellation of one 
item, ioe. one condition only was to be satisfied, but 
cancellation tests have also been used where several 
items/ · 
items were reQuired to be cancelled.p The cancellation 
of several items, however, involves a different 
principle from the cancellation of single items fulfilling 
several conditions, but with some adjustment to the 
customary form, it was found possible to employ the 
cancellation test to measure the number of times the 
relevant to ga~s of varying degrees of specification could 
be selected. The test may be called "Selection according 
to Graded Controls". It provides a possible method of 
measuring the relevant, in distinction from the amount of 
relevant, and has none of the disadvantages of the series 
of discrete problems which was tried out in the former 
experiment as a means for measuring the relevant. 
Material used for Selection Testso 
Various tentative series of tests were 
constructed on the principle of selection, using materials 
such as words, numbers, shapes and letters. \"lords 
were ~resented in columns, numbers were printed in 
columns with eight in each row, and the subject was 
instructed to cancel whichever word or set of figures 
contained 
(a) one specified item 
(b) two specified items 
(c) three specified items 
(d) four s~ecified items 
Letters were arranged in groups of nine, viz. 
-r R p 
G S Y 
L_ T Z 
I R L N 
0 S A 
P B T 
The subject was then instn1cted to cancel 
each set of letters where he found, e.g. an R to the N.E. 
of an S, - and so on, increasing the specification of the 
set of letters to be cancelled at each step. 
On an analogy with Whipple's perceptual 
cancellation/ 
p For example, by Binet, four or five·· items were to be 
cancelled; by Burt, two items. Woodwo rth and Wells, 
Kent and Bering both used cancellation tests where 
items were to be cancelled if they fulfilled certain 
conditions. 
cancellation test of shapes, geometrical shapes were 
printed in rows of ten, the subject being instructed, 
for example {1) to cancel every isosceles triangle 
(2) to cancel each isosceles triangle which followed 
a circle, etc. 
On the strength of preliminary experiments 
with material, geometrical shapes were discarded for 
practical reasons of printing and unwieldiness. 
The materials left for selection tests were 
thus:- Words, Numbers, Letters. 
Third Preliminary Exneriment. 
A test series including both production and 
selection controlled association tests was now 
constructed. 
The series consisted in A. Free association test. 
B. Controlled association tests 
Production Words 
Percepts. 
Selection Words 
Numbers (a) 
l\f"t.xrnb ers (b) 
Letters 
The production tests were in their previous form. 
Selection tests were printed on four sheets, since 
it had been found impossible to construct a single 
form which could be used for all four· controls. There 
was also the difficulty that when the fourth control 
was reached, the subject had become too fruniliar with 
the position of items on the sheet. On the first 
sheet (one control) in each test, were forty items out 
of which ten fulfilled the given conditions and were 
to be cancelled. Each test sheet was so constructed 
that each item which fulfilled the given conditions was 
placed within a group of three other items (not 
demarcated from the column) which c1id not fulfil the 
conditions. 
For example:-
Sheet I. 
Cancel A. 
non - A 
non - .A 
A 
non A 
Sheet II. 
Cancel AB. 
A non B 
AB 
non A-B 
non A-non B 
Sheet III. 
Cancel ABC. 
A non B non C 
non A, B, non C 
A,B, non C 
ABC 
Sheet IV. 
Cancel .ABCD. 
.AB non C non D 
ABCD 
non A, BCD 
non A, non B CD 
Thus in each separate selection test, there 
v1ere 40 items to be selected from a total number of 160 
items, there being 10 items fulfilling the conditions at 
each stage of increase of controls. {Samples of the tests 
found in Section IV). 
These tests were applied individually to forty 
students, and after the lapse of four months, a~~lied 
agai'l.. 
The objects in view in this preliminary 
experiment/ 
r 
ex~eriment were (a) to examine the validity of the tests 
in the selection series (b) to decide what timing should 
be allowed for the tests in extensive group application 
(c) to obtain introspective reports (d) to study by 
means of the retest, the constancy of individual scores. 
Conclusions. 
(a) The selection tests, with the exceplJlon of 
the Letters test (directions) seemed adequate. Controls 
appeared e~ually graded, and the gap seemed, from the 
objective point of view, to be specified to an additional 
degree by each additional control. In the Letters 
test, the configuration principle entered too strongly 
for the addition of controls to make much difference 
after the nmaber of two was reached. The material was 
more directly perceptual than in the case of any other 
test in the series, and further complication of the 
pattern for which the subject wa·s searching made it 
easier to select instead of more difficult. 
Although it is clear that from the subjective 
point of view the difficulty does not, in the case of any 
test, increase concomi tautly \Vi th increase in the 
number of controls, yet, in this specific test, the 
nature of the material was such as to render selection 
in many cases as simple with four controls as with one. 
The fact is clearly brought out by the introspective 
reports (see Appendix). This test was consequently 
cli scarded. 
{b) Subjects had been instructed to work 
equally for speed and accuracy, and were timed in the 
selection series by a stop watch. Examination of the 
average time taken by the group resulted in the fixing 
of the time limit for group application at sixty seconds 
for each list. (Thus one selection test occupied four 
minutes, the subjects being stopped and started for 
each fresh list, in group applications). 
{c) A short account of introspective reports is 
given in an appendix. 
{d) A conservative estimate of the retest 
scores as compared with the scores on first testing, 
together with the conclusions arrived at by examination 
of the introspective reports, mal<:e it possible to say 
that a given subject's score remains constant (within 
the space of four months' time). There was a small 
increase in performance in the retest as compared with 
the/irst test scores, but this would anpear to be due ~-
due to familiarity with the form of the tests, with 
the general trend of the requirements, and with the 
experimental conditions in general. Small variations 
were taken to be indicative of accidental factors, such 
as differences in physical condition. It could be 
taken that performance remained constant. 
SECTION VI. 
Final Form of the Test Series. 
Final Form of the mest Series - Instructions -
Application - Experimental Conditions -
Groups of Subjects Selected - Treatment of Data. 
SECTION VI. 
FINAL FORM OF TEST SERIES. 
A. Otis General Intelligence Scale, Advanced Form B. 
B. Free Association Test .. ~~continuous Form. 
c. Controlled Association Tests with four 
increased 
{1} Production 1 Words Test {a) 
2 Perception Test 
(2} Selection 3 Words Test (b) 
4 Numbers Test (a) 
5 Numbers Test (b) 
Instructions given for tests. 
B. Free Association. 
"Write down as quickly as you can a list of 
thewords which enter into your mind. Any words 
will do • Dont stop to think what you are writing 
or whether you are repaating words. Just write 
down all the words you can think of as quickly as 
you can. You will be allowed one minute." 
c. Production, Controlled Association Tests. 
1. In the next 60 seconds write down as many 
words of one syllable as you can think of. 
2. In the next 60 seconds write down as many 
words of one syllable and four letters as you can 
think of. 
3. In the next 60 secon~s write down as many 
words of one syllable and four letters, one of 
which must be S, as you can think of. 
4. In the next 60 seconds write down as many 
words with one syllable and four letters, one of 
which must be s and another t, as you can think of. 
II. Perceptual Test. 
1. In the next 60 seconds, write down the names 
of as many white things as you can think of. 
(Alw~ys white; sometimes white; thought of as white; 
silver-coloured.) 
2. In the next 60 seconds, write down a list 
of things that are white, and at the same time flat, 
3. In the next 60 seconds, write down a list 
of things that are white, flat and smooth. 
4. In the next 60 seconds write down a list 
of things that are white, flat, smooth and eireU.lar 
in shape. 
Notes. 
Subjects were instructed that words already given 
in one test might be repeated in another, as long as 
both sets of conditions were fulfilled. 
Subjects were asked to note that in II (4) the 
existence of the conditions flat and circular 
excluded such things as ngolfOalls". 
In the Words Test two examples of a word 
fulfilling each set of conditions were given. In 
the Perceptual Test, one example of a thing 
fulfilling the conditions was given, but further 
examples in all cases were given if it seemed necessary. 
The forms and instructions for the Selection 
Tests follow. 
SELECTION TESTS. 
Instructions IA. 
Cross out all words containing the 
letter R. 
dependent 
practice 
champion 
swallow 
gratuities 
attache 
pencil 
WORDS TEST 
lA 
selection 
gratitude 
immune 
sanguine 
sanctuary 
community 
submission 
commonwealth svelte 
feasible time 
royalty strychnine 
tempest pigeon 
limped kinetic 
megalomania radiator 
justice banjulele 
morality peaceful 
fustian translucent 
mendacious plunge 
dahlia willow 
analytic possibly 
bifurcate anomalous 
Instruction. IB. 
Croxa out words which contain both 
R and F. 
WORDS TEST 
IB 
reserved enfetter 
repugnant royalty 
facile pinnacle 
evil enfold 
fully melancholy 
cataclysm pioneer. 
formulate profligacy 
dorsal mafia 
differentiate camera 
fixation franght 
pillow confession 
ermine homily 
robust endorse 
enfranchise general 
dispassionate folium 
feeble fictitious 
genetic translucent 
glanders roseate 
gruff ratify 
fortunate preference 
Instructions. Ie. 
Cross out words. which contain the 
letters R, F and G. 
fresh 
WORDS TEST 
IC 
refurnishing 
redintegration gallantry 
gospel formamint 
gratify groundsel 
regain running 
bifurcate reproof 
forgiven cognate 
lugubrious glandiferous 
forgathering forgotten 
transgress fortify 
gambit agnostic 
forsaken gravitate 
fury thing 
graphic: glorification 
unguent boring 
refulgent fervid 
throughout reference 
reforming gunnery 
garnish grafting 
fermentation margin 
Instructions. ID. 
Cross out words which contain the 
letters R) F, G and T. 
glorification 
regret 
fetters 
forgetting 
great 
gruffness 
retiltering 
perfect 
preferring 
garter 
fitter 
restnfi 
target 
figure 
forthright 
faster 
WORDS TEST 
ID 
remigrate 
fortification 
refitting 
glorify 
refrangibility 
foretaste 
rectangular 
grafting 
transference 
fearnought 
forgery 
regimental 
fragment 
foreign 
regatta 
turf 
glandiferous generation 
turgid font 
fortune graffito 
regretful golfer 
Instructions. IIA. 
Cross out any number which contains 
at least one 3. 
1 4 7 1 
2 3 6 4 
1 8 2 9 
·8 8 1 8 
2 9 8 4 
4 8 7 9 
3 1 2 4 
5 6 9 8 
3 6 7 7 
4 8 2 9 
5 6 7 8 
1 4 2 8 
5 7 7 9 
2 3 4 4 
9 8 7 6 
2 4 8 1 
1 8 7 9 
2 8 4 0 
8 7 9 6 
4 8 8 9 
NUMBERS TEST 
IIA 
8 1 6 9 
7 0 9 8 
1 2 3 4 
1 0 1 7 
1 8 8 4 
4 7 9 8 
... 0 4 3 n 
1 6 5 7 
1 5 3 0 
9 4 4 8 
7 0 8 7 
5 9 5 6 
1 8 8 1 
2 7 2 3 
8 
4 
2 
7 
2 
8 
2 
7 
1 
9 
8 
6 
4 
0 
6 8 1 8.1 
9 9 1 1 1 
1 1 4 7 9 
3 0 3 1 0 
2 1 5 6 6 
6 2 2 9 8 
8 4 5 
2 1 4 
0 5 1 
9 1 2 
0 1 5 
7 6 9 
9 0 8 
9 1 4 
2 4 0 
2 1 1 
6 7 1 
7 8 7 
1 1 6 
6 4 5 
2 9 2 
4 8 0 
9 4 1 
2 4 4 
9 8 5 
4 1 6 
Instructions. IIB. 
Cross out all numbers which contain 
both 3 and 6. 
NUMBERS TEST 
11 B 
4 3 9 8 8 2 9 4 3 1 1 2 
4 5 9 1 1 1 8 2 0 4 1 9 
1 3 0 5 6 0 7 6 9 3 7 8 
7 9 8 6 1 1 1 6 1 5 0 8 
8 9 8 7 1 4 2 1 7 0 9 8 
6 0 0 8 2 5 4 6 9 1 4 1 
9 3 0 9 1 1 8 9 3 4 0 5 
8 6 7 6 3 4 1 6 5 8 0 3 
1 5 6 2 0 5 4 6 8 9 1 7 
1 6 5 8 3 9 2 6 0 0 3 1 
5 8 1 2 4 8 1 1 9 5 4 7 
7 3 9 2 1 1 9 8 9 0 4 3 
3 0 8 5 6 0 7 3 8 5 6 1 
3 4 9 9 8 9 7 1 2 9 3 7 
9 8 7 1 2 8 2 4 2 0 1 5 
9 0 6 5 4 7 1 6 4 9 4 7 
1 2 3 4 7 7 8 9 0 0 5 3 
9 0 4 0 2 2 4 2 4 8 7 0 
8 3 7 9 6 1 2' 9 8 7 6 2 
8 1 5 4 6 0 9 1 3 0 5 6 
Instructions. IIC. 
Cross out all numbers which contain 
3, 6 and 2. 
2 4 5 3 
1 0 3 5 
2 1 3 9 
9 8 2 5 
9 4 2 3 
6 8 0 9 
4 2 5 9 
9 3 0 1 
2 8 8 9 
5 4 3 4 
2 0 5 6 
2 8 4 0 
9 8 7 5 
5 1 2 3 
9 3 0 0 
4 6 3 9 
6 1 6 0 
2 7 7 3 
3 5 8 2 
5 0 4 1 
NUMBERS TEST 
11 c 
6 1 1 6 
6 7 9 3 
9 2 4 3 
1 9 7 2 
6 8 8 6 
2 7 9 2 
1 7 1 2 
2 1 1 9 
3 2 5 6 
6 5 4 6 
3 5 5 1 
0 1 7 1 
2 0 8 2 
3 9 9 6 
6 0 8 2 
2 8 1 6 
3 7 7 3 
1 4 2 3 
6 0 8 4 
2 1 4 5 
2 8 5 3 
0 6 7 6 
0 0 1 2 
7 4 5 1 
0 0 3 9 
9 3 6 4 
5 7 8 9 
0 3 1 2 
5 3 0 1 
3 5 4 2 
5 2 8 9 
9 5 2 4 
1 1 3 9 
3 2 4 9 
9 0 8 6 
7 3 5 5 
9 8 8 2 
0 6 5 2 
2 8 1 1 
8 9 1 0 
Instructions. IID 
Cross out all numbers which contain 
3, 6, 2 and $. 
3 0 
9 1 
8 9 
2 3 
1 2 
9 8 
2 9 
2 3 
6 9 
6 4 
2 6 
9 2 
9 8 
2 1 
3 0 
1 9 
NUMBERS TEST 
11 D 
6 5 2 1 4 3 5 
1 2 3 4 1 3 8 
6 3 0 5 7 4 3 
1 6 9 0 7 3 9 
9 4 3 0 8 3 0 
7 6 3 7 1 6 6 
5 6 3 8 8 6 3 
0 6 1 1 4 2 6 
8 3 4 8 5 3 6 
2 9 3 1 7 9 6 
3 1 4 7 1 2 5 
8 3 1 5 8 3 2 
2 3 6 4 7 2 9 
9 0 3 0 8 3 8 
0 6 2 1 8 9 6 
3 6 1 8 5 2 6 
3 5 6 9 2 7 4 3 6 
1 3 8 6 9 7 8 3 6 
6 0 7 3 2 1 8 l 1 
9 1 2 8 3 4 1 3 4 
0 6 2 
8 2 9 
9 8 6 
2 4 6. 
0 9 2 
3 9 1 
2 7 9 
0 3 1 
1 9 8 
1 3 2 
6 0 3 
7 1 9 
8 6 3 
8 2 9 
0 3 1 
1 1 3 
5 9 2 
7 8 9 
6 3 2 
9 2 1 
Instructions. IIIA. 
Cross out 4 whenever it comes immediately 
after a number greater than 6. 
2 4 
1 3 
1 5 
2 4 
1 2 
1 3 
9 8 
8 4 
5 7 
2 3 
8 6 
3 2 
5 6 
7 4 
8 3 
1 1 
5 4 
9 4 
4 5 
1 0 
NUMBERS TEST 
IliA 
3 5 9 2 2 1 4 9 7 9 
8 6 7 3 5 3 4 2 0 3 
7 4 2 0 6 8 0 8 4 1 
6 5 4 1 1 3 2 6 9 8 
5 6 9 9 9 7 6 5 8 4 
4 2 5 8 3 1 1 3 2 1 
7 3 4 6 2 8 9 7 6 2 
2 0 3 7 1 3 1 1 4 5 
9 4 1 1 1 9 0 0 7 1 
4 2 5 0 7 5 4 7 4 3 
9 1 4 3 3 2 3 6 5 2 
0 4 1 4 2 1 1 3 4 2 
8 2 9 7 6 8 6 5 9 4 
3 0 1 9 1 3 0 4 2 3 
9 7 6 8 5 1 2 9 8 7 
2 3 4 3 1 8 3 0 5 1 
1 2 3 2 9 1 1 5 3 2 
7 8 1 1 2 4 6 0 5 3 
6 8 9 0 8 8 1 2 7 3 
4 3 1 7 3 2 1 1 9 4 
Instructions. IIIB. 
Cross out 5 whenever it comes 
(a) immediately after a number greater 
than itself'. 
(b) immediately before a number less 
than itself. 
6 5 7 1 
9 4 5 1 
6 7 9 3 
2 6 5 1 
4 6 3 5 
2 9 5 9 
9 7 5 3 
1 2 3 6 
9 4 0 0 
2 8 5 4 
4 2 8 5 
2 5 3 7 
1 7 5 1 
4 7 6 3 
5 1 5 2 
7 7 5 7 
9 8 3 5 
1 8 5 8 
4 9 5 2 
2 3 1 8 
NUMBERS TEST 
Ill B 
1 3 4 6 9 
7 4 3 1 4 
2 2 2 4 9 
4 6 1 9 9 
4 7 9 4 2 
3 8 7 2 6 
4 9 8 8 7 
9 3 6 9 8 
3 4 1 4 3 
0 2 2 1 9 
8 7 4 3 8 
1 6 3 8 1 
9 4 7 6 5 
1 2 6 7 7 
2 9 8 6 4 
6 8 9 4 9 
1 7 2 9 1 
3 3 1 8 7 
3 1 3 1 2 
4 2 4 3 4 
9 5 9 
5 4 9 
7 3 2 
5 2 1 
5 3 3 
5 8 7 
5 4 3 
1 0 1 
1 3 2 
8 5 1 
5 7 1 
5 2 7 
2 0 0 
9 7 0 
5 4 3 
5 9 3 
5 3 2 
5 6 1 
8 5 4 
7 9 5 
Instructions. IIIC. 
Cross out 6 whenever it comes 
(a} immediately after a number greater 
than 4. 
(b) immediately before a number less 
than 4. 
(e) whenever the difference between the 
figure two places before 6 and the 
and the number immediately before 6 
is 4. 
3 5 6 1 
3 7 6 1 
1 5 6 9 
9 8 1 2 
8 1 5 6 
2 6 6 8 
4 6 6 2 
1 2.4 3 
3 3 9 1 
4 8 6 3 
4 8 6 7 
9 6 6 3 
3 7 6 5 
7 0 0 7 
1 7 6 3 
6 5 9 6 
5 8 6 1 
2 6 6 3 
8 9 8 8 
5 9 6 6 
NUMBERS TEST 
Ill C 
0 0 9 8 9 6 3 9 
9 1 1 4 8 6 2 3 
1 2 8 4 8 6 5 3 
3 3 2 1 2 3 4 1 
2 4 7 2 5 9 6 3 
9 9 3 1 5 6 7 4 
5 8 1 6 8 6 2 6 
0 7 2 4 5 9 8 6 
2 5 7 5 8 1 3 4 
7 4 9 3 7 6 3 1 
8 3 3 2 6 6 6 2 
4 0 6 5 7 6 1 8 
7 1 4 9 9 6 0 8 
1 2 5 2 3 9 2 1 
3 9 3 8 9 6 1 4 
1 1 2 9 1 5 6 1 
0 8 1 7 7 6 3 3 
4 2 9 5 9 6 2 8 
5 7 5 4 5 9 8 0 
9 3 6 4 8 6 9 1 
Instructions. IIID. 
Cross out 7 whenever 
(a) it comes immediately after a number 
greater than 3. 
(b) it comes immediately before a number 
less than 3. 
(~) the difference between the figure two 
places before 7 and the figure 
immediately before 7 is 3. 
(d) the difference between tb.~ figure 
immediately following 7 and the figure 
two places after 7, is 7. 
3 6 
1 4 
9 5 
2 3 
8 4 
1 4 
4 0 
6 9 
2 5 
5 6 
3 6 
2 5 
5 8 
4 7 
1 7 
2 5 
6 3 
1 4 
6 9 
3 8 
NUMBERS TEST 
Ill D 
7 2 2 1 4 2 5 
7 1 8 6 3 4 7 
7 2 9 2 1 2 7 
9 5 0 8 2 5 9 
7 1 8 3 6 9 4 
7 1 9 9 8 4 7 
0 3 1 4 9 1 2 
7 2 9 2 8 6 9 
3 1 3 1 6 1 0 
7 2 9 3 1 7 8 
7 2 9 5 2 2 5 
7 2 1 6 3 5 8 
7 1 8 9 5 5 8 
7 7 9 7 4 3 2 
7 1 8 3 1 6 6 
7 2 4 2 1 4 7 
3 1 2 1 3 6 5 
8 2 9 0 4 9 7 
7 2 3 0 2 1 4 
7 2 9 1 1 3 6 
7 2 6 
7 1 8 
7 1 8 
9 4 1 
7 2 9 
7 2 5 
3 6 5 
7 1 8 
5 0 3 
7 1 8 
7 1 8 
7 1 7 
7 2 9 
1 4 5 
7 2 9 
7 2 1 
0 3 9 
7 1 8 
7 1 8 
7 1 0 
APPLICATION OF TESTS. 
Experimental Conditions. 
The actual apprehension o£ the meaning of each 
condition, or the group of condition, was no part 
of the test. The work of the experimenter was to 
make certain that each subject had a thorough grasp of 
the meaning of (the conditions with which he was 
going to work, before proceeding. Differences in 
speed or apprehension of conditions were to be 
eliminated at ~he outset, in so far as explanation 
and illustration made it possible. The object is 
toJneasure bhe individual's ability to work with 
controls, not his speed in apprehending conditions 
as such. 
Emphasis was to be laid equally on speed and 
accuracy. Subjects were to be instructed that they 
were to work as quickly as was compatible with 
accuracy. As arising from the experience of past 
tests, the subject was warned that in the Selection 
Tests one single light stroke of the pencil was 
sufficient, while in the production tests,, he was 
instructed to write as quickly as possible while 
preserving reasonable legibility. 
Notes on Application. 
Tests were applied to groups of 20 - 3o subjects 
a; once. In most cases, the Intelligence Test was 
given a day before the Association Tests. Since 
the Intelligence Test occupied more than one hour 
and the Association Tests over 40 minutes, it was 
not considered advisable to proceed to one after the 
other without a rest period. 
Since the majority of the subjects were school 
children, the tests were given in classrooms. Ideal 
experimental conditions were not attained for most 
groups. 
Groups of Subjects Selected. 
All subjects were taken either from schools or 
from university. 
The aim in view in selecting the subjects was 
to have as many subjects as possible for each year 
of age between 10 and 21 years of age, and t9 make a 
special study o~ one age group. Since it was possible 
to procure large groups of'.· schoolchildren between the 
ages of 12 and 13 (High School entrants} the largest 
group is of that age. 
It the groups used in preliminarycntests are 
excepted (i.e. one group o~ 50 students and one group 
of 40 students) the following are groups where resulns 
are included in the statistical analysis. 
I. Alloa School Group. (50 subjects (12-18) 
No intelligence tests). 
II. Bell Baxter School Group (90 subjects (12-18) 
No intelligence test). 
III. Madras College Group. (20 subjects (13-14) 
No intelligence tests). 
IV. Kirkcaldy High School Group (2i5 subjects (9-14) 
Tested Otis group}test. 
Mean I. B. 125.5. Selected group tested by 
N. I. I. p. test No. 34. Retested Association 
Series.) 
v. Waid Academy Group. (96 subjects (13-18) 
tested Otis Group Test. :Mean I. B. 129.7.) 
VI. Student Group. (General Logic ~lass) (56 subjects 
1st and 2nd year, 18-21) Tested Otis Group Test. 
Mean I. B. 142.8. 
Since Groups I, II and III were not subjected to 
any intelligence test, their results have been used 
in the calculation of Age Norms only. 
The main section of statistical analysis is 
based on the data obtained from Groups IV, Y and VI. 
In these three groups the required ran~e of age 
is present, and Group V (K. H. s.) gives the opportunity 
for a more detailed study of High School entrance age. 
Groups IV, V and VI are tested as one group of 
367 subjects (Age 9 - 23). Mean r. B. 126.1. 
Notes on Groups IV, V and Vi. 
Group IV (I. B. - 125.5) as consisting of 
High School entrants is a group w~ch is unselected 
by any intelligence factors. Since all children 
have to attend school until the age of 14, this 
group:.: contains children of all levels of intelligence. 
Group V, on the other hand, consisted largely of 
children 14 - 18 years. It would tend to be the 
case that such children remained in school because it 
was considered that they had the capacity to reach 
or Leaving Certificate standard. 
(I. B. 129.7). Such a group would tend to be self-
selected, a higher mean I. B. is only to be expected. 
Group VI, again, tend to be yet more highly 
selected since it is clear that individuals in a 
univers~ty have had the capacity to reach and to 
pass University Entrance examinations, and must 
presume that they have the capacity to at~~ degree 
standards. (MeBn I. B. 142.8) 
Thus a process of self-selection of more from 
less intelligent is illustrated by these three ~roups, 
and cannot be discounted in considering the results 
of this investigation. 
Treatment of Data. Statistical Analysis. 
As a result of the application of the series of 
tests, the following datav~ obtained for each subject 
in Groups IV, V and VI. 
Name, Age, Class, Free Association Score 
(Words per minube), Relevant Items per 
minute for each of four control groups in 
five different Controlled Association Tests. 
Absolute Score in Otis Intelligence Test, 
I. B. (i.e. Difference between Absolute score 
and Age Norm added to lOO). 
The data 
Class 
Name School 
IC 
for each subject ~tr ta.\bulated thus:-
Absolute Free 
Age I. B. Score Association 
I.R.Smith K.HJm. 12/3 151 144 23 
Controlled Association. 
I II III IV V 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I !I III IV I II III IV 
15 13 10 7 9 8 7 5 10 10 6 4 10 9 8 7 10 7 5 4 
The next step was to add all scores in the five 
Controlled Association Tests together, and to get the 
sum over five tests for each control, viz:-
Class Absolute 
Name School Age I. B. Score 
IB 
F.A. I I! III IV 
J.D.A K.H.S. 13/1 160 149 21 43 37 31 
Results were treated statistically in three 
main ways. 
28 
A. For each of Groups IV, V and VI the total number 
of subjects in each group were arranged and ranked 
according to I. B. They were divided into groups. (1) According to every 10 units decrease on the I. B. 
score, i.e. 
Group I (180-190) all subjects with I.B. between 
180 - 190. 
Group II (170-180) all subjects with I.B. between 
170 - 180 
Etc. 
The Average Free and Controlled Association Score 
{per each control} was then calculated for each of these 
groups. . 
(2) The subjects in each of Groups IV, V and VI 
ranked according to I. B. were then divided into 
five groups, each being 20% of the total number in 
each group. The same calculation of group average 
scores for Free and Controlled Association was made 
as in the last grouping. 
(3) The subjects in each of Groups IV, V and VI were 
divided into3groups of 25%, 50%, 25% of the total 
number respectively. Corresponding Association 
scores were calculated for these. 
Groups IY;~ V and VI were treated as one and 
divided into groups by each of these methods in turn. 
Mean Variations and Absolute and Percentage Decrease 
between Controls I and IV were added for each grouping. 
B. Age. 
The subjects in Group IV were arranged an d 
ranked according to each year of age, and Free and 
Controlled Association Scores calculated for each 
age group. 
The subjects in Groups V and VI together Groups 
I, II and III were ranked similarly to give another 
set of age norms. 
Age Norms were then calculated with all 
subjects (Groups I - VI). 
From the total group a selection of subjects 
was made, and Association scores calculate.d for each 
year group of Mental Age. Association scores were 
then calculated for corresponding year groups of 
Chronological Age, and the two compared. 
c. Coefficients of Correlation. 
Correlation Coefficients were calculated for: (1) Otis I. B. with Association (a) Free 
(b) Controlled, I,II,III,IV 
(a) for Groups IV, V and VI and (B) for total Group 
(IV, V, VI). . 
(2) Otis I. B. with fiontrolled As.::ociation, I, II, III, IV 
for Prodtction and Selection Test series taken 
respectively. (GroupV). 
(3) Free Association wtth Controlled Association, 
I, II, III, IV (for Groups IV, V and VI). 
(4) Controlled Association Scores, I with II• III, IV. 
for Groups IV, V and VI. 
II with III·t IV. 
III with IV. 
(5) Absolute Scores with Controlled Association Scores 
I, II, III, IV (Group IV). Absolute Scores with 
Production and Selection Group v. 
(6) Small selected group fram Group IV tested 
N. I. I. P. No. 34, and (a) correlated with Controlled 
Association Series I, II, III, IV, (b) with Otis 
I. B. for same group. 
(~) Age with Free Association and Controlled 
Association I, II, III, IV (for Groups I - VI). 
SECTION V. 
TAPL:2S Al'J'TI GRAPHS. 
A. Group Average Free and Controlled Association 
Scores. 
B. Age Norms. 
c. Coefficients of Correlationo 
Section V. 
Tables and Granhso 
A. 
Groun Average Free and Controlled Association ScDres. 
Table I. Total number of subjects ranked according to I.B. 
and divided into groups according to each ten units decrease 
in the I.B. score. Group average scores for Free ~~d 
Controlled association are given. It is apparent from the 
table that the average number of items produced by the highe! 
I.B. groups exceeds the average number produced by the 
lower I.B. groups. 
GROUP-I.B. NO. IN F. A. I. I I. III. IV. 
GR. 
I (1?0-194 19 24.1 13 10.61 8.?5 ?.52 
II 160-1?0 21 25.3 l2o9 10.52 8.4 ? 
III 150-160 35 20.28 11.?4 9.42 ?.?8 6.18 
IV 140-150 54 23.5 12.17 9.23 ?.?? 6.45 
V 130-140 41 23.02 11.53 9o0? ?.26 6.29 
VI 120-130 55 20.8 11.27 8.74 7.01 6.34 
VII 110-120 35 16.41 9.95 8o22 6.32 5.25 
VIII 100-110 42 19.52 10o2 8.59 6.35 5.54 
IX 90-100 26 19.16 9.?? 8.48 5.81 5.23 
IX l(below 90 36 1?.1? 9.26 ?.48 5.9 5.11 
Totals. 209.26 111.?9 90.36 ?1.35 60.91 
Averages. 20.92 11.18 9.04 7.13 6.1 
lts5~cc.at(.ol'f ~cores <7( S'"""iec.L~ o.s 
\"" a(,(e I jTd.fh4td. 
/3 
12 
11 
/O~ 
9. 
'i 
7 , 
• 
Table Ia. 'Mean Variations from Group average scores 
in Free and Controlled association as in Table I. 
Average 
of I ~ ,.., 
.J:J.liroup. 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
~I [VII 
YIII 
IX 
pc 
Totals. 
},lean -.rariat: 
ion. 
Variation on 
..b • '"'" • I 
+3.18 +1.82 
+4.38 +1.72 
-0.64 +0.56 
+ 2.58 +0.99 
+ 2.1 +0.35 
-0.12 +0.09 
-4.51 -1.23 
-1.4 -0.98 
-0.'76 -1.41 
-3.75 -1.92 
23.42 11.07 
2.34 1.11 
II III IV 
+1.5? +1.62 -t-1.42 
+1.48 +1.27 +0.9 
+0.38 +o.65 +0.08 
+0.19 +0.64 -t-0.35 
+0.03 +0.13 -t-0.19 
-0.3 -0.12 +0.24 
-0.82 -0.81 -Oo85 
-0.45 -0.78 -0.56 
-0.56 -lo32 -0.87 
-1.56 -1.23 -0.99 
7.34 8.5? 6 •'15 
.73 .85 .64 
Table Ib. Grou~ aver&C0 ~0r~entage and absolute decrease 
between Free Association and Controlled Association (one 
control). Group average percentage and absolute decrease 
between Controlled Association (one control) and (four 
controls). The table shows that the percentage decrease 
effected when one control is iHposed in the free association 
process is approxirl'l tely eq_ual to tne -yercentage decrease 
effected by the further addition of three controls to 
performance with one control. 
Contro1·r on Free Association Control IV on Control I 
Abs. ~o.Age Abs. 5-~.Age Abs ~J.A.ge 
Grou • Deer Deer • M. V. 11. v. Deer Deer. M.V.A M.V.P. 
I 11.10 46.58 +1.45 .. .633 5.48 42.11 -r.382 -3.532 
II 12.40 48.99 +2.75_3 1.777 5.9 45.72 i-.802 -+.078 
III 8.54 42.11 1.10? 5.103 5.56 47.35 + .462 +1.708 
IV 11.33 48.21 1.683 .997 5.72 47 -l'o622 -t1.358 
y_ 11.49 49.90 1.84:3 2.687 5.34 46.3 -1-.242 +.658 
iVI 9.53 54.18 .17? 6.967 4.93 43.74 -.168 -1.902 
VII 6.46 39.36 3.187 7.853 4.7 47.23 -o398 -t1.568 
Y._III 9.32 47.74 .327 .527 4.66 45.69 -.,438 +- • 048 
IX 9.39 49.00 • 25? 1.787 4.54 46.47 -.558 + o828 
~{ 7.91 46.06 1.73 1.153 4.15 44.81 -.948 -.832 
.. 
96.47 472.13 14.524 2 9.484 50.98 456.42 5.02 12. 5l2C: 
9.647 47.213 1.452 2o 948C:C 5.098 45.642 .502 1. 25S0 
Table II. Total number of subjects ranked accordinG 
to I.B. divided so that each group represents 20~ of the 
total number. Group average scores for Free and 
Controlled Association • 
G roup. N 1 o. .., A .l:!. . I II III ~ 
I 75 22o62 12.4 10.03 8 6.75 
II 72 22.36 12.16 9.3 7.83 6o61 
III 72 21.26 11.47 8.68 6o81 6.1 
rv 72 17.83 10.04 8.46 6.47 5.48 
rv 73 18.43 9.72 8.21 5.96 5.24 
Average 20.5 llol5 8.93 7o01 6.03 
Standard Deviations for each group in the foregoing table. 
Groun. Control I Control IV Free Assoc. 
I 1.97 1.5 7.15 
II 2.34 lo66 8.41 
IJ.I 2.16 1.41 7.62 
IV 1.96 1.55 7.92 
rv 1o24 1.19 6.73 
.A-verage 1.93 1.46 7.56 
. A. f:"rutLqE ~ 1.) 
A.ssoc;<.a.tcolll S<Dr<ls a) Sr...bJ'k.IS 
a$ ,,.. Tau~ '' !jT&phe£ . 
Table IIa. Subjects grouped as in Table II. Group 
average percentage and absolute decrease between Free 
Association and Controlled Association (one control). 
Group average percentage and absolute decrease between 
Controlled Association (one control) and Controlled 
Association (four controls). 
Free Assoc. & Control I~Control I & Control IV. 
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage 
Groun Decrease Decrease. Decrease. Decrease. 
I 10.22 45.18 5.65 45.56 
II 10.2 45.61 5o 55 45o65 
III 9.79 46.04 5o37 46.81 
rv 7.79 43.68 4.56 45.41 
tv 8.71 47.26 4.48 46.09 
Table III. Total number of subjects ranked according to 
I.B. and divided into groups such that the first group 
represents the upper 25% of the subjects, the centre 
group the middle 50';\ and the last group, the lower 25~~ 
of the subjects. Group average scores for Free and 
Controlled Association. 
Grouu. F • A.. I 
-
III IV 
A 91 22.3? 12.24 9.87 8.03 6.61 
B 182 20.98 11.2 8.79 7.11 6.~ 
c 91 18.63 9.58 8.1? 5.99 5. 2jl 
Table IIIa. For the above grouping, the group average 
percentage and absolute decrease bet~Creen Free Association 
and Controlled Association (one control). Group average 
percentage and absolute decrease between Controlled 
Association (one control) and Controlled Association 
(four controls). 
Control I on Free Association. Control IV on Control I 
P.r. ~bsolute. s;;A_f'e. A.l..I. V. P.M.V Ab sol c;.A.g A.Iv:. V. P.l!I. V. ,::, e. 
··-·· 
lA. 10.13 45.28 .4-77 1.36 5.63 45.99 .64 .65 
lB. 9.78 46.61 .127 o.-L 0 0 5.07 45.26 .os .os 
c 9.05 4S.04 .603 1.4 4.29 44.7S .7 • 56 
Tota: 2S.96 139.93 1.207 2o79 14.99 136.03 lo42 1.29 
!Av. 9.653 46.64 .402 .93 4.99 45.39 .473 o43 
A. f:tGURE. 0"·) 
A.ssoc.1a.bo1V Scor-es o~ SCA.~e,L-s 
u lN Ta.l.l~ill. ~ ca.rheci. . 
Group IV (K.H.S.) 
Subjects in group IV (age 9-14). No. 215. 
Mean I.B. 125.5 
Table Io Subjects ranked according to I.B. and divided 
into groups according to each ten units decrease on the 
I.B. score. Group average scores for Free and Controlled 
Association given. The s&~e features are exhibited by 
the trend of the association scores as in the scores for 
the to~al group. (First Testing Scores) 
Gr. I. B. No .. F.A. I II III IV 
I (170-194) 8 20.25 11 .. 32 9.25 6 .4? 6.57 
II (160-1?0) 6 17 .. 33 10.56 8.? 6.56 5.36 
III {150-160} 21 18.28 10.62 8.39 6 .. 86 5.66 
DT (140-150) 24 1'7 .. 37 10.47 7.84 6.62 5o3 
V (130-140) 17 17.17 9.83 7.87 6.15 5.22 
VI (120-130) 36 17.33 10.36 8.28 6.44 6.25 
i\r.!:I (110-120) 26 13.72 9.18 7 .. 92 5.94 4.94 
[VIIJ (100-110) 27 14.85 9.14 7.97 5o62 5.04 
IX ( 90-100) 19 17.31 9 .. 18 8.12 5.58 5.13 
~ (80-90) 16 16.06 9.25 7.48 5o9 4.81 
~I ( 70-80) 15 16.86 9.01 7 .. 32 5.56 5.28 
Table Ia. Group average :percentage and absolute 
decrease between Free Association and Controlled 
Association (one control) and between Controlled Association 
(one control) and Controlled Association (four controls). 
4th Control on lst. 4th Control on F.A. 
Abs. Percenil Dev. Dev. Abs. Percent Dev. Dev. 
Gr. Deer. Deer. I 
-
I 4o75 42.03 .263 
II 5.2 49.25 .713 
III 4.96 46.69 .473 
IV 5.17 49.39 .683 
V 4.61 46.89 .123 
VI 4.11 39.56 .377 
VII 4.24 53.68 .247 
VIJ. 4.1 44.85 .387 
IX 4.05 44.06 .437 
X 4.44 48.00 .047 
;x:I 3.73 4lo39 • 757 
49.36 505.79 4.507 
4.487 45.98 .409 
4th Control on 1st. 
Absolute M. Vo - o409 
Percentage M. V. - 3.002~~ 
II Deer, Deer. I II. 
3~95 8.93 44.09 .966 2.7 
3.27 6.77 39.07 1.194 2.32 
.71 7.66 41.9 .304 • 53 
3.41 6.9 39.72 1.064 1 .. 67 
.91 7.34 42.8 o624 1.41 
6.42 6.97 40.28 .994 1.11 
4.7 -4.54 33.09 3.424 7.3 
1.13 5.71 38.45 2~254 2.94 
1.92 8ol3 46.96 ~166 5.57 
2.02 6.81 42.4 1.154 1.01 
4.59 7.85 46.55 .114 5.16 
33.03 87o6} 455.31 12.258 31. 7.1L. 
3.002 7.964 41.39 1.114 
lst Control on F.A. 
Absolute M.V. - 1.114 
Percentage M.V. - 2.885% 
2.885 
Table II (Retest Scores). Group of 13? subjects 
Division into I.B. grou:ps as in Table I. 
Table shows average group scores in both ?ree 
and Controlled Association as hiGher on the 
retest than in the first test. 
Gr. No. I. B. F.A. I II 
I 6 (1?0-194) 21.33 12.6 11.2 
II 5 (160-170) 18 11.68 10.2 
-
III 15 (150-160) 19.93 11.13 9.96 
IV 19 (140-150) 19.1 11.5? 9.46 
V 10 (130-140) 20 11.8 9.44 
-
VI 2? (120-130) 19.1 11.52 9.35 
VII 13 (110-120} 18.16 10.61 8o49 
VIII 14 (lOQ-110} 1?o5 10.94 9.14 
rx: 20 ( 90-100) 1?.35 10.8 9 
-
~ 8 (80-90) 14.5 10.4 7.? 
III 
8.86 
?.44 
? 
7.54 
?.52 
7.35 
6.23 
6.35 
6.95 
5.?? 
IV. 
?.02 
6.64 
5.66 
6.21 
-
6.22 
6.08 
5.52 
5.65 
5.61 
5.22 
Assoc::Lalu>(l( Sc..ore.s . o} S\. • .1)~ck"s Cl-5 ~""' 
T ctb((t I ( KCSI~ fe.s.t) o.r,.,al Tat,L(t I) 
( Re.l:esl) 9'1"~(td. . 
I 
17 
'"'" 
11 
<- ' 
Table III. Scores on first testing ranked according 
to I.B. and divided. into groups of 25<;;, 5CY,s, 25% 
respectively. Group average scores for Free and 
Controlled Associationo 
~roup. No. F.A. I II III TV 
I 54 18.42 10.76 8.37 6o73 5.7 
II 107 15.17 9.69 8.06 6.09 5.2J 
_._ 
I-' 
..L..l. 54 16.71 9.19 7.71 5.71 5. os 
Table IV. Scores on retesting. Group of 137 subjects 
ranked according to I.B. and divided into groups as 
in Table II. Group average scores for Free and 
Controlled Association. 
Kiroup. No. I.B. F.A. I II III IV 
I 34 (190-150) 22.64 11.31 9.76 7.74 5.93 
II 69 {150-110} 18.75 11.3 9.19 6.99 5.99 
III 34 (110-80) 16o64 10.67 8.76 6.56 5.54 
• 
~ S~oct.a..b.oN' ~c.ores o/- S'llL)ecL~ as ~ 
fa.ule Ti1 (T-est)'"'"\ T(l.(,t._ ~ (Re.t4l) 
jTa..l,h~r. 
Group V (W. A. ) 
Subjects in Group V (age 13-18) 96 subjects 
Mean I.B. 129.7 
Table I. Subjects ranked according to I.B. and 
divided into groups according to each ten units 
decrease on the I.B. scoreo Group averac~e scores 
for Free and Controlled Associatio~. ~ 
Gr. No. I. B. F.A. I II III 
I 4 (170-180) 31 14.3 11.05 9o3 
II 7 (160-170) 31.1 14.0::? 10.6 9.37 
III •10 {150-160) 25.1 13.16 10.64 8o82 
IV 14 (140-150) 30.9 13.48 10.2 8.7 
rr 20 {130-140) 26.8 12.46 9.6 7.87 
!VI 12 (120-130) 28.33 12.45 9.5 8 
-- -· --
VII 7 (110-120) 25.3 12.25 9.34 7.7 
:VIII 11 ( 100-110) 29.3 12.25 9.85 7.87 
IX 10 (below lOO) 28.82 10.18 8.14 6.12 
IV 
8 
8.05 
·-
6~7 
.. 
7.8 
7.04 
6.65 
1-· 
6 
6.52 
4.9 
• 
As:soc;a.hoN Sco(tS or S'. .... t,.,cc.l\ Q.S 
t~ Ta.l.la I gTa.rh~cf. 
Table II. Subjects ranked according to I.B. 
divided into groups of 25)~, 50;"~, 25% respectively. 
Group average scores for Free and Controlled 
Association. 
' 
Group. No. I.E. F.A. I II III 
. 
I 26 (175-145} 28.8 13.54 16.6 9.04 
II 49 (146-115) 27.66 12.66 9.67 8.04 
IT..,.. 
_.J.. 22 (115-75) 28.9 11.78 9.39 7.38 
IV 
7.62 
6.86 
6 
Assoc1aboN S'c<>r«s •I- S'l4.~\e.c.li-
t<S 1r" T a...{, le. IT 3,-a..fhccl . 
Y.Y- lhso~~ ~VlV-J. 
{3~ . 
Group VI (G.L.C.) Age (18-21. lst and 2nd year 
students) Mean I.:a. l42o8. 56 subjects. 
Table I. Subjects ranked according to I.B. and 
divided into groups according to each ten units 
decrease on the I.B. score. Group average scores 
for Free and Controlled Associationo 
Gr. No. I.B. F.A. I II III DJ 
I 7 ( 170-181) 24.28 14.14 11.9 11.05 8.34 
-
II 8 (160-1 70) 26.28 13.72 11.82 8.92 7.32 
III 6 (150-160) 19.16 12.96 10.66 8.96 6.96 
IV 16 (140-150) 26.28 13.2 10o48 7.95 7 
V 4 (130-:-140) 29 14o33 11.55 9 7.15 
~ 7 (120-130) 25.7 13.97 9o88 8.28 6.28 
VII 2 (110-120) 19 11 8.2 6.4 7 
VIII 4 (100-110) 24.2 11o75 9.25 7ol 6.2 
IX 2 (below lOO 13 9 8.2 6.2 6o2 
-·-
A~Jo<:lat-loN' ~cores 4 ~1.1.~\t.tl..i 
as eN Tal.l~ l ~ ra~h~cl . 
.P-6 
/if 
If 
• 17 
If. 
/)-
f4 
13~ 
1'). 
/I 
ro 
q 
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1 
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Table II. Subjects ranked accorQlnG to I.B. 
and divided into 25·,:,, 50~j, 25~; grou!)s. Grou:p 
average scores for Free and Controlled Association. 
Gr. Noo I.B. F.A. I II III 
I 15 (181-160) 25.28 13.92 11.87 9.92 
II 27 (158-129) 25.36 13.5 10.6 8.77 
III 14 (127-163) 22.07 12.47 9.33 7.41 
IV 
7.8 
6.97 
6.5i 

B. 
AGE NORMS.. 
Table I. Total number of subjects divided into 
groups according to each year of age. Age group 
average scores for Free and Con trolled_ As so ci at ion. 
Table shows increase in averae;e numb er of items 
given by older groups. 
Age No.in Gr F • .A. I II III rv 
-
I 10-ll g 15.88 9.53 ?.84 5.95 5 .. 53 
II ll-12 36 15.14 9.43 ?.62 5.6? 4.?6 
III 12":'13 123 16.2? 9.?5 8.01 6 .. 08 5.23 
~ 
IV 13-14 122 19.16 10.9 8 .. 6? 6.98 5.98 
V 1 1.!:-15 63 20o41 11.48 9.21 ?.27 6.04 
VI 15-16 52 24.44 12.1 9.66 7.93 6 .. 69 
VII 16-1? 40 2?.75 12.6 9.63 ?.85 ?.03 
lVIII 1?-25 76 24.6 13.11 10.21 8.46 6o92 
--
_B ~ FlC-U.RE. (J.) 
Ac-E !Yor?"'JS . 
As.,oc.l.a..t,oN ~r.or~s of r"'61ut.; as-\~ 
/a.<.(~I qya.pheJ . 
l..f 'l<Y- ~s.s~ .S~ 
.11 1(2- - R-'j e. ~ 
~-
Table Ia. Age grou~ average percentage and absolute 
decrease in score between Free Association and Controlled 
(one control). Ase group average percentage and absolute 
decrease between Controlled Association (one control) 
and (four controls). -
Control I on Free Association. Control IV on Control I 
--
~ 
. 
Abs. Percent Ab so %Age Ab so ~Age Abs. (flAg /0 -- e 
Gr Deer. Deer. Var. Var. Deer. Deer. Var. Var. 
I 6.35 40.00 2.993 3.582 4.00 41.96 1.09 3.86 
II 5.71 37.71 3.633 5.872 4.67 49.52 .42 3.7 
II 6.52 36.38 2.823 7.202 4.52 46.35 .57 .53 
IV 8.26 43.11 1.083 .672 4.92 45.13 .17 .69 
V 8.93 43.75 .313 .168 5.44 47.38 .35 1.56 
VI 12.34 50.49 1.997 6.908 5.41 44.80 .32 1 .. 02 
VII 15.15 54.59 5.707 1.008 5.57 44.21 .48 1.61 
VIII 11.49 42.63 2.147 .952 6.19 47.21 1.10 1.39 
-
Toti .74.75 348.66 20.696 26.364 40.72 66.56 4.50 14.36 
A.ver .9.343 43.582 2.5 3.295 5.09 45.82 • 562 1.794 
---
-
Table II. Selected grou~ of 176 subjects arranged 
in groups (1) accordin~ to each Chronological year of 
age (2) according to each Mental year of agA (i.e. the 
age for which the Absolute Score is the norm). The 
table shows real e..ce norms in.variably hisher than t,Iental 
age norms. 
Gr. Ll. A. Ho. F.A. I II III IT 
I 10-11 13 16.3 8.49 7.24 5.32 4.61 
II 11-12 30 16.43 8.93 7.46 5.53 4.93 
III 12-13 29 16.1 9.63 7.85 5.66 4.9 
IV 13-14 40 15.89 9.62 8.18 6.11 5.35 
V 14-15 33 18.3 10.25 8.41 6.48 5.54 
VI 15-16 11 17.83 10.54 8.23 6.54 5.43 
VII 16-18 20 19.6 10.83 8.43 6.61 5.59 
Cl-':RO ~OLOGIC U. AGE GHOUPS 0 4' S.AM:E. 
I 10-11 15.8 10.2 7.64 5.64 5.32 
II 11-12 14.?5 9 ?.75 5.36 4.51 
III 12-13 14.06 9 .. 72 ?.78 5.72 5 
IV: 13-14 17.4? 10.24 8.35 6.44 8.44 
IV 14-15 21 10.66 9.22 6.66 5.42 
VI 15-16 35.2 12.45 8.75 6.85 6 
VII 16-1? 36.3 11.93 9 .. 26 8.4 6.06 
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Table III (Group V only) Subjects arranged in groups 
according to each year of age. Age group average 
scores for Free and Controlled Association. 
Gr. No. .Age. F.A. I II III IV 
I 41 (13-14} 20.58 11.81 9.3 7 .. 55 6.68 
II 38 {14-15) 21.5 11.89 9.52 7.86 6.57 
III 34 ( 15-16) 26.94 12.6? 10.1 8.45 ?.25 
IV 22 (16-17} 32 .. 95 13.49 10.32 8.60 ?.94 
lV 11 (1?-18) 30.71 12.?4 9.43 8.,09 ?.11 
:B. FIGURE HJ. 
AG-E NOR "'S . 
A Ss o c ,·il.. i:c~N Sc.or•s a.s ~ .... 
/ ~ 8LE 11/ :Jra...j>h ed. . 
to ~ 
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Table rf. (Part of total grou:p, including Group IV {K.E. s.) 
and VI (G.L.C.) subjects from other schools). Subjects 
arranged in grouys according to each year of age. Age 
group average scores for Free m1d Controlled Association. 
--
Gr. .r.,o. Age. F.A. I II III IV 
---
I 9 (lO-ll) 15.88 9.53 7.84 5.95 5.53 
II 36 (11-12) 15~14 9.43 7.62 5.67 4.76 
III 123 (12-13) 16.27 9o75 8.01 6.08 5.22 
-
IV 81 (13-14) 17.71 10.58 8.46 6.69 6.05 
-
tv 25 (14-15) 18.76 10.81 8.75 6.41 5.25 
VI 18 ( 15-16) 19.28 11.03 8.82 6.95 5.64 
~II 18 (16-17) 21.38 11.51 8.77 7.01 5.92 
[VIII 9 (17-18) 21.33 12 8o64 7.17 5.91 
IX 56 (Adult) 24.45 13.35 10.62 8.74 7o04 
A ssocia. tt;, IV' Sc.orts as if'l 
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c. 
Group IV I ( T- H n ) Group V l\.o .Le i:::J 0 
Otis I. B. with Free Assoc. .31 
" " 
n Cont. Assoc.I 
.39 
-
(a) ( P-r , t · + ,, 1 II - .32 -OQUC lOll 08 :IIT 
.• 2? ection Tests) IV _ 
.26 
IV 
Otis I. B. with Free Assoc. :31 
Cont. Assoc.I 
.39 (b) (Production Tests II .29 
only) III .33 
IV .45 
IV 
Otis I.B. vii th Free Assoco .31 
Con to .Assoc.I .24 
II .17 (c) (Selection Tests III .09 
only) IV .06 
II 
Groun IV (K. E. s.) 
Absolute Se:ore with Free Assoc. - :.32 
.48 
.. 41 
.38 
.33 
III 
" " " Cont. Assoc.I-
(Production+ Selection 
Tests) 
Group V (TI. A. ) 
Absolute Score vtith Free 
Cont .. 
(Production only) 
II -
III -
IV -
Assoc. - .29 
As soc • I - • 44 
II - .34 
III - .73 
IV - .. 54 
{W. A.) 
.13 
.41 
.42 
.45 
.44 
V 
.131 
.36 
.35 
.34 
.36 
V 
.13 
.09 
.17 
.25 
.42 
Group VI (G- "' ~ • ~. v • j 
.11 
.32 
.52 
.54 
.. 39 
VI 
.11 
.22 
.33 
,42 
.44 
VI 
.11 
o04 
.53 
.64 
.37 
IV. 
V. 
G IV ( -~ 1:-- " ) roup h .•. d .• .::>. 
Otis I.B. with N.I.I.P. Test noo34 o73 
N.I.I.P. no.34 score with Controlled Assoc.I .46 
II .34 
III o35 
IV o32 
Grou:Qs IV+ V +VI. 
Otis I.3o with Controlled Assoc.I o48 
II .46 (l?::.,oduction+ Selection Tes-ts) III .46 
IV .40 
VI Group IV. V. VI • 
Free Association with Control I .56 
- II .39 
III .34 
IV .42 
VII. 
Controlled Association. 
I with Group IV. v. VI. 
II .74 .63 .61 II with 
VIII. 
Age 
11 
III .53 .68 o48 III 
IV .57 .43 .39 IV 
IV V VI 
III with 
IV o64 .54 .70 
(10 upwards) vrith Free Association 
" " -vvith Cont.Assoc. I 
II 
III 
IV 
.48 
o25 
.29 
o44 
IV. 
.57 
.44 
• 48 
.42 
o36 
.32 
V. 
:..68 
.44 
.53 
.54 
o47 
.59 
.39 
VI. 
.72 
.64 
Section VI. 
General Su....'TIIllary of :~e sul ts. 
A. Tables and FiE;ures. I.B.Grou:ps with Association Scores. 
B. Age norms. 
c. Coefficients of Correlation. 
A.Intellisence .and Group Average Association Sco~es. 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
Tables and figures in this section show 
Avera(-;e number of items given for :proe;ressi vely 
increased e~ually graded controls, i.e., the effect of 
the addition of objectively equal controls in limiting 
the number of relevant items produced or selected. 
Differences in the nu....~ber of items given in free 
association and controlled association testso 
Diff'erences in the number of items :produced by crou:r;>s 
of differing average I.B's. 
Zffects of retesting on group average production 
of items. 
(1) and (2). Averase Number of Items Produced. Effect of 
Additional Controls. 
The most general indication of average nmnber 
of i teras produced will be found in tables relative to 
the total group, viz., Tables I, II and III. 
e.g. Table I Free Association 
Controlled Association 
or Table II Free Association 
Controlled Association 
(l) 
(2) 
20.92 
- 11.18 
9.04 
( 3) -
( 4) -
?.13 
6ol 
20.5 (S.D.?.56) 
(l} - ll.l5(S.D.l.93) 
(2) - 8.93 
(3) - '7. 01 
(4) - 6.03(S.D.l.46) 
Insnection of S.D' s and 1\I. Vs show that the rm:-ge of 
variation is considerable, more pa:rticularly ln.free 
association where accidental facto~:>s of many klnds 
must be :pre~ent. In the complete group, the large 
range/ 
range of ages accounts for the rar~e in the size of 
the scores. 
Inspection of the tables of average number 
of items given for free and controlled association 
shows very clearly the effect of the nresence of one 
control. Calculations of grou~ average percentage 
reduction between the number of items nroduced in the 
free association test and the number or items -pr~du-ced 
in the controlled association test with one control, 
show that the presence of one control reduces the 
number of i tens produced 43% - 47~s. · 'Hi thin controlled 
association scores, the addition of three controls to 
one reduces the num.ber of items prodJJ.ced by an average 
45:~,. Thus the effect of the addition of one control 
to free association is a:9proximately the same as the 
effect of the ad2ition of three controls to one control. 
That the percentage reduction in scores either between 
free association and one control, or between one control 
and four controls, remains constant, is substantiated 
by the fact that when age group average association 
scores are calculated, the results show an approximately 
sinilar percentage decrease. (Tables BI, Ia) When one 
control is present, the reduction on free association 
is 43.5)) (M. V. 3o2), and when three controls are added to 
one, the reduction is 45% (M.V.l.79%) 
All tables of group average scores whether 
grouped according to I.B •. or age, show that the 
progressive addition of objectively eq_ual controls has 
a progressively less effect in reducing the number of 
items produced, i.e. the addition of the fourth control 
to the third reduces the number of items given to a 
less degree than the addition of the third control to 
the second, or the second to the first. 
(3) Di f'ferences in Number of' Items produced by groups of 
diff'ering average I.B~. 
Inspection of tables and figures show that the 
DTOUD avera~es for both free and controlled association decr~ase with the decreasing I aB. of the groups. In 
no case does the group vvi th the lowest average I.E. have 
a higher score either for free ass?ciation or for 
controlled association (with any g1ven n~~ber of controls) 
than the group with the highest average I.E. 
(4) Effects of Retest on Group .Average Scoreso 
In everv case the number of itei?-s given in 
both free and controlled association was lncreased in the 
retest scores,. It is irrroossi ble to decide ·whether 
the/ 
the incre~se is due to (a) increased familiarity with 
the ~xperlme~tal~procedure, (b) memory of the tests 
as g1ven oz:. ~he -:orEier occasion, (c) additional six 
m~nths tra1n1nc 1n the solving of problems, combined 
Wlt~ th~ a~e.~actor. If the introspective reports 
of ~h~ 1nd1v1uually retested group (3rd preliminary 
exper1ment} are considered, it seems most likely that 
the increase is largely to be attributed to 
familiarity with the conditions of the tests, although 
the actual content was probably forgotten. It seems 
most likely that an age factor, expressed e.g. in 
increasin6 facility in writing, would also enter. 
B.AGe norms. 
Increase in the age of the year groups gives 
corresponding increase in the number of items produced 
both in free and controlled association. In no case 
does the youngest age group produce a greater number 
of items either in free or controlled association 
(any civen nu~ber of controls) than the oldest age group. 
(Table B I). 
Chronological age norms for both free and 
controlled association tend to be almost consistently 
hicher than mental age norms. Chronological age 
norins for free association are lower, however, in the 
younger groups and much higher in the older groups, 
than the corre s:ponding lvlen tal age norms. Within the 
controlled association scores, the distinction between 
Chronoloe;ical and Eental age norms tends to lessen 
in passing from one to four controls. (Table II. Fig.II) 
(Note. The dip in controlled association scores 
indicated at age (ll-12) may be due either (a) to the fact 
that the (10-11) age group is small and possibly composed 
of self selected bright children - They are rather 
less than averaoe entrant age, and would therefore have 
a higher than a~erage I.Q., or (b) to the fact that, as 
many educationists have noted, there does tend to be 
either a lowering or a static state, of ability about 
this age.) 
c. Coefficients·of Correlation. 
The correlation between I.B. and controlled 
association is positive but low. (Range .26-.54). 
In Grouu IV (K.H.S.) the rfu~ge of r is .26-.39 ~ (Mean I.B.ll5.5) 
In Group V (W.A.) the range of r is .41-.45 (Mean I.B.l29.7) 
In/ 
In Group VI (G.L.C.) 
(see Table Ia) • 
the range of r is .32-.54 
(Mean I.B. 142.8) 
The correlation of' I.B. with Production 
controlled associ:J.tion tests taken separately from 
Selection controlled association tests is uositive (Range .22-.45}. - o 
PRODLCTION controlled 
In Group IV (K. E. S. ) 
V ( '.i • .ci.. } 
VI (G. L. C.) 
association 
the rar1ce of 
the rane;e of 
the range of 
tests. 
r is .29-o45 
r is .34-o36 
r is .22-.44 
(Table Th) 
SELECTIOJ:i controlled association tests. 
(Av.r .36) 
().Vor .35) 
(Av.r o35) 
The correlation of I.B. with Selection controlled 
association tests is positive but very low. 
In Group IV {K.H.S.} the r~nge of r is .06-.24 (Av.r .14) 
V ('V.A.) the range of r is .09-.42 (Av.r .23) 
VI (G.L.C.) the range of r is .04-.64 (.::l...vor .39) 
(Table Ic) 
The correlation with I.E. is thus higher for 
procluction tests than for selection tests, and~ the range 
of' ~he coeff'icient of correlation in the selection tests 
is creater. In :9rodtwtion controlled association tests, 
the coefficient of correlation of I.B. with controlled 
assoc1ation is thus 
(a) hisher 
(b) less variable, than in saection tests. 
Correlation of other ~easures of Intelligence.w1th 
Controlled Association Scores. 
In G-roun IV (K.H. s.) 
N. I. I.P. test no. 34 correlated with Otis I.B. gives 
r - .73 (Table IV) 
N.I.I.P. test no. 34 correlated with controlled association 
scores in Group IV (K.H.S.) gives a higher correlation 
than Otis I.B. correlated vnth the controlled association 
scores of the same group. 
Decrease of r (I.B. - ContoAss.} between Controls I and IV 
- .13 
Decrease of r (Score N$I.I.P. - Cont.Ass.) between I and IV 
- .14 
Absolute score (6tis test) correlated with controlled 
association scores i~ Group IV (K.H.S.) gives a higher 
correlation than r.B. (6tis test) correlated with 
controlled/ 
controlled association scores in the same group. (Table II). 
Decrease of r (Absolute Score - Cont.Ass.) between r and 
IV - .15 
Thus the, decrease in r in Group IV (K.H.S.) 
remains cons~~nt wnatever measure of intelligence is 
correlated Wl~h controlled association. 
The higher correlation of N.I.I.P. with 
controlled association, and Absolute Score with controlled 
association in comparison with the correlation of I.B. 
with controlled association, is to be explained by the 
fact that each of these measures contains an age factor 
which is eliminated in I.B. 
In Group V ( -;J. A. ) 
Absolute Score (6tis) correlated .v:i th 
uroduction tests only, gives a higher correlation than 
when I.B. is oorrelated with production tests only in 
the sruae group. The intervention of the age factor 
again ex~lains the difference. (Table V).· 
Direction taken by Coefficients of Correlation between 
One and Four Controls. 
Surrilllary table of trend of r (I.B.-Cont.Ass.) between 
Controls I and IV. 
GroUl) IV (K.H. S.) Group V(W. A.) Group VI 
( G.L. C) 
(1) Selection tests 
(ll)Production tests 
( 111 ) ( ( l) + ( 2) ) 
Decrease 
Increase 
Decrease 
Increase 
Constant 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
The increase in correlation with I.B. in 
passing from one to four controls in the production tests, 
is the result looked for in support of the principal 
hypothesis of the investigation. The_fact that_this 
result is not obtained from the select1on tests 1s to be 
attributed to the inadequacy of the selection test for 
its uurnose. The failure of the selection tests explain 
why the~hypothesis is not supported by the t:st as a 
whole, i.e. :production + selection tests (Taole Ia} 
Al thow:;-h in the selection tests the correlation 
with I.B. increa~es between one and four controls in . 
Groups v and VI, the lowness of r in Contro~I and II 1n 
both-groups, and its variability in ?-roup VI lay.the 
increase open to suspicion as a poss1ble chance l~crease. 
The decrease of r in Group IV in selection tests lS 
consistent/ 
consistent and marked (Group IV is the largest and most 
uniform group) and will account for every decrease in 
the correlation of any measure of intelligence with 
production and selection controlled association tests 
taken together in this group, which is the only group 
showing such a decrease of· correlation with intelligence 
between Controls I and IV in Table Ia. The failure of 
selection tests also accounts for decrease in r between 
Controls I and IV when Absolute Score (Otis) or N.I.I.P. 
Score, is correlated with ~reduction and selection 
controlled association scores. (Tables II and IV}. 
Arsain, in selection tests, the correlation of 
intelligence with free association is consistently 
hiBher than the correlation of intelligence with 
controlled association (Control I), whereas in production 
tests, the correlation of intelligence with controlled 
association (Control I} is consistently higher than the 
correlation of intelligence with free association, -
a result entirely in accordance with legitimate 
expectation. 
Thus, if the correlation of I.B. with 
controlled association in selection tests is not only 
lower and more variable than in nroduction tests but also 
fails to support the legitimate hypothesis (a) that 
controlled association must correlate more highly with 
intelligence than free association, and (b) that the 
correlation of controlled association with intelligence 
must increase in passing from one to four controls, it may 
be concluded that selection controlled association 
tests are inferior to production controlled association 
tests, both as a measure of controlled association and as 
a measure of intelligence. 
This being so, support for the hypothesis must 
be looked for in the correlation of I.B. with production 
controlled association tests (see Table Ib). From these 
results, it can be concluded that the correlation of I.B. 
with controlled association increases between one and 
four controls. 
Performance \nri th four controls has a higher 
cor~elation with intelligence than performance with one 
control. 
Correlation of Intelligence with Free Association. 
The correlation of I.B. with free association is 
.31 for Group IV, .13 for Group V, and .11 for Group VI. 
In each case the correlation of I.B. with free association 
is/ 
is less than the correlation of I.B. with controlled 
association (one control). 
(1) The fact that the correlation between I.B. 
and free association is higher than might have been 
expected, is to be explained by the fact that free 
associa~ion in the Continuous form is essentially a 
;productl. ve. test. It was shown, in discussing the 
controls introduced into undirected thought when it is 
examined under laboratory conditions, that one additional 
non-accidental significant control is always involved 
in undirected. thought (free association) under laboratorY 
conditions, i.e. that the subject must respond in discrete 
words. Besides this control which is always present, 
other accidental si~nificant controls are freouentlv . 
introduced by the sU:bjects themselves. • ~ 
Thus, under laboratory conditions, free 
association is not only a productive process, but, in the 
case of many subjects, a productive process directed by 
self-imposed controls. 
~~e findings of other investigators as to the 
relation between free association and intelligence are 
most frequently based on the Discrete free association 
method, which has not the same productive aspect as 
the Continuous free association method. The productive 
aspect of the Continuous method is thus sufficient to 
ex:plain the comparative height of these correlations 
as comuared vfi th the lower correlations found to exist betwee~ intelligence and free association in other 
investigationsap 
{2)The fact that the correlation of I.B. with 
free association is higher in Group IV (K.H.S.) than in 
either of Groups V or VI may possibly be explicable on 
the hypothesis that a free association test correlates 
more highly with intelligence in younger subjects than in 
older subjects. 
There are many reasons why this might be so. For 
example verbal facility and speed of writing must.be 
factors influencing the number of items produced 1.n a 
free association test of the Continuous form.. .Arn.ong 
subjects/ 
p E.g. See Wllipple. Manual p.53-71, 328 ff. 
subjects over, for example, thirteen or fourte~n years of 
age, whatever the I.Q. may be, (within limits of 
normality} a sufficient period of training ~ill have 
elapsed to have levelled many initial differences in 
speed of writing or verbal facility. The initial 
advantage which the more intelligent child has, which 
will Show itself in the earlier attainment of ability in 
these fact.ors, and particularly in verbal facility, will 
have been compensated for in the less intelligent 
children by the practice and training afforded by further 
education and experience. Hence, at an earlier age 
where the effect of practice, experience and training 
in such factors has not yet levelled attainment in them, 
the factor of intelligence will play a larger part. In 
short, at an earlier age, attai~ment either in verbal 
facility or possibly in speed of writing,. vJill be 
influenced by intelligence factors to a greater extent 
than will be the case in later years, si nee at this stage 
both the finding of words, and the task of writing, are 
conscious tasks requiring effort. 
This hypothesis is further substantiated by the 
fact that in B. ~able V and Fig.II, it is seen that 
Chronological age norms for free association are lower 
than t.=ental age norms for free association for ages ten 
to thirteen years, whereas, after fourteen, the Chronologic& 
age norms are consistently higher than the J\.::ental age 
norms. 
It may be concluded that free association 
correlates more highly with intelligence in younger 
subjects than older, and f'inally, that free association 
correlates less highly with intelligence than controlled 
association. The correlation of free association with 
intelligence is con si sten tl y lower than the correlation of 
controlled association with intelligence throughout the 
production tests. 
Free Association and Controlled Association. 
The correlation of free association with 
controlled association ranges between .25 and o56, and is 
higher than the correlation of I.B. \nth controlled 
associationo 
In all groups the correlation of free association 
v;ri th controlled a~soci ation decreases b et-rreen the firs~ 
and fourth controls. Since the correlation of I.E. vn th 
controlled association increases between the first a~d 
fo'~lrth controls, and since the correlation of I.B. Wl th 
free/ 
:free association is lower than the co rre la tion of I.B. 
with controlled association, it is to be expected. that 
the correlation of free association with controlled 
association will decrease in passing from one to four 
controls. 
The com:9arative size of the correlation of 
tree association ~'iith controlled association (one control) 
is again to be e~lained by the fact that free 
association in this form is a proctt..lction test. 
Controlled Association. 
The correlation of Control I vri th II is higher 
than the correlation of Control I with III which is in 
turn hi=:her tha:::1 the correlation of Control I -v'li th rv. 
Again the eo rrela tion of Control II with III is higher 
than the correlation of Control II with IV. The result 
is in accordance v!i th expectation. It would_ be presumed 
that t~w eo rrela tion b et~=reen an individual's :performance 
with one control and his performance with two controls 
would be hic;her than the correlation of his performance 
with one control and his ~erformance with either three 
or four controls. The closer in nuraber the controls, 
the c;reater the resemblance bet·ween the operation 
involved in workins with the controls. 
Correlation of .~~e with Association. 
The correlation of age with free association 
is .53~ It is higher than the correlation of I.B. with 
free association, which is .31, .13, .11 {see Table Ia}. 
The correlation of Age ~nth controlled 
association ranges betvJeen .39 and • 59. It is averagely 
hic;her than the correlation of I.B. with controlled 
association. 
The correlation of age with controlled association 
decreases between the first and fourth controls. 
(a) Age and Controlled Association. 
It is clear that both Age and Intelligence are 
correlated with controlled association. I.B. is a 
measure which eliminates the age factor from Absolute 
Score which is a measure of (Age and Intelligence)· That 
this factor, if allowed to reFBin increases the size of 
the correlation is evident from Tables II and III (Absolute 
Score - Association) 
viz./ 
viz.Group IV.I.B.-r;ith 1!,.A.- .31 Absolute score with 
I - .39 (Production+Selection)II - .32 
Group V, I.B. VTi th 
(Production only) 
III - .27 
IV - .26 
F.A.-
I 
II 
III 
IV 
.13 Absolute Score with 
.36 
.35 
.34 
.36 
F .A.- .32 
I - .48 
II - .41 
III - .32 
IV - .33 
lTl • .A.- • 29 
I - .44 
II .34 
III • 72 
IV .54 
Although it is clear from this that the nresence 
of an age factor increases the size of the correlation of 
intelligence with controlled association vet the 
correlation of age with association might have been 
expected to be smaller than it actually is, viz • 
.Age -vvi th F. A. • 53 
(P~oduction+ Selection) 
Complete Group. 
I .54 
II .47 
III • 59 
IV .39 
The comparative size of this correlation 
however may be ex?lained when it is seen that in this 
measure, intelligence has not actually been isolated 
from age. 
Exaruination of the size of the groups and the 
distribution .of age among the groups show that the groups 
for ages fifteen upwards are much smaller than the 
age grou:9s for each year below 15 (see B. Table I Age norms). 
The distribution of age muong the three main 
groups of subjects IV (K.H.S.) V ('N.A.) and VI (G.L.C.), is, 
as we know, uneven. Group IV contains all the youngest 
subjects, Group V subjects between fourteen and eighteen 
years, and Group VI subjects over eighteen. Thus in the 
computation of r (Age ·- Association) the upper ages are 
represented by subjects from Groups V and VI, and the 
lower ages by subjects from Group IV. It is known also 
that the mean I.B.s of the upper groups V and VI are 
129.7, and 142.8 respectively, while the mean I.B. of 
Group IV is only 125. 5. We saw that this difference in 
the group mean I.B.s was explicable on the ground that a 
urocess of self-selection of more from less intelligent 
subjects must be presumed in passing from lower to higher 
classes in the Secondary schools and finally to University 
standard (discussed Section IV). It might be concluded 
that Group VI would tend to be composed of averagely more 
intelligent/ 
intelligent subjects than Grou~ V, which in turn would be 
composed of averasely more intelligent subjects than 
Group IV. 
Thus, in this computation of Age-Controlled 
association, the older age grouns will consist of 
averagely more intelligent subjects than the voun.aer aae 
groups. This ract will necessarily raise th~ si~e of0 
the correlation of age with association, and hence it can 
be taken that Table VIII does not show the relation of age 
alone to association, but the relation of age and an 
unisolated intelligence factor to association. 
It must be concluded that both age and intelligence 
are correlated with controlled association. The age factor 
remaining in the correlation of Absolute Score with 
controlled association raises the correlation higher than 
the correlation of I.B. with controlled association. It is 
clear that, in the second place, the comparatively high 
correlation of age with controlled association found in 
Table VIII is not to be explained wholly by the intervention 
of an intelligence factor, but must also represent the 
effect of increasing age in controlled association scores. 
(b) Age and Free Associationo 
The s~1e facts explain the height of the 
correlation or Age with rree association, .53 
In Group IV (K.H.S.) r (I.B.-F.Assoc.) - .31 (Intelligence) 
" n n rr r (Abs.Sc.-F.Assoc.)-.32(Intelligence+A@,B) 
In Group V (W.A.) r (I.B.-F.Assoc.} - .13 (Intelligence) · 
n n " " r(Abs.Sc.-F.A.ssoc .. )- .29 (Intelligence-t-.AgeJ 
In total group r (Age-F.Assoc.) - .53 (Age+Intellige~~ 
Since from B. Table V (Mental v Chronological 
Age norms) it is evident that older groups produce a 
sreater average number of items in the free association 
test, and since, as has been shown, a considerable 
intelligence factor intervenes in the calculation of the 
correlation of age with rree association, the height of the 
corr·elation of age with free association is understandable. 
The fact that the age factor present in Absolute Score raises 
the correlation of Absolute Score with free association 
above the correlation of I.B. with free association, shows 
the joint effect of age and intelligence on free assoc~ation 
scores and clearlv in the calculation of the correlat1on 
of age'with free a;sociation, the age factor is paramounto 
It may be concluded that age and intellige~:e. 
both affect free association scores. As was seen, l~ 1s 
most probable that intelligence has a greater effect on the 
free/ 
free asso?ia~~on score than age in the younger age groups. 
Further s~nce from Table Ia, it would seem that the 
correlation of I.B. with free association is smaller in 
the more.intelligent groups than in the less intelligent, 
and in v~ew of the fact that the correlation of age with 
free association is high, it may be the case that age 
correlates more highly with free association than 
intelligence in the older age groups. 
Factors Determining the Correlation of Age with Associationo 
Only hypothetical reasons can be advanced as to 
why age should correlate comparatively highly with 
association, both free and controlled, in this investigation. 
Reasons why age should correlate With free association are 
easier to discover. As has been considered, it is an 
empirical fact that speed of writing and verbal facility 
tend to increase with training and education. In free 
association tests of the Continuous form, both of these 
factors must be implicated. 
In controlled association tests of the productive 
type, they will also be at work, but although they may 
influence the amount of relevant produced, they cannot 
account for the ~uality of relevance. Some other 
factors may explain the influence of age on controlled 
association. 
In theoretical analysis, Chapter VI, the 
relation of facility in the use of controls to ability 
to employ controls was discussed. It was agreed that 
facility in employing controls must be partially 
deuendent upon ability to employ controls, but that 
facility in employing controls vras not the sam.e thing as 
abili tv to emulov controls. It also seemed to be· the 
case that facility in employing controls could be 
acquired with practice. If this is so, and if we 
suuuose that ability to employ controls is measured by 
th~·correlation of I.B. with controlled association, 
then it is l:)ossible that the facility with which controls 
are employed is measured by the correlation of age 1Yi th 
controlled association. 
Under the term facility in the employment of 
controls would be meant purely the speed with which 
controls are employed, and this, as has been seen, does 
not a priori, involve anything as to the slic?e~s with 
which controls are employed, which is the ab1l~t2 to 
employ controls. 
If the speed with which controls are employed 
increases/ 
increases with extensive practice in the use of controls, 
i.e. in solving problems, such practice will obviously 
be given in the course of education, and it could be 
presumed that the older classes in the schools and 
particularly the University group, would have had 
considerably more practice in solving problems and 
employing controls than the younger classes. Increase in 
the facility with which controls are employed, is therefore 
to be expected in passing from the younger to the older 
groups of subjects used. 
It is possible that the facility factor may 
only extend to a certain number of controls. In this 
connection it is interesting that the correlation of 
I.B. with controlled association increases in passing 
from one to four controls, vn1ile the correlation of age 
with controlled association decreases between one and 
i'our controls. The advantage gained by age, and hence 
facility may fall away with the addition of controls, 
where the intelligence factor, i.e. ability to employ 
controls, comes to play its proper part. 
It is to be reinembered, however, that the 
advance of ae;e neans grmvth in ex:perience factors and 
verbal facility. It cannot be decided from the evidence 
in he.nd v:rhether increase in performance with the advance 
of ae;e is due 
(a) to growth in the "reservoir~' i" e. enlargment of 
vo cabule..rv and_ verbal facility 
or (b) growth in the fe.cj_lity with which controls are 
employed. 
Section VII. 
The Support Given to the Hypothesis by the Results of 
Exoerimental Investication. 
. ~he most linportant facts which emerge from the 
cons7deratlon of the results of the investigation are 
(1) ~hat free association has a positive but low 
correlat~on w~!h intelligence. It has a higher 
correlatlon Wluh controlled association, and a higher 
correlation with age. 
(2) Controlled association has a uositive 
correlation both vri th age and intelligence.~ 'J:h.e 
correletion of controlled association with intelligence is 
lower than micht have been expected but (a) it is 
consistently hic;her than the correlation of free 
association with intelligence, and (b) it increases 
in passins from one to four controlso 
(3) Production controlled association tests 
have a hisher correlation with intelligence than 
selection controlled association tests. 
How far do these results su9port the 
hypothesis arrived at by the theoretical analysis of 
the relation of association and intelligence? The 
hy:pothesis as stated was "If one essential factor in 
intelligence is the ability to solve problems, and if 
Sl.J.ccess in solving problems depends upon the extent to 
vrl1ich a subject can manage a complex group of controls, 
the higher the intelligence of the subject, the greater 
the number of controls with which he can work 
successfully." Hence an increasing coef:ficient of 
correlation in passing from few controls to many controls 
is to be expected. 
The results of the experimental investigation 
support this hypothesis. It has been found that 
controlled association in its productive form has a 
consistently higher correlation v:Ti th intelligence than 
free association, and sho·ws a consistent increase in the 
size of the correlation between one and :four controls. 
The main points on which the results of the 
investigation :fail to support the hypothesis can be 
accounted for by a reconsideration of the test series. 
The uoints are these:-(1) The decrease of some coefficients of correlation of 
controlled association and intelligence betvieen one and 
four/ 
four controls. 
(2) The lowness of the correlation of intelliD·ence and 
controlled association. o 
(3) ~he fact tha~ the correlation of age iNi th association 
is hl~he~ than tn~ correlation of intelligence vnth 
assoc1at1on. Th1s fact does not invalidate the 
hypothesis in any sense, but it must be ex-olained in 
relation to the hypothesis. -
These points may be dealt with in order. 
(1) TI1e Decrease of the Cor~elation o~ IntelliPence with 
Controlled Association in some cases. 9 
-::e have to account for the decrease of the 
correlation of 1.3. with Controlled Association between 
one ana. four controls for Group IV (K.H. s.) in Table Ia 
- -"' th ' anc .LOT e same group, the decrease of the correlation 
of Absolute Score with controlled association in Table II 
and in Table IV, the decrease of the correlation of ' 
N.I.I.P. score with controlled association. In all of 
these correlations, the measure of intelligence is 
correlated with production and selection controlled 
association tests taken together. 
These points have already been dealt with in 
the last section. Whatever the reasons for the failure 
of selection controlled association tests, it is clear 
that they do fail, since (a) the corr~lation of 
intellieence with selection controlled association tests 
is lower than the correlation of intelligence with 
production controlled association tests. (b) It is more 
variable (see particularly the correlation of I.B. with 
selection controlled association tests in Group VI.(Table Ic] 
·{c) Contrary to all legitimate expectation the correlation 
of any measure of intelligence with selection controlled 
association tests decreases consistently and steadily 
between one and four controls in 'Group IV (the largest 
and most uniform group). (d} The correlation of any 
measure of intelligence with selection controlled 
association tests is smaller than that of intelligence 
with free association tests. 
Since the failure of the selection tests is 
most marked in Group IV (K.H.S.), it accounts for the 
decrease of the correlation of any measure of intelligence 
with controlled association taking both production and 
selection tests together, throughout this group. Further, 
since GrouD IV is the largest group, the failure of 
selection tests doubtless accounts for the decrease of 
the/ 
the correlation between one and fo~IT controls when all 
groups are tal;:en together. (Table IV) 
~~ere the correlation of intelli~ence with 
controlled association decreases between one and four 
?ontro~s, then, the.decrease is accountable for by the 
1nclus1on of selcctlon controlled association tests 
since when the calculation of the correlation of ' 
intelligence uith controlled association is confined to 
:production tests, the correlation increases between one 
and four controls for all groups. 
The failure of the selection tests is 
sic..snificanto iTo-~ only are selection tests less 
satisfactory as a means for measuring -performance 1Ni th 
controls, but most importantly, they correlate less 
highly with intelligence, and must be less reliable 
as a measure of' intelligence.y:) \';[hen it is considered 
that Selection is a principle on 'o7hich numerous intelligence 
tests are based, the probable importance of this finc1ing 
is clear. It may be that all tests where subjects are 
asked to select items which are relevant to certain 
req_uirements are less reliable as measures of· intelligence 
than tests where subjects are instructed to produce 
items relevant to reQuirements. Such a findingvindicates 
the older form of examination questions as against newer 
forms where candidates are asked either to underline the 
correct answer, or to &iswer yes or E£ to the questions. 
The superiority of production tests is under: 
standable when we consider that what an intelligent 
thought process does is to produce something which is 
relevant to the sap in the consciousness of a problem, to 
nroduce, in short, something vv-hich ans-vvers requirements. 
The fact is nerha··)S clearer when we consider the solving 
of a problem~by til.e production of a new idea, as, for 
example/ 
~ Since selection tests used on a simple level as in the 
nresent investigation are an adaptation of Cancellation 
tests, it is interesting that VJhipple, reporting the 
findin~s of past investigators as to the relation between 
cancellation and intelligence, says nEarlier investigators 
did not reveal consistent relationship between cancellation 
and intelligence. Later investigators, working with more 
refined correlation formulas, have usually discovered a 
very small positive correlation." {l~:Lanual.) 
example the solvins of an economic, a literary or an 
aesthetic ~roblem by the creation of something new, than 
when we consider a simple uractical situation where the 
problem consists in the adJustment or adaptation of some 
already existing elements within the situation. Neverthe: 
less, both cases are the same. ~:That is a_emanded by 
each is the production of a new synthesis of elements in 
experience. Items are released from their former contexts 
and welded into novel contexts. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the essence of an 
intelligent ~roblem-solving process lies in the fact 
of the initial production of relevant ideaso 'IIhat comes 
to mind has al·ways a comparative clegree of relevance. The 
relevant is not selected from a chaotic mass of the 
primarily irrelevant. Yet this is exactly the process 
which series of intelligent tests fre:-;~uently stress 
For exarJ.ple:-
Underline in each line the word which should go in the 
parenthesis in place of the question-mark 
foot; man- hoof: (?)Go••••leg, dog, horse, boy, shoe 
book; author- statue:(?) •..•.• sculptor, model, marble, man 
The Opposites, Similarities, Directions, 
1-Jarrative com:pletion tests i'Vhich are included in most 
series of intelligence tests are frequently cons~ructed in 
this selection form.p It seems that the principle of 
selection of the relevant from the irrelevant upon vmich 
such tests are based, is a principle which is involved 
onlv in a secondary vray in an intelligent thought 
process, and has little connection with the essential 
-orinciple in such a process, which is the production of 
the relevant. 
It is at least clear that in the present 
investigation, the principle of selection in accordance 
with stated requirements has failed to answer its 
~Jurpose./ 
p It is probable that mlch ~est~ could be improved if the 
items from which the selectlon lS to be made aEe such_ 
that all are l!artially relevant to. th~ gap~ J!.;Ven thls 
adjustment would not affect the prlnclple lnvolved. 
purpose. If performance in controlled association is to 
be measured it can best be measured if the tests are 
restricted to production controlled association tests. 
(2) The Size of the Correlation of IntelliGence and 
Controlled Association. 
Before discussing further reasons for the 
size of the correlation of intelligence and controlled 
association, it may be remarked that the :failure of the 
selection tests to produce otner than a very low and 
variable correlation with intelligence must naturally 
affect the height of the correlation when nroduction and 
selection tests are considered together. -If the selection 
tests had been replaced by further production tests, the 
size of the eo rrela tion woulct doubtless have been increased. 
As matters stand, however, if production tests 
alone are considered (Table Ia) it is clear that the 
average correlation with intelligence is not much greater 
than .4. This fact alone would not give the results 
much weight; what is important is the height of the 
correlation of intelligence with controlled association, 
even with only one control, as compared with the correlation 
of intelligence with free association. 
In normal thought, as was seen, problems are of a 
very complex nature. Not only does a norrual problem tend 
to be an inter-relational whole of problems, but the unit 
problems within that whole may also be complex, either in 
the sense that they themselves contain sub-gaps or because 
(a) they may contain many controls, thus presenting 
difficulty in the organisation of the controls to specify 
the gap, or (b) they may present 'experience' difficulties, 
as e.g. that appropriate experience is difficult to revive, 
or, should it be revived, it may yet be difficult to 
organise in such a way as to exactly fit the gap. 
Such: nroblems are very different in complexity 
from the kind of problem which is presented in controlled 
association tests, such as have been used in this 
investigation. Controlled association, as we saw, is a 
schematisecl form of ~oroblem-solving process, which is 
simnler even than processes of the kind frequently involved 
in the answering of intelligence test problems, whe~~ · 
experience factors are eliminated in so far as posslole. 
But in controlled association problems, both exp~rienae and 
oroanisine factors i.e. control factors, are simplified. Th~se tests embody'fewer and generally speaking, simpler 
controls than would normally be found in what are corrilllonly 
styled 'problems' o 
To/ 
controlled association, since the difference between the 
two is measurable, v;hereas the difference between directed 
and undirected thought is not measurable. 
If then, it is the case that free association 
even in the Continuous form has not, and cannot be 
expected to have, more than a low correlation with 
intelligence, there is no reason why controlled association 
in its q_uanti tati vely simplest form, and_ the form •Nhich is 
the nearest possible to free association, should have a 
very much higher correlation with intelligence. It is 
sufficient if the height of the correlation of intelligence 
with free association is clearly demarcated from the 
height of the correlation of intelligence with controlled 
association. In the results of the present investigation 
the line of demarcation is clearly dra-.~'11. 
Further, it must be realised that when the 
numbers of the controls do not exceed four, only the lower 
reaches of the control of associative processes by the 
conditions of a problem are being examined, and the procesE 
is, as has been shmvn, very far distant in complexity from 
the urocess involved in dealing with the controls of most 
normal problems. It is probable that a high correlation 
between controlled association and intelligence could only 
be reached where a quantitative complexity of controls, 
reyroducing the degree of difficulty involved in the 
orsanising of the controls of ordinary problems, is 
employed. Theoretically, it should be possible to 
construct a series of controlled association tests ranging 
from one control to several, from simple controlled 
association nroblems to intricate :problarns. The ,curve 
of coefficients of correlation with intelligence would 
then :probably be of this nature:-
Coefficients 
of' 
Correlation 
with 
Intelligence 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Controls 
If this should be the case, it is clear that in this 
investigation, only a small section of the curve has 
been exarr.ined. 
It may be concluded that a high correlation 
between intelligence and controlled association should 
not have been e:x:yected from the results of the nresent 
investigation. It is more im:c.>ortant that the ~istinction 
between the correlation of free association with 
intelligence, and that of controlled association with 
intelligence, should have been marked. If a hir-'her 
correlation of controlled association with intelligence 
is to be found, the nuNber of controls embodied in the 
controlled association tests must be raise·a above the 
number used in the present investigation. 
One further consideration of the quantitative 
aspect of the controls is indicated by examination of the 
intros:9ective re0orts given by one group of subjects. 
(See Appendix} Although each additional control is 
objectively equal to each other control, it is clear 
that from the subjective point of view, the addition of 
each further control does not mean a corresponding 
eq_ual increase in difficulty. Subjects re:port that 
working with four controls is more difficult than 
working with one control, but not four times more 
difficult. Thus, when equally graded controls are· 
added to specify the gap, it is evident that, as 
subjectively apprehended, the difficulty of specifying 
the gap is not increased to a corresponding degree. 
In five out of six cases in the present results, the 
coefficients of correlation vnth intelligence are lower 
for the second control than the first. It may be the 
case that where there are not yet sufficient controls to 
render their organisation to specify the gap difficult, 
or to render the task of holding the controls before the 
mind difficult, the addition of a further control may 
onlv serve to "individualise" what is being looked for 
in such a way as to make it no more difficult to find 
than if the additional control were not present. 
The fact that difficulty is only markedly 
increased from the subjective point of view Yii th the 
addition of two or three further controls, :provides 
another reason whv it woulcl prove advisable to employ 
a greater number of controls than that used in this 
investigation. 
(3) Age and Controlled Association. 
In discussing the relation of age to free 
association/ 
association, it was seen that such factors as verbal 
facility and speed of writing must help to exnlain the 
increase in free association performance with. age. In 
controlled association, speed of writing will not play 
so large a part. In free association, sneed of thinkin~ 
runs ahead of speed of writing, but in co~trolled o 
association, more particularly when more controls are in 
use, this would not be true to the same extent. Several 
subjects report that they "wrote down everything they 
thought of" in the controlled association tests. 
Verbal facility, however, is a factor which 
must play a considerable part in controlled association. 
If it is remembered that the :production of words containing 
certain letters must depend upon the size of what is 
called "explicit vocabulary",~ ~-c is clear that the 
part played by verbal facility in such a test as this, 
must be carefully considered. 
In older grouys, and particularly in the groups 
of S'\lbjects used in this investigation, which are all 
composed of school children or students, it may be 
presumed that verbal facility has been inculcated by 
training as apart from initial advantages given by 
intelligence or particular aptitude. It is, of course, 
clear that intelligence does not imply corresponding 
verbal facility, and further, that only training of a 
certain kind will tend to increase verbal facility. 
In the older groups tested in this investigation, 
training has meant training in academic subjects such as 
languages and literature, and it would only be reasonable 
to suppose hence, that the fUrther education undergone 
by the older groups will have meant (a} that they must 
have a larger ex:plici t vocabulary (b) that they ha;r,e ~ad 
considerable practice in the handling of words. uucn 
a conclusion would not affect the perceptual test to the 
srune degree as the words test, but a similar factor enters 
the perceptual test. 
It/ 
~ Explicit vocabulary means the number of words vrhich an 
individual actually uses, or can use; implicit vocabulary 
the number of words which he recognises. FOT' all -oractical 
uur;poses, the "potentially revivable" will be identical 
with explicit vocabulary. 
It was suggested that the increase in 
performance in controlled association might either be 
attributed (a) to f~rther practice in the emplo~'Tilent of 
controls or (b) to 1ncrease in the 'reservoir' of 
experience. It was agreed that it was difficult to 
decide how far either or both of these factors might be 
respo~sible. ~n.the perceptual test, for example, it is 
conce1vable tha~ the runount of experience possessed by 
older, as in comparison v1ith younger subjects, should 
play a considerable part in increasing the correlation of 
age and controlled associationo 
Ultimately both verbal facility as ·employing 
the existence within the 'reservoir' of aunro-oriate 
experience of 710 rds' and eX';)erience fac t~rs of the kind 
appropriate to the perceptual test, are the same kind 
of factor. They depend upon the arrwun t of experience 
having certain appropriate qualities existing within 
the 'reservoir' • 
Tb.us, in explaining the size of the correlation 
of age with controlled association, the two alternative 
hypotheses sta~d; either (1) in older years, a certain 
facility in employing controls may be attained or (2) 
in olcler years, the 'reservoir' of experience '\till be 
larGer and will favour success from the side of 
experience factors. 
On the strength of the conclusions drawn 
from theoretical analysis, it is probable that both of 
these factors are implicated, b1.1.t direct evidence cannot 
be obtained from the results of the present investigationo 
It is clear that if increase in the facility with which 
controls are em·oloyed is to be investigated, some way 
r.lUst be found to discount ex-perience factors. In the 
present investigation, al thou.gh every at tempt was made to 
keep the material content of the tests uniform, and to 
attempt to guarantee its independence of special knoydedge 
or training, it has been shown that, even with such 
material, it is impossible to guarantee that the amount 
of uotentially revivable experience appropriate to 
rea~irements can be reasonably supposed to be approximately 
similar in every case. The reason why this is impossible 
is· to be attributed to the fact that the range of ages is 
too greato 
There is no material suitable for a series 
of productive controlled association tests of this 
nature where no increase in the amount of experience 
appropriate to requirements can be guaranteed Yvi th 
advancing/ 
advancing ase. Any specialised materials, such as 
g~ographical or literary names, have already been 
d1scarded on these grounds. Numbers cannot be used in 
the form or ~ontroll~d association tests with graded 
controls. .1ords anQ percepts must also be influenced 
by growth or experience. 
Thus, i~ tests embodying the nrincinle of 
graded controls are to be used, and if the eA~erience 
factors involved in such tests are to be disc~unted, 
there is no other way out or the difficulty than to 
restrict the test to ages \Vhere it may be :presumed that 
the amount of :potentially revivable exnerience is 
a:p:p~oximately the same for every subject. In a group of 
subJects of a restricted range of ages, anc1 of similar 
training, it would be possible to discount factors of 
ex:9erience and to take the correlation of age with 
controlled association as measuring more nearly a 
3;)ossible increase in the facility with which controls are 
employed. Further, the restriction of the test to 
certain ages would render the coefficient of correlation 
with intelligence more reliable, for the intervention 
of an accidental age factor would be far less liable to 
occur. Any age factor accidentally intervening in the 
calculation of the correlation of intelligence with 
controlled association will invalidate the correlation to 
a certain extent, because it vrill either introduce {a) 
a measure of the facility with which controls are 
employed {which is, as was seen, something other than 
the ability to employ controls) or (b) experience factors. 
Both of these must be eliminated in a reliable measure of 
the ability to employ controls. 
In conclusion, then, since it seems impossible 
to find material for the construction of controlled 
association tests which will not in traduce ex-_p eri ence 
factors into the calculation of the correlation of either 
age or intelligence \nth association, it vrill be necessary 
to restrict controlled association tests as a measure of 
intelligence to certain ages where 
(a) the amount of potentially revivable e::cperience may be 
supposed similar in ~uantity and QUality in all subjects 
tested, ancl 
(b) where speed of vrriting does not affect performance. 
Suggested Lines of Development o~ Test Series for further 
investigation of the Hypothesis. 
Since the points on which the present 
investigation has failed to give entirely satisfactory 
results/ 
results are to be explained by the inclusion of the 
selection tests, in the first place, the insufficient 
number of controls embodied, in the second nlace and 
~ ' the large range in the aces of the subjects to which the 
tests were applied, in the third place, the test series 
could be emended and developed along each of these lines. 
The h}~othesis could be further tested by a 
test series which 
(a) is restricted to production tests 
(b) embodies further and more comulex controls 
(c) is restricted to certain ages~ (l) excluding younger 
subjects ~nere speed of writing is an irr~ortant factor 
(2) excluding older subjects where the existence of more 
experience influences performanceo 
A series of tests on such lines should prove 
a reliable measure of intelligence for certain ages of 
subjects. It may be suggested, from scrutiny of the 
Men tal and Chronological age norms, that the most 
suitable age for the application of such a series of 
tests would be between twelve and fourteen years of age. 
In view of the fact that measurement of intelligence 
is often desired for these ages, the tests might prove 
of value and utility as a possible standard measure of 
intelligence (or of problem-solving ability) foi' these 
intensive ages. 
Even if intelligence is not identical with 
lJroblem-solving ability, the latter is worth testing 
for its own sake, for it is obvious that one reason 
why individuals are sub jectea_ to intelligence tests 
is the practical one that it is desirable to know 
what reasonable exnectation exists that they will prove 
able to solve the nroblems they are called upon to solve. 
.Appendix A. 
In tros-oecti ve Renorts o 
A questionnaire of the following nature 
was presented to each of the subjects who were individuallv 
tested and retested (3rd Preliminary Experiment) V 
(1) Did you find the performance of the tests easier 
this occasion than on the former occasion? ~dha t 
factors accounted for the difference (if any)? 
on 
(2} Did you find the tests with four conditions in every 
case four times more difficult than the tests with 
one condition? Did you notice any differences in 
individual ~ests with regard to this point? 
(3) State your method of selecting each example which 
fulfilled the conditions. For example, did you 
recall each one of the set of co ndi ti ons to mind 
before cancelling each item? 
(4) In the first Words test {Monosyllables) - and in the 
Perceytual test, ciid what came to mind in answer to 
the requirements fulfil all the necessary conditions, -
or did you find it necessary to examine the ideas 
which crune into your mind to find out whether they 
really did satisfy the given conditions? haa you any 
feeling of searching about anong irrelevant items 
for ·what was relevant to the conditions? 
(5) How often had you mental images of the things you 
wrote down? - e.go in the Perceptual test as compared 
to any other test? 
Some Tyrical answers to g.uestion (1). 
T'.ne majority of subjects replied that the tests 
seemed easier on the second occasion, because of their 
fruniliari ty vvi th the procedure, or bee ause theY 
remembered something of vt.o.at they had written before. 
i~o subject suggested that the actual performance was 
easier •. For example (1) 11 slightly easier. There was no 
greater ease in actual performance. It was rather because 
of a certain familiarity with the procedure". 
(2) "Easier because I remEmbered the kind of 
thing I had to do." 
(3) "lv'Iuch easier because (a) I knew what to 
expect/ 
expect and was subconsciously thinking about the test 
before I came for it (b) I had the last list of words 
I gave to fall back on." 
(4) "Some tests were easier because I had 
thought about them in between. \'iri ting down lists of 
words was more difficult." 
(5) "Much the same. l~urnbers tests were easier 
owing to recollection of conditions. I also remembered 
some words I gave in the '1~fords test before. 11 
(6) "Everything seemed perfectly fresh almost 
as though I had never done it before, but later I began 
to remember what I had -put down before. I felt I almost 
knew what they were but couldn't ouite remember them.tt 
(7) "I really don't think I found the tests 
any easier this time." 
(8) "I di:5_ not find the tests easier in any way. 11 
Question ::LI. 
95;; of the subjects declared it was not four 
times more difi'"'icul t to v10rk with four conditions than to 
work with one condition. It is interesting that 
several subjects stated explicitly that the four conditions 
seemed to become one complex condition. 
For example (1) nThe four conditions fell into 
one main condition in my mind. 11 
(2) nAs soon as I had understood each set of 
conditions I never thought of them separately." 
(3) "Tests with four conditions were certainly 
more difficult than tests •Hi th one co-ndition, but I did na 
find them four times more difficult.n 
( 4) "Tests with four conditions may have taken 
more time, but it wasn't a matter of a_iffi cul ty. 11 
( 5) nTes ts with four conditions were not more 
difficult in every case. In the numbers tests, ~Qe more 
conditions there were, the easier it seemed to be to tell 
at a glance what examples fulfilled them. The Letters 
test was the exact oppositeon 
(6) "Tests with four conditions were not four 
times/ 
times m~re dir'"'ficul t than tests vri th one cona_i tion, 
exce:pt 1.n the case of the lTumbers Tests vThere the 
difficulty was in :proportion to the mJ..mber of conditions." 
Question III. 
':'he ans\'iers to this c:ue s tion give evidence of 
the orgru1isation of all conditions into one comnlex 
condition. For exa.'1lple (1) "I did not remember each 
set of conch tions one by one, but all tor--:ether and as 
a whole." -
( 2) "I kept a notion of the conditions before 
my mind. It was not necessary to remember each one 
ex:plici tly." 
( 3) "I renembered the rules in a pat tern and 
applied that to each case." 
As to the I!l_ethod of selecting items, the 
followinz ty;o enswers are representative. 
{4:) nr.che r,lethod of selecting exam.ples fulfilline; 
one condition is obvious. For two conditions I looked to 
see if one \70.S ob served; similarly in the case of three 
or four concLitions, althouc;_,.'l. here the selection seemed 
rmch more intuitive." 
( 5) "I got a picture of what the thing wo-q_ld 
look like, and so dici not have to think of each condition 
separa telJ;-. 
The se last ansvvers seem to demonstrate very 
vrell what was referred to as the apprehension of the gap 
as specified meaning implicit l<:nowledge of the kind of 
thine; required. 
Q,uestion IV. 
Although many subjects failed to give an 
answer to the point on vvhich I was most anxious for 
information among those who did, there seemed a general 
agreement that -v'ihat came to mind was characterised by 
relevance. 
For example (1) "In the Words test, what came to 
mind first fulfilled the conditions. n 
(2) "I believe I wrote down all the ideas I 
thought of - probably because I seemed to have very few 
ideas/ 
ideas at all. I vras never conscious of searching 
about for words. They all seemed to be connected either 
by sound or by eye." 
(3) "In doing the \.'iords test at first there was 
no feelin~ of searching about maong words for the right 
ones. Analogy played an important part in this test and 
sometimes when analogy failed, a viTong word would come to 
mind, but the rejection was immediate." 
(4) "There was no searching about among a lot 
of things for the right ones. There was no irrelevant 
matter, and little relevant." 
Question V. 
This QUestion was not put so much with the idea 
of investigating imagery, as to discover whether any 
subjects would suggest by what means they did consider 
that ideas entered. their minds in answer to the 
consciousness of a problem. There was considerable 
disagreement. 
For eX82Tl})le (1) 11 I found_ all the white objects 
by imagery, but in the other tests I had no images." 
(2) "I always had images of nouns and 
adjectives in the 1.'i"ords tests, and in the Perceptual test.,, 
(3) 11 I had very vague images but I didn't know 
whether they were images or memory. I wondered at the 
time." 
(4) "Images were vague. I thinl<: I found 
everything by mental association of ideas~" 
(5) "I definitely found the items in the 
Perceptual Test by mental imagery. Some clear images 
of things fulfilling the conditions caQe to mind at 
once but after the first few again, I found it necessary 
to c~ll up images separately, for my mind was more or 
less blank. n 
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